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VALIDITY AND APPLICATION OF THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT AFTER CITY OF
BOERNE V. FLORES
INTRODUCTION

During this survey period, September 2000 to August 2001, the
Tenth Circuit grappled to define a standard for evaluating alleged violations of the First Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion.
The Tenth Circuit exhibited little difficulty in concluding that the Supreme Court's 1997 landmark case, City of Boerne v. Flores' invalidated
the highly controversial Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA" or
the "Act")2 only as it applied to state actions. In this regard, the court
aligned itself with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in holding that claims
alleging federal government violations of the Free Exercise Clause
should be held to the highest constitutional standard when brought under
RFRA.
The Tenth Circuit was less certain, however, of exactly how to apply the RFRA standard. On August 8, 2001, three different Tenth Circuit
panels released opinions involving challenges to the same federal regulation but arriving at very different conclusions. Cognizant of the inconsistencies among the results in these cases, the court vacated all three
decisions and ordered an en banc re-hearing to bring about consistency
within the circuit. The en banc hearing was held on January 15, 2002.
The regulation at issue in all three cases was an exception to two
federal laws that prohibit the possession and transportation of eagles and
eagle parts, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act7 ("BGEPA") and
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act8 ("MBTA"). The exception allows members of federally recognized Indian tribes to possess eagle feathers for
Indian religious purposes after obtaining a permit from the U.S. Fish and

1. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
2.
42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2001).
3. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
4.
Saenz v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir.
Aug. 18, 2001), vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam);
United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. 17702 LEXIS (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001),
vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199; United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) vacatedby Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199.
5. United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
6. See generally Saenz v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698
(10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2001), vacatedby United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam); United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 (10th Cir. Aug. 8,
2001), vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199; United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199.
7.
16 U.S.C. § 668(2001).
8.
16 U.S.C. § 703 (2001).
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Wildlife Service.9 In each of these cases, the federal government had
seized eagle feathers from individuals, who did not qualify for permits
because they were not enrolled in federally recognized tribes.' ° All three
individuals claimed eagle feathers were necessary for their religious
practices and challenged the permitting regulation as unconstitutionally
burdening their First Amendment free exercise rights." In one case, the
court invalidated the regulation.' 2 In the other two cases, the court upheld
it.1

Several factors contributed to the mixed results. One factor, which
is the central focus of this article, was whether courts must apply
RFRA's strict scrutiny standard to all free exercise claims or whether
4
they should apply the less rigorous Employment Division v. Smith standard, if none of the parties invoke RFRA.
These cases also raised important questions concerning the government's unique relationship with federally recognized Indian tribes,'" specifically, whether case law involving Indian trust and treaty rights mandates application of rational basis review to laws and regulations designed to benefit tribes and tribal members.'6 Some members of the court
9. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2002).
10.
See Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *2-3; Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17702, at *2-3; Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *24.
11.
See Saenz, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 at *34; Hardman, No. 99-4210,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 at *2-3; Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS at *24.
12. See Saenz, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *38.
13.
See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *71; Wilgus,, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS, at
*34.
14. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15.
On rehearing, several tribes submitted amiCus curiae briefs. Brief of Amici Curiae Ute
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210); Brief of Amici Curiae Hopi Tribe, United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d
1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210); Brief of Amici Curiae Jicarilla Apache Nation, United States
v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210); Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal
Society, United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4210).
16.
Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that these cases should be decided in the
context of Indian law, which is a "distinct field, with its own doctrines and traditions," independent
of broader legal, social and political concerns. See FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 220-28 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (describing the development of the
Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and its application as a limit on Congressional authority over Indians).
Cf John Celichowski, A Rough and Narrow Path: Preserving Native American Religious Liberty in
the Smith Era, 25 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (2001) (surveying Indian First Amendment/Free Exercise
claims before and after Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Antonia M. De Meo,
Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of
Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 808 (1995) (asserting Indian religious claims should be
analyzed under the Federal Indian Trust Doctrine because the Free Exercise Clause and the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act "fail to offer Native Americans effective religious
protection"); Matthew Perkins, The FederalIndian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle
ProtectionAct: Could Application of the Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L.
701, 701 (2000) (arguing "a valid trust doctrine argument remains to be made for Native American
religious freedom" against federal limitations on Indian use of eagle feathers and parts for religious
purposes). See generally David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof
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questioned whether the government had a compelling interest in conserving eagles and called for more fact finding on the issue. 7 Although
each of these issues merits in-depth discussion and analysis, they are
discussed here only to the extent that they influenced or were implicated
in the various panels' decisions on first hearing.
Part I of this article traces the jurisprudential history of what at least
one commentator has dubbed the "holy war" that has been raging since
the early 1960s over the appropriate standard for evaluating free exercise
claims.'" At the center of the debate is RFRA, which has drawn fire for
both its substantive content and the manner of its birth. 9 At stake is the
delicate balance between the First Amendment's protection of the individual's religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause and its protection of the national interest in maintaining separation of church and state
under the Establishment Clause.1 Also at issue is the scope of Congress's
legislative powers when they collide with the judiciary's long-established
authority to interpret the Constitution. 2' By placing RFRA in the context
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that preceded and followed the statute's
enactment, it becomes apparent why some have vilified RFRA as an
"unconstitutional grab for power" by Congress,22 while others remain
States' Rights, Color-BlindJustice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 340-61 (2001)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's use of Indian cases as a "crucible" to further a broader agenda under
which state interests prevail, rights of racial minorities fail and mainstream values are protected,
while undermining the "political relationship between the United States and self-governing tribes").
17. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *71
18.
Robert Hoff, Losing Our Religion: The Constitutionality of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Pursuant to Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 377, 377
(1998).
19.
See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994). In an early critique of
RFRA, Eisgruber and Lawrence argue the Act is substantively unconstitutional because it
"privileges" rather than "protects" religious practices and impermissibly favors religion over equally
important secular concerns. Id. at 447-61. They claim RFRA's "constitutional vices" are directly
associated with the Act's "origin as an attempt by Congress to undo the Supreme Court's
constitutional judgment." Id. at 444. They also expressed concern that Congress had exceeded its
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, foreshadowing a similar conclusion the
Supreme Court would reach later in City of Boerne. Id. at 460-69; see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507,
516-36 (1997) ("Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the
federal balance.").
20. Compare Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
Period, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 2-8 (1998) (arguing RFRA violates the Establishment Clause), with
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a Constitutional Expansion of
Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 632-34 (1998) (arguing the protection RFRA affords free
exercise is not incompatible with the Establishment Clause).
21.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 604, 606 (arguing that the Constitution sets the
"floor" for protected personal liberties which Congress may expand under its section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment). For the opposing view, see Hamilton, supra note 20 (arguing RFRA
violates Article V); Edward J.W. Blatnik, No RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act's FederalApplication in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores.98 COLUM. L. REV.
1410 (1998) (arguing RFRA violates Article V).
22. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 5.
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steadfast in their belief that RFRA was a legitimate expansion of rights"
that correctly imposed "the highest standard of constitutional protection
from one of the most important freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. , ,
Part II describes four Tenth Circuit decisions rendered during the
survey period which involved religious freedom claims, the first of
which established the continued viability of RFRA as applied to federal
government actions and the three other cases that illustrate the differing
perspectives within the court as to the constitutionality of the eagle
feather permitting regulation. Finally, Part III summarizes the questions
the Tenth Circuit identified for discussion in its order for rehearing en
banc.
I.BACKGROUND
A. In the Beginning, There Was Sherbert v. Verner 5 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder 6
The Brennan Court's 1963 decision in Sherbert was the first shot in
the war of constitutional standards, because it "marked the first time that
the Supreme Court applied the compelling interest test to a Free Exercise
Clause challenge to a generally applicable law. 23 In Sherbert, a Seventhday Adventist claimed South Carolina violated her First Amendment
right to free exercise of her religion by denying her request for unemployment benefits. 28 The woman's employer had fired her for refusing to
work on Saturday, which was the Sabbath Day of her faith. 29 Because the
claimant would not accept Saturday work, she was unable to find another
job and filed an unemployment benefits claim. 30 The state denied her
request for benefits based on a statutory provision that disqualified any
claimant who "failed, without good cause.., to accept available suitable
work."3 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the state's decision,
reasoning that the statutory disqualification placed no restriction upon
the claimant's religious freedom nor did it "prevent her in the exercise of

23. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 629-34.
24. Hoff, supranote 18, at 380.
25.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
27. See Hoff, supra note 18, at 380. The Court has made the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment applicable to states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 86-87
(1990)).
28. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401.
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 399-400.
31.
Id. at 401 (quoting S.C. Code § 68-114(3)(a)(ii)).
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her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with
the dictates of her conscience."32
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the state court's decision and ruled for the claimant.3 The Court held that to withstand the
claimant's constitutional challenge, South Carolina's decision to deny
unemployment benefits:
must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents
no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of [her]
religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest' in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate.34
Though the Court found the consequences of denying the claimant unemployment benefits to religious practices and principles "only an indirect result" of legislation that was "within the state's general competence
to enact," it held that where the "purpose or effect of a law" impedes a
religion or discriminates between religions, such a law "is constitutionally invalid., 35 Here, the government forced the plaintiff to choose between "following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits...
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work," which the Court held was "the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship. 36
The Court then found South Carolina failed to show "some compelling state interest" that would justify the "substantial infringement" of the
plaintiffs First Amendment right." In so doing, the Supreme Court also
noted "no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable
state interest would suffice," and "only the gravest abuses, endangering a
paramount [state] interest" would permit a limitation on an individual's
free exercise of religion.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder,39 which
further clarified the "compelling interest" standard by stating a "regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."0 The issue in Yoder was whether the
32.
Id. at 401 (citing Sherbert v. Vemer, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (S.C. 1962) overruled by
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (internal quotations omitted)).
33. Id. at 402.
34. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
35. Id. at 403-04 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
36. Id. at404.
37. Id.at 406.
38. Id. (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
39. Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
40.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
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State of Wisconsin, under its compulsory school-attendance statute,
could impose criminal penalties on Amish parents who refused to send
their children to school past the eighth grade.4 ' The Court said no, notwithstanding Wisconsin's argument that the requirement for school attendance to age 16 applied "uniformly to all citizens of the State and
[did] not, on its face, discriminate against religions or a particular religion" and was "motivated by legitimate secular concerns. ' 42
"
3
B. Court Redraws the Borders in Employment Division v. Smith

Almost three decades after Sherbert, the fortress of compelling interest surrounding free exercise came tumbling down in 1990 with the
Court's decision in Smith. The question in Smith was whether the Free
Exercise Clause permitted the State of Oregon to deny unemployment
benefits to Native Americans who were dismissed from their jobs for
using peyote during religious ceremonies." The Court said yes.45
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia went to great lengths to distinguish the circumstances in Smith from Sherbert and its progeny.46
Here, the Court distinguished between religious beliefs and "performance of (or abstention from) physical acts," particularly acts that violate
criminal laws.47 The Court also attempted to distance Smith from previous decisions by noting it had applied the Sherbert balancing test to invalidate generally applicable laws only when they involved the Free Exercise Clause "in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such
as freedom of speech and of the press."' Yoder, for example, was rationalized as presenting a "hybrid situation" in which "the interests of parenthood [were] combined with a free exercise claim." 9 The Supreme
41.
See id at 207.
42. Id. at 220.
43. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment; Blackmun, J., with whom
Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., join, dissenting).
44. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
45. See id. at 890.
46. See Getches, supra note 16, at 341-42 (analyzing Smith as an example in which the Court
used an Indian case as a "crucible" for promoting states' rights in ruling "states should not be
burdened with proving a compelling interest to enforce its laws every time someone claims to have
violated the law in the name of religion"). Getches suggests the unusual facts of this case, which
were "unlikely to be replicated in mainstream religious cases," provided the Court with a "vehicle
for changing First Amendment law and giving governments more latitude to regulate religious
practices that are contrary to mainstream norms." Id. Thus, even if the Court is not pursuing a
specifically anti-Indian agenda, its application of traditional First Amendment principles rather than
established Indian law doctrine effectively erodes and diminishes Indian rights. See id at 342.
47. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
48. See id. at 881.
49. See id. at 882 n. 1. But see Hoff, supra note 18, at 382-386 (agreeing with the conclusion
Congress would reach in its finding that compelling interest was "a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests"). Hoff
points to many of the same cases the Court cited in Smith as evidence of the Sherbert test's
effectiveness in rendering some laws invalid and others valid. Id. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 902
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Court went on to attack Sherbert directly by arguing its applicability had
been limited to "denial of unemployment compensation" cases, offhandedly dismissing cases that evidenced the contrary as only "purport[ing] to
apply" the Sherbert test.50 The Court further narrowed applicability of
Sherbert even in the unemployment benefits context to those situations in
which "the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, [which]
it may not refuse to extend ... to cases of 'religious hardship' without
compelling reason."5 '
In finally rejecting the compelling interest test, the Supreme Court
asserted that to do otherwise would "subvert its rigor in the other fields
where it is applied." 2 The Supreme Court also raised the specter of "anarchy" under the compelling interest test's presumption of invalidity
extended to every regulation of conduct that may be challenged given the
broad diversity of religious beliefs that could be burdened. 3
The significance of the majority opinion was not lost on other members of the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, who applied the Sherbert
compelling interest test to arrive at the same result as the majority, vigorously disagreed with Justice Scalia's analysis of precedent and the
majority's decision to reduce the standard of scrutiny." The three dissenting justices concurred with Justice O'Connor's reasoning when she
wrote:
The Court today gives no convincing reason to depart from settled
First Amendment jurisprudence. There is nothing talismanic about
neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions,
for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion. 55
Smith's effects in Free Exercise Clause cases "were immediately felt." 56
A firestorm of controversy ensued, provoking vehement criticism by
"impassioned commentators" 57 and "high-profile hearings [on Capitol
Hill] on Smith's 'evisceration' of free exercise rights." '

(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing post-Sherbert precedent has demonstrated "the courts have been
quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing state interests").
50. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
51.
See id. at 884.
52. Id. at 888.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 901.
55. Id.
56.
See Hoff, supra note 18, at 388-91 (arguing the new standard of scrutiny "virtually
eliminated any protection previously provided by the Free Exercise Clause").
57.
Id. at 378. See also Getches, supra note 16, at 341 n.323 (citing, e.g., John Delaney,
Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith,
25 IND. L. REV. 71, 72 (1991) (arguing that "minority religious claims will be held hostage to
majoritarian politics")); Roald Mykkeltvedt, Employment Div. v. Smith: Creating Anxiety by
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C. Congress Enters the Fray with RFRA5 9

Congress's response to Smith was unambiguous. In passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Congress clearly set its sight
on the Supreme Court's decision in Smith as "virtually eliminat[ing] the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion ....I" because neutral laws

could burden religious exercise "as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise." 6 ' Furthermore, Congress stated RFRA's purpose
was to:
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.
. and Wisconsin v. Yoder... and to guarantee its application in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to
provide a claim or defense to persons
62 whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
RFRA received almost unanimous Congressional support with all members of the House of Representatives
and all but three members of the
63
Senate voting for the Act.
Specifically, RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening the exercise of religion "even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability. . .. .64 The Act also allows individuals whose re-

ligious freedom has been burdened in violation of RFRA to "assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain relief
against a government." 65 The government may substantially burden free
exercise only when the government demonstrates that such a burden
furthers "a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 6 RFRA is
retroactive and far-reaching in scope, applying to all federal and state
statutory and judge-made law.67 In addition, RFRA expansively defines
Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. REV. 603, 631 (1991) (concluding "the degree to which various sects
will be free to exercise their religions will be determined by their political power and not by the
application of legal principles by a disinterested judiciary").
58. Blatnik, supra note 21, at 1411 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time for
Constitutional Amendment: The Limited Reach of City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 689, 689 (1998)).
59. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2001).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
61.
Id. at § 2000bb(a)(2).
62. Id. at § 2000bb(b).
63. Hoff, supra note 18, at 392 n.97.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- l(a).
65. Id. at § 2000bb-l(c).
66. Id. at § 2000bb-l(b).
67. See id. at § 2000bb-3(a) (stating "[tihis Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the
enactment of this Act enacted Nov. 16, 1993"). This language was in the 1993 Act, but reference to
"and State law" has been deleted by amendment. Id.
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"religious exercise" to encompass "any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief' including
"[tihe use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of
religious exercise.... 1168
Subsequently, parties raised RFRA claims in contexts from AIDS
and abortion to zoning. 69 For example, courts applied RFRA to invalidate
a school district policy that prohibited students from bringing ceremonial
knives to school; 70 portions of the federal Bankruptcy Code that allowed71
the government to recover funds that a debtor had tithed to a church;
and a grooming regulation that required Rastafarian correctional officers
to cut off their dreadlocks.7 ' RFRA claims, however, failed to invalidate
the Food and Drug Administration's refusal to mandate labeling of genetically modified foods;73 a zoning regulation that limited locations in
which churches could operate food banks and homeless shelters ;74 and
drug possession and trafficking charges against a "Church of Marijuana"
member.75
D. The Court Strikes Back with City of Boerne

76

The Supreme Court's reaction to RFRA was "[as] decisive as Congress's reaction to Smith ...
In City of Boerne, Justice Kennedy led
the majority in striking down RFRA - at least as the Act applies to state
and local governments - holding the Act "intruded into an area reserved
by the Constitution to the States. '78 At issue was a local ordinance and
historic preservation plan under which the City of Boerne denied a
Catholic church's application for a permit to enlarge its building.79
An argument more prominent than one based on federalism came
from the majority's assertion that Congress had invaded the judiciary's
turf, thereby violating separation of powers principles. 0 Indeed, the Supreme Court's opening round relied on the M'Culloch v. Maryland's

68.
Id. at § 2000cc-5(7). See § 2000bb-2(4) of RFRA (providing the term '"exercise of
religion' means religious exercise, as defined in section 2000cc-5 of this title").
69.
See generally Mary L. Topliff, Validity, Construction, and Application of Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996) (listing almost 200 topics in which RFRA
protections have been sought).
70. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 1995).
71.
See United States v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420
(8th Cir. 1996).
72. See Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
73.
See Alliance for Bio-integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D.D.C. 2000).
74. See Daytona. Rescue Mission v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1561 (M.D.
Fla. 1995).
75. See United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1509 (D. Wyo. 1995).
76. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
77.
Hoff, supra note 18, at 380.
78. City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 527.
79. Id. at 511-12.
80. See id. at 516.
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pronouncement that the "Federal Government is one of enumerated powers,"" immediately followed by Marbury v. Madison's declaration that
the legislature's defined and limited powers may not be mistaken, or
forgotten.82 These premises form the basis for "judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws[] in cases and controversies." 3
While acknowledging Congress's authority to enact legislation enforcing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion pursuant to section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court noted, "[a]s broad as
the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited."8
Here, the Court found Congress exceeded its limits by enacting legislation that lacked "congruence between the means used and the ends..
" because RFRA's legislative record lacked evidence of "modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious
bigotry." 85 Furthermore, the Court considered RFRA "so out of proportion to [the] supposed remedial or preventative objec[tivel ... that it...
appear[ed] instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections." 86 The Court specifically objected to RFRA's "[siweeping coverage [that] ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter. 8 7 In a rebuke of Congress, Justice Kennedy
asserted the judiciary's authority to define the parameters of constitutional rights:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is best preserved when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other branches.
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within
the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say
what the law is. When the political branches of the Government act
against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them
under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to control cases
and controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of
the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it
is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control. 88
Despite Justice Kennedy's clearly expressed hostility toward Congress' s enactment of RFRA, the extent to which the Court invalidated the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 516 (citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819)).
Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 176 (1803)).
Id.
City of Boeme, 521 U.S. at 518 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970)).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 532.
id.
Id. at 535-36.
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Act remains cloudy in that the opinion repeatedly refers to RFRA's impact on state laws. s9 In one such instance, the Court also makes clear that
it reduces the standard of review two notches below "compelling interest" to minimal scrutiny: "Even [assuming that a interpretation of RFRA
would] in effect.., mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching
judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation." 9
E. Post-City of Boerne Fallout
RFRA opponents elevated the significance of City of Boerne's separation of powers argument to posit the Supreme Court effectively invalidated RFRA in its entirety as applied to both state and federal law. 9'
Therefore, some courts and commentators viewed RFRA as dead. 92 But
93
those who read City of Boerne more narrowly - like the Tenth Circuit
concluded that RFRA still applies to federal government actions.94

89. See, e.g., id. at 533-34 ("The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved."
Requiring a "state [to] demonstrate a compelling interest and show that [it has adopted] the least
restrictive means of [achieving that]" interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional
law. (emphasis added)).
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
91.
See Hamilton, supra note 20, at I ("[Tihe message of Boerne is that RFRA is
unconstitutional under any scenario, whether it is applied to state or federal law."). Cf Blatnik, supra
note 21, at 1412-13 (asserting that the Court left "unanswered" RFRA's constitutionality in its
application to federal law, but arguing the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety for reasons other
than those set forth in City of Boerne).
92. See, e.g., Blatnik, supra note 21, at 1412 n.Il (citing cases in the Sixth Circuit, Seventh
Circuit, several district courts and bankruptcy courts which have rejected RFRA claims based on the
assumption that such claims are moot as a result of City ofBoerne); Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at
634 (implying RFRA's demise by suggesting Congress could "reenact the law" by showing that
neutral laws of general applicability do seriously burden religious freedom); Hoff, supra note 18, at
380 (stating the Court "struck down the statute" with no distinction between its applicability to state
versus federal law).
93.
See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (Holloway, J., concurring
and dissenting; Ebel, J., concurring) ("This court agrees ... with both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
in their conclusion that [City of Boeme] does not determine the constitutionality of RFRA as applied
to the federal government.") (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-33
(9th Cir. 1999); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59
(8th Cir. 1998)).
94.
See also, Blatnik, supra note 21, at 1413 n.12 (citing cases in the Fifth Circuit, Sixth
Circuit and several district courts asserting City of Boerne did not reach the issue of federal laws).
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II. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
95
A. Kikumura v. Hurley

1. Facts
Yu Kikumura was a federal prisoner, who had emigrated from Japan.96 Upon entering prison, he listed Buddhism as his religious affiliation to support his request for a special diet.97 Kikumura later became
acquainted with a Methodist minister, who had served as a missionary in
Japan and was familiar with Kikumura's spiritual culture.98 Kikumura
accepted the minister's offer to make pastoral visits. 99 However, prison
officials denied the minister's requests to visit Kikumura based on a
prison regulation that required (1) requests for pastoral visits be initiated
by the inmate; and (2) the member of the clergy be of the same faith as
that professed by the inmate.' °° Kikumura's administrative appeal was
denied.'0 ' Kikumura then filed a claim in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, asserting prison officials had violated his
religious beliefs under the First Amendment, as well as his right to equal
protection under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 0 2 In addition
to damages and permanent injunctive relief, Kikumura sought a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to compel prison officials to grant the request. 3 The district court denied both the preliminary
injunction and the temporary restraining order."" Kikumura appealed.'0 5
Because denial of a temporary restraining order was not reviewable, only
the preliminary injunction was subject to appeal.' 6
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In the Tenth Circuit, a preliminary injunction must be granted if the
movant demonstrates:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied;
(3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
Kikumura, 242 F.3cL at 953.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954.
Id.
Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 954.
Id.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id. at 955 n.2.
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other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is
not adverse to the public interest.'0 7
However, when a preliminary injunction would disturb the status quo,
the movant must satisfy a heightened burden of showing that the four
factors "weigh heavily and compellingly in his favor."'0 ' In reviewing
Kikumura's request for a preliminary injunction, the court applied the
heightened burden requirement. ' 09
a. RFRA Claim
The court's major conclusion is its most controversial in light of the
national debate over RFRA's applicability to federal government actions
in the post-City of Boerne era. Specifically, this Tenth Circuit panel was
unanimous in finding the district court erred when it concluded the Supreme Court in City of Boerne had declared RFRA unconstitutional in its
entirety and, therefore, Kikumura's RFRA claim had no likelihood of
success."0 Rather, the Tenth Circuit, aligning itself with the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits,"' held City of Boeme invalidated RFRA only as it applied
to state, but not federal government action." 2 Therefore, the court ordered
the district court to allow Kikumura the opportunity to provide evidentiary support for his RFRA claim on remand." 3
In reaching its conclusion, the panel implicitly overruled an earlier
unpublished Tenth Circuit case, which was among those the defendants
had used to support their argument that City of Boerne had rendered4
RFRA unconstitutional in its application to the federal government.1
The Tenth Circuit here asserted the "only issue" before the Supreme
Court in City of Boemne was "Congress's remedial powers to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against state and local authorities."' ' 5 "Because
Congress's ability to make laws applicable to the federal government"
does not depend on its Fourteenth Amendment, section 5 enforcement
power, the court reasoned, "the [City of Boerne] decision does not de107. Id. at 955. See also Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th
Cir. 1996).
108. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 955.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 958.
111.
Compare Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-33 (9th Cir.
1999), and Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59 (8th
Cir. 1998) (interpreting City of Boeme as invalidating RFRA only as applied to state actions), with
Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001), Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116
F. Supp. 2d 166, 180 (D.D.C. 2000), Combs v. Corrections Corp. of America, 977 F. Supp. 799, 801
(D.W.D. La. 1997), and In re Gates Cmty. Chapel of Rochester, Inc., 212 B.R. 220, 225-26 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1997) (interpreting City of Boerne as invalidating RFRA as applied to both state and
federal actions).
112. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958.
113. Id. at 961.
114. Id. at 958.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
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termine the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government."' 6 The court concluded, "[tihus, the separation of powers concerns
expressed in City of Boerne do not render RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the federal government.'",
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne did "mention" separation of powers concerns."' However, it
found in the context of the entire [City of Boerne] opinion that the Supreme Court raised these concerns only to the extent that RFRA could
not be considered remedial or preventative under the limits the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on Congress's enforcement power vis-a-vis
the states.' '9 By contrast, Congress's power to apply RFRA to the federal
government comes from Article I, which allows Congress to establish
standards for suits against the federal
government that are more protec2
tive than the Constitution requires. 0
After determining that the unconstitutional portions of RFRA that
applied to state government could be severed and did not alter RFRA's
structure or applicability to the federal government, the court found federal officials, such as the prison officials
here, within the class of defen2
dants subject to RFRA requirements. '
The panel, however, lacked unanimity in the application of RFRA'.
At issue was the provision that "[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion . . ." without compelling justification. '1 3 The majority held this requirement is a question of law for which
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie RFRA claim by proving, with evidentiary support, a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion.'24

116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 959.
118. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959.
119. Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 960.
122.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Ebel expressed disagreement with the majority only with
respect to whether Kikumura's allegations, even if supported by evidence, would establish a
"substantial burden" absent a more far-ranging inquiry into matters such as whether the defendants
would grant Kikumura pastoral visits by other Christian ministers whose counseling would be
substantially similar to that by the minister Kikumura requested. See id. at 966. Judge Ebel explained
that, "[b]ecause this is an intrinsically fact-based question, and there has been no opportunity for the
parties to develop these facts, I believe it is inappropriate for us to rule on the issue as a matter of
law at this time .... Since we are remanding anyway for a balancing analysis, I would also remand
to the district court for it to determine whether there is a substantial burden in the first instance,
without prejudging the issue." Id. at 966-67.
123. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 961-62.
124. Id. at 960-61 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479
n.l (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that a plaintiffs religious belief must be sincerely held)). But see supra
note 122.
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The court found, and the defendants did not challenge, that Kikumura was sincere in his beliefs.'25 The court also found Kikumura's request for pastoral visits were "protected activities"'' 26 within the expansive definition of "exercise of religion" Congress adopted in passing the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA").'27 When the district court considered Kikumura's claim,
RFRA defined "exercise of religion" as "the exercise of religion under
the First Amendment to the Constitution."'2 8 However, Congress had
since amended RFRA to incorporate the RLUIPA definition of "religious
exercise" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5, '299 which provides that religious exercise includes "any exercise, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief." Thus, the Tenth Circuit noted
Kikumura's expressed desire to study Christianity and practice Christian
prayer under the tutelage of a clergyman with missionary experience in
Japan satisfied the new RFRA definition of protected "exercise of religion" even though30 such pastoral visits were not required by Kikumura's
religious beliefs.'
The court, however, found insufficient evidence on record to support Kikumura's claim that denial of the pastoral visits constituted a
"substantial burden" on his exercise of religion as required for showing a
substantial likelihood of success on his RFRA claim.'3 ' The majority
(with Judge Ebel dissenting on this point only) did conclude, if Kikumura could provide evidentiary support sufficient to prove the allegations related to his "substantial burden" argument, "he will have satisfied
his prima facie burden.' 32 The burden will then shift to the defendants to
prove "application of the burden" to Kikumura is the "least
restrictive
33
means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest."'1
b. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim
In reviving Kikumura's RFRA claim, the Tenth Circuit effectively
breathed new life into RFRA as applied to the federal government within
the Tenth Circuit. The majority (with Judge Holloway dissenting), however, refused to revive Kikumura's First Amendment claim by agreeing
with the district court that he had not demonstrated a substantial likeli125. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 961.
126. Id. at 960-61.
127.
See id. at 960; Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc)
(hereinafter, "RLUIPA").
128. Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1999).
129. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 960; 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-2(4).
130. Kikunura, 242 F.3d at 960-61.
131.
Id. at 961.
132.
Id. But see supra note 122.
133.
Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 961-62; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(1)(b) ("Government may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person - (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest: and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.")
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hood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claim.' 3 The court
based its decision partly on the deference given prison officials when
evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims'35 and, more significantly,
13 6
based on the Supreme Court precedent under Turner v. Safley.
Under Turner, a prison regulation may not be "arbitrary or irrational" as evidenced by a valid, rational connection between a legitimate,
government interest and the regulation. 3 7 The court must also consider
whether readily available, alternative means exist for the inmate to exercise the asserted constitutional right, as well as the extent to which accommodating the inmate's right might affect guards, other inmates and
prison resource allocation.'3 8 Here the court found the prison regulation
that allowed pastoral visits only when the prisoner initiates the request
was sufficiently related to the prison's goals of allowing pastoral visits
while limiting the overall number of visits and preventing abuses of the
system. 39 Thus, as a matter of law, the regulation was not "arbitrary or
irrational,"' ° particularly given the deference courts must give prison
regulations that attempt to balance prisoner rights with legitimate penological concerns. 4 ' Kikumura had to demonstrate that no "obvious,
easy alternatives" to pastoral visitation existed.'4 2 The court ruled that he
failed this test, suggesting that correspondence would be a possible alternative to pastoral visitation.'4 3 Accordingly, the majority held the district
court did not commit a legal error or abuse its discretion in concluding
Kikumura failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on his First
Amendment claimi4
c. Dissent
In dissent, Judge Holloway disagreed with the majority's analysis of
Kikumura's First Amendment claim.'4 5 Specifically, Judge Holloway
argued limitations on the number and frequency of pastoral visits would
be an obvious alternative to the "unjustified" use of an inmate's religious
identification to "restrict to that one faith those from whom pastoral vis134. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 956. But see infra Part c (summarizing Judge Holloway's dissent).
135.
Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 956 (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)
(holding that courts cannot substitute their judgment on matters of institutional administration for
prison officials' determinations, even when First Amendment claims are made)).
136.
Id. at 956 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests")).
137. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 90.
138. Id. at 90-91.
139. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 957.
140. Id.
141.
Id.
142. Id. at 957-58 (citing Turner, 482 U.S at 90).
143. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
144. Id. at 958.
145.
Kikurnura, 242 F.3d at 964.
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'
its or counseling is permitted" and to ban "all other pastoral visitors."' 6
For that reason, Judge Holloway found the prison's regulation too broad
and not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest.14 7 Accordingly, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Kikumura
had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on his First
Amendment claim.'4 8 However, he agreed with the majority that, on remand, the district court should provide Kikumura the opportunity to
prove his allegation that the requested clergyman was well suited to provide him religious assistance.' 9 In agreeing with the majority that Kikumura should be allowed to provide evidentiary support for his RFRA
claim, Judge Holloway stated the defendants also should be allowed to
present any showing they may have on security issues they claim were
involved. 5 °

B. The "Indian Tribal Use" Exception Cases
On August 8, 2001, just five months after Kikumura, the Tenth Circuit simultaneously issued three opinions in cases involving individuals
charged with violating federal laws prohibiting the possession of eagle
feathers - Saenz v. Department of the Interior, United States v. Hardman and United States v. Wilgus. 5 ' In all three cases, the court found the
individuals were practitioners of Native American religions that purportedly required the use of items with eagle feathers. 5 2
The federal laws at issue were the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act ("BEGPA") ' 3 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA").' 1 Both
acts prohibit, inter alia, the possession and transportation of eagles and
eagle parts unless permitted to do so under the so-called "Indian tribal
use" provisions of the federal "Eagle Permits" regulation.'" The exception requires applicants to provide the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(the "FWS") with "certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is

146. Id.
147.
Id.
148. Id. at965.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 966.
See Saenz v. Dep't of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir.
151.
Aug. 18, 2001), vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam);
United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. 17702 LEXIS (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001),
vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199; United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) vacated by Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199.
Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *12; Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. 17702, at *2;
152.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *4.
153.
16 U.S.C. § 668 (2001).
154.
16 U.S.C. § 703 (2001).
155. Id.; 16 U.S.C § 668; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2002).
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federally recognized"'5 6 and that the applicant be "an Indian who is
authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies."' 57
1. Saenz v. Departmentof the Interior'
a. Facts
The Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians was recognized as a tribe by
the federal government until 1886, when the Chiricahua reservation was
dissolved in the wake of warfare between the Apache and the United
States. 5 9 Joseluis Saenz was a descendent of the Chiricahua, whose religious practices required the use of eagle feathers.'6r In 1996, pursuant to
the BGEPA, 16' New Mexico state officials seized and sent to the FWS
eagle feathers from Saenz's home because he did not have a permit
authorizing him to possess them. 162 The BGEPA authorized the Secretary
of the Interior (the "Secretary") to permit the taking, possession and
transportation of eagles and eagle parts under specified circumstances,
including "for the religious practices of Indian tribes.' '

63

After failing to

get the items back through administrative proceedings, Saenz sought
their return by filing a motion in district court for return of his
property.i 64 Saenz argued he had a right to possess eagle feathers under
BGEPA, asserting claims under RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
Equal Protection Clause. 6 5 The district court granted Saenz's motion
based "solely on the BGEPA and RFRA" without reaching the constitutional issues.' 66 The government appealed.
b. Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the government stipulated Saenz was a Chiricahua Indian and sincere practitioner of the Chiricahua Apache Indian religion. 67
Even though the government also agreed that the BGEPA substantially
burdened Saenz's religious beliefs, it argued "restricting eagle permits to
members of federally-recognized Indian tribes is the least restrictive
means of furthering the government's compelling interests . . .in eagle
156.
The definition of "tribe" and significance of federal recognition is a highly complex and
sensitive issue beyond the scope of this article. See generally COHEN, supra, note 16 at 3-27
(discussing "tribe" and "Indian" as an ethnological classifications and as a legal-political
designations, and the significance of these distinctions in different legal contexts).
157.
50 C.F.R. § 22.22.
158. No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id.
161. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2001).
162. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *2-3.
163. Id. at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668a).
164. Id. at *3.
165. Id.
166. Id.at*9.
167. Idat*13.
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313

conservation and fulfilling its treaty obligations to Indian tribes under
RFRA." '68 The Tenth Circuit, like the court below, analyzed Saenz's request for return of the eagle feathers under RFRA without specifically
addressing his constitutional claims under the Free Exercise and Equal
Protection clauses. 69 However, in an opinion written by Judge Kelly, the
Tenth Circuit
ruled in Saenz's favor and declared the regulation uncon70
stitutional.
The court first rejected the government's assertion that Saenz lacked
standing to challenge the permit process because "he failed to actually
apply for a permit.' 7 ' The court reasoned that the regulation restricts
permits to members of federally-recognized Indian tribes and contains no
provision for discretionary waivers.' 72 Therefore, it would have been "futile" for Saenz to apply for a permit notwithstanding "credible proof that
he is Indian and uses eagle feathers as an essential part of the exercise of
an Indian religion.' 73 "The law recognizes . . . that a plaintiff need not
make costly futile gestures simply to establish
standing, particularly
' 74
when the First Amendment is implicated.'
Using the test set forth in Kikumura, the court found Saenz had established a prima facie free exercise claim under RFRA by showing the
government had "(1) substantially burdened (2) a sincerely-held (3) religious belief.' 75 The burden then shifted to the government to "demonstrate that the challenged regulation furthers a compelling state interest in
the least76 restrictive manner," as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1).1

Il(b)(

With respect to the government's asserted interest in fulfilling trust
and treaty obligations, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court
below that trust and treaty obligations generally encompass "a duty to
tribal government and a need to acknowledge tribal sovereignty.' 7 7
However, it then argued, the central issue in this case was "the rights of
an individual, not as against tribal governments, but as against the United

168. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *12-13.
169.
Id. at *13.
170.
J. McKay and J. Murphy also sat on this panel.
171.
Id. at *14. But see United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
defendant Indians' failure to apply for a permit precluded their challenge to the manner in which the
BGEPA was applied, but preserving their facial challenge of the statute and the "Indian tribal use"
exception under RFRA). Hugs is discussed more fully infra Part H.C.
172. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *15.
173. Id.
174.
Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming Control
Bd., 172 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 1999).
175.
Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *15 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950,
960 (10th Cir. 2001).
176. Id. at *16.
177. Id. at *21-22.
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States.' 7' The court also looked to legislative history as an indication
that Congress intended to balance the "conservation purposes of the stat9
'7
ute" against the "special cultural and religious interests of Indians.'
Thus, the government failed to prove a compelling interest
in fulfilling
0
trust and treaty obligations with respect to the BGEPA.
Significantly, the Tenth Circuit questioned the district court's finding that the government had a compelling interest in eagle
conservation. 8 ' However, the court declined to decide on this issue as
"unnecessary" to its disposition of this case, because of its conclusion the
government was not furthering its interest - even if it were compelling by the 8"least
restrictive means," pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb2
1(b)(2).'
The government argued restricting permits to members of federallyrecognized Indian tribes satisfied the "least restrictive means" test for
four reasons."'
The first reason was "allowing all persons of Indian heritage to possess eagle feathers, without regard to membership in a recognized tribe,
would undermine the United States's obligations to recognized tribes."'
Because the court had already ruled the government failed to prove its
treaty interests in the context of this case were compelling, this reason
could not be used to justify the permit system.'
The government's second argument was that its interest in protecting eagles would be harmed because "significantly increasing the number of persons authorized by law to possess eagle parts and feathers...

-,

178.
Id. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit specifically declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit,
which had held that the government had a compelling interest in fulfilling its treaty obligations based
on an analysis that the BGEPA was "meant to be a substitute for tribes' abrogated hunting treaty
rights." Id. at *19 (citing Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)). Although the
Supreme Court has held the BGEPA abrogated Native American hunting rights, the purpose of the
"Indian tribes" exception was for "religious" not "hunting" purposes in consideration of the Indians'
"special cultural and religious interests." See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743-45 (1986).
179.
Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *20-21.
180.
Id. at*22.
181.
Id. at *22-23. Though the court acknowledged case law "seems to support this
proposition," it contended the government's "alleged" interest in eagle conservation "existed without
evidentiary analysis," noting the golden eagle was not endangered and the FWS had proposed the
bald eagle be removed from the endangered species list. Id. at *22-23, *23 n.8 (citing Gibson v.
Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1999), affid, 223 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237,
1241 (D. Ore. 1996); United States v. Thirty Eight (38) Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp.
269, 276-77 (D. Nev. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Rupert v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 35 (lst Cir. 1992) (finding the government has a "legitimate
governmental interest" in "protecting a dwindling and precious eagle population").
182.
Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *23.
183.
Id. at *25, *31.
184.
Id. at *25.
185. Id. at *26.
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would likely lead to increased numbers of illegal kills and increased reliance on a black market for eagle parts.' 86 The court shot down this argument for lack of proof that illegal killings would increase or that a
black market for eagle parts even existed. 8 7 Arguably, the court stated,
"opening up the permit process to all Native Americans... would decrease the number of illegal eagle kills and black market transactions...
[because] a Native American who is not a member of a federallyrecognized tribe has no method . . . of obtaining
88 eagles for religious
ceremonies other than through the black market.',
The government also asserted equal protection concerns.' 9 Specifically, opening up the permit process to all Native Americans would rely
on an "impermissible racial classification."' The government based its
argument on the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Morton v. Mancar'9 ' that found membership in a federally-recognized tribe was "political in nature rather than racial in nature.' 92 The Saenz court distinguished the context for the Morton ruling as "solely concerned with
tribal sovereignty" from Saenz's case as "dealing with an individual's
free exercise rights."' 93 The court went on to note that even the government admitted "there may be occasions when it is defensible for the goveminent to rely on ancestry in determining a person's status as an Indian."'' 94 In concluding "this is one of those occasions," the court pointed
to certain federal educational and employment programs as examples
that allow for a broader definition of "Indian" that includes Native
Americans who are not members of federally-recognized tribes.' 95 The
court also noted "federal policy toward recognition of Indian tribes has
been by no means consistent with 'real' ethnological principles."' 6 Congress has frequently consolidated distinct tribes for recognition purposes,
divided tribes into more than one separately recognized group, terminated some tribes' federal recognition (e.g., the Chiricahua Indians) and

186. Id. at *25.
187. Id. at *29.
188.
Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *31. By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in
upholding the validity of the "Indian tribal use" exception, emphasized that opening up the permit
process would increase the burden on the religious practices of members of federally recognized
tribes. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2000); discussion infra Part III, C.
189. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *31.
190. Id. at *32.
191.
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
192.
Id. (citing Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (holding that a BIA employment preference
applies to applicants who are members of federally recognized tribes, not as a discrete racial group,
but as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities)). See also COHEN, supra note 16, at 3-27.
193. Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *32-33.
194. Id. at *33.
195. Id. at *33-34.
196.
Id. at *35-36 (quoting Christopher A. Ford, Executive Prerogatives in Federal Indian
Jurisprudence: The Constitutional Law of Tribal Recognition, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 141, 156
(1995)).
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restored federal recognition for others.' 97 On the one hand, the government made federal recognition impossible for the Chiricahua tribe, while
on the other hand, it "wants to use that same lack of recognition to infringe upon Mr. Saenz's religious freedom. We refuse to base Mr.
Saenz's free exercise rights on such tenuous ground."' 98
The court was especially unsympathetic to the government's final
argument that expanding the permit program to encompass all Indians
would make it "administratively unfeasible." '99 The court noted, the
BGEPA permit system exception had operated for at least eleven years
after the Secretary first issued the "Indian tribal use" exception and possibly for as many as eighteen before the government imposed the "federally-recognized" requirement. 2°° The court, again, pointed to other federal
programs for Native Americans that do not require participants belong to
federally recognized tribes as additional evidence that the government is
able to allocate limited resources among a broader pool of applicants. 20 '
The court's bottom line was membership in a federally-recognized
tribe "bears no relationship whatsoever to whether or not an individual
practitioner is of Indian heritage by birth, sincerely holds and practices
traditional Indian religious beliefs, is dependent on eagle feathers for the
expression of those beliefs, and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. 2

2

20
2. United States v. Hardman

3

a. Facts
Raymond Hardman had practiced a Native American religion for
many years. 2°4 He lived in Neola, Utah, within the boundaries of the
Uintah and Ouray Ute Reservation.205 Although his ex-wife and children

were enrolled members of the federally recognized S'Kallum Tribe,
Hardman himself was not of Native American descent. 2 6 In 1993, in the
course of a religious ritual, a Hopi tribal religious leader gave Hardman a
bundle of prayer feathers, including golden eagle feathers, to keep in his
truck which he had used to transport the body of his son's godfather to
religious services in Arizona. 2 7 After Hardman returned to his home, he

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at *35-36.
Id. at *37.
Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *37-38.
Id. at *5 n.2, *38.
Id. at *38.
Id. at *38-39.
No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).
Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"contacted the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources in order to obtain a
permit to possess the feathers," but was told he could not apply because
he was not a member of a federally recognized tribe. 208
In 1996, Hardman's estranged wife told Ute tribal officials Hardman possessed golden eagle feathers without a permit. 2°9 Subsequently,
Hardman surrendered the feathers, under protest, to a Ute tribal fish and
game officer, who was cross-commissioned as a federal law enforcement
agent.20 On March 10, 1997, Hardman was issued a violation notice for
possessing golden eagle feathers without a permit pursuant to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"). 21' Almost two years later, a magistrate judge convicted Hardman of violating the MBTA and imposed a
small fine.2 2 A district court23 affirmed Hardman's conviction, and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit. 1
b. Tenth Circuit Opinion
As in Saenz,1 4 the government argued Hardman had no standing
because he never actually applied for a permit. 25" However, the Tenth
Circuit held Hardman's "good faith effort to do so" was sufficient to
establish standing.1 6
Once again, as in Saenz, the tougher question was what standard to
apply to the regulatory requirement that permits could only be issued to
members of federally recognized tribes. 217 Hardman raised Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause challenges to the permit criteria in the
MBTA and its implementing regulation which states: "(1) that the person
be an actual practitioner of a bona fide Native American religion requiring the use of migratory bird feathers, and (2) that the person be a member of a certain political classification, i.e., a member of a federally recognized tribe.",28' Hardman argued both qualifications should be subject
to and would fail strict scrutiny. 2 9
i.Free Exercise Claim: Revisiting RFRA and Smith

208. Id.
209. Id. at *2-3.
210. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *3.
211.
Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2001).
212. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *3.
213. Id.
214. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 18,2001).
215. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *4.
216. Id.
217.
Id. at *6-7; see also Saenz v. Dep't of Interior, no. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2001).
218. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2002)).
219. Id. at *7.
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Judge Tacha, writing for the majority,22 ° first addressed the question
of whether to apply the RFRA standard of review even though Hardman
had not raised RFRA.22 The court acknowledged that Congress intended
to overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause as set forth in Smith, and also acknowledged that, under its own
decision in Kikumura, RFRA created a "valid statutory 'standard for
suits against the federal government.'

' 222
,

The court then concluded "a

RFRA claim for relief from federal burdening of religion is clearly distinct from a First Amendment claim for identical relief," labeling the
latter a "constitutional free exercise claim" subject to the Smith
standard.223 Although the Tenth Circuit had previously applied the RFRA
standard to a First Amendment claim, "even when it was not raised by
the parties, '224 it declined to do so here.2
In applying the Smith standard, the court posited two questions: (1)
"does a generally applicable law containing an accommodation for a
specific religious group ... violate the Smith requirement of neutrality";
and (2) if "non-neutral, does the fact that the accommodation is for a
Native American religion trump the generic rule, thereby requiring
226 only
the application of a rational basis test, rather than strict scrutiny?,

With respect to the first question, the court responded in the affirmative. 7 Thus, the court found that, although the MBTA without the
exemption is "clearly neutral ' 228 with the secular purpose of protecting
eagles, "its attendant regulations for practitioners of Native American
religions" rendered it in violation of the Smith neutrality standard.229
However, the court stated its holding was not "dispositive of the neutrality analysis in this case..." because Harding's religion did not prevent
him from complying with the permitting regulations. 230 Rather, his non-

membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe, a "political classification render[ed] him . . . in violation of the statute. " 23' Because the court
had "no difficulty" finding neutrality forbids "religious accommodations
contingent on membership in a particular political subdivision," it held

220. Also on this panel were J. Henry, concurring, and J. McKay, dissenting. Id. at *2.
Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *7.
221.
Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and
222.
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (2001), and mentioning City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997)).
223. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at *10 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995)).
225. Id. (refusing to "transform [Hardman's] constitutional claim into a statutory one").
226. Id. at *12.
227. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *12.
228. Id. at *13 n.3.
229. Id. at *35-36.
230. Id. at *36.
231.
Id.
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both qualifying requirements of the permitting process violated Smith's
neutrality prong.232
With respect to the second question, the Tenth Circuit responded in
the negative.233 The court specifically rejected the rationale adopted by
the First Circuit in upholding the same regulation pursuant to an Establishment Clause challenge.] In Rupert v. Director, United States Fish &
Wildlife Service,233 the First Circuit held that "where the government has
treated Native Americans differently from others in a manner that arguably creates a religious classification," the First Amendment is not violated because of "Congress's historical obligation to respect Native
American sovereignty and to protect Native American culture.2 3 6 The
Tenth Circuit found the First Circuit's analysis inapplicable to Hardman's free exercise claim, because the First Amendment's "two religion
clauses protect different values, and because they require different things
from the government.3 37 Rupert concerned the government's inability to
"maintain strict non-entanglement with religion when it was exercising
its trust duties toward Native American tribes., 238 By contrast, in analyzing Hardman's situation, the Tenth Circuit found the Free Exercise
Clause is concerned with "protecting individual religious freedom" so
that the "Free Exercise Clause cannot be trumped by the guardian-ward
relationship between the government and Native American tribes. 239
Thus, the court concluded First Amendment strict scrutiny applied and
required the regulation be "justified by a compelling governmental
inter'2
est and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 40
Contrary to the Saenz panel, this Tenth Circuit panel found that the
United States had compelling interests sufficient to save the regulation. 4
The court distinguished the MBTA from the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act ("BGEPA") 2 2 in that the former implements treaty
agreements between the United States and Mexico, which the court
found created a compelling governmental interest in "enforcing its treaty
obligations.. .,,14 Although this panel found the government's interest in
protecting Native American culture and religion was inapplicable to the
analysis that lead to its use of the strict scrutiny test, it noted that this
interest - the same interest the Saenz panel found uncompelling - also
232. Id. at *37.
233. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *12.
234. Id. at *40-41.
235.
957 F.2d 32(1st Cir. 1992).
236. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *40 (quoting Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34-35).
237. Id. at *48.
238. Id. at *49.
239. Id.
240.
id. at *49-50 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-32, 546 (1993)).
241.
Id. at *55.
242.
16 U.S.C. § 668a (2001).
243. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *50-52.
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was sufficiently compelling to justify the burden on Hardman's free exercise of his religion.2"

ii. Establishment Clause Claim
Because the court had already determined the permitting process
survived strict scrutiny in its free exercise analysis, it concluded it did
not need to decide whether the regulation should be subject to the rational basis or strict scrutiny review in the Establishment Clause
context.245 However, in dicta, the court noted that, where a denominational preference exists, strict scrutiny applies,2" but also acknowledged
the "unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal government
and Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of church
and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment., 247 The court also
stated the government could not apply "conventional separatist understandings of the establishment clause" to that relationship. 248
c. Dissent
Judge McKay, who also sat on the Saenz panel, dissented.249 He disagreed with the majority's characterization of RFRA "as a statutory
cause of action separate from a constitutional claim.""25 Rather, McKay
wrote that RFRA is a "required statutory supplement to those constitutional claims.""n In this regard, RFRA strict scrutiny applies to all free
exercise challenges to federal government actions even if not raised by
any of the parties.252
Judge McKay acknowledged that the First, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had held that the Indian tribal use regulation survived strict scrutiny, but declined to follow their precedent. 253 Despite his belief that the
federal government, as a matter of law, has a compelling interest in accommodating Native Americans' religious practices, Judge McKay
wrote, "it is not at all obvious to me that this interest leads to the conclu-

244.
Id. at *54-55. Significantly, in light of the holding in Saenz, this panel stated it did not
later under 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 such as whether a
reach "more specific questions which may arise
bona fide Native American who is not a member of a federally recognized tribe may constitutionally
be excluded from the exemption." Id. at *55 n.21.
245. Id. at *58.
246. Id. at *56 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
247.
Id. (quoting Peyote Way Church of God, Inc., v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
248. Id.
249. Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *63.
250. Id. at *68.
Id.
251.
252. Id.
253.
Id. (citing Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hugs, 109
F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997); Rupert v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1992)).
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sion that the government may draw distinctions between adherents to the
same religion and practices."
Judge McKay's dissent also echoed the Saenz panel in questioning
whether sufficient evidence existed to support the government's claim of
a compelling interest in protecting eagles. 5 He rejected the majority's
finding that the government had a compelling interest in fulfilling its
treaty obligations under the MBTA.256 Though the treaty authorizes the
government to enact regulations for distributing eagle parts, Judge
McKay argued, such regulations "must comply with the Constitution." 7
He concluded that the record was not adequately developed to determine whether the government's interest in protecting eagles was compelling, and if so, whether it was sufficiently compelling to "require discrimination among adherents to the same religion."' 8 Judge McKay
stated additional fact finding on this issue was needed to determine
whether the regulatory scheme satisfied "either the narrowly tailored or
the least restrictive means tests" for achieving any government interest
"so compelling as to justify the denial of free exercise of religion."5 9
26
3. United States v. Wilgus 0

a. Facts
Samuel Ray Wilgus, Jr., like Hardman, was a non-Indian who was a
"bona fide adherent of a Native American religion.26 Possession of eagle
feathers was central to his beliefs and practices. 262 In June 1998, a Utah
Highway Patrol officer stopped a pick-up truck in which Wilgus was a
passenger and discovered a box containing 137 feathers from bald and
golden eagles.2 63 Wilgus admitted he possessed the feathers and others
subsequently seized from his home by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. 264 Wilgus was charged with violating the BGEPA because he did
not have a permit. 265 He entered a conditional guilty plea, which permitted him to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss
the indictment in which he asserted violations of the First Amendment's
religion clauses.2

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at *68-69.
Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *69.
Id. at *70.
Id.
Id. at *71.
Id.
No. 00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001).
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *4.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *3.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
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b. Tenth Circuit Opinion
Judge Ebel,267 writing for the majority, raised the threshold issue of
whether RFRA always applies in free exercise cases even when, as here,
it is not raised on appeal.268 After acknowledging the split among the circuits on this question, the court declined to apply RFRA - notwithstanding a finding that the regulation substantially burdened Wilgus's religious freedom - based on the rule that "an appellant must raise the issues
upon which he seeks [the] court's review. 2 69 Where Judge McKay's dissent in Hardman found RFRA "by its own language ... applies 'in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened, ' '2 70 the
Wilgus majority argued that "[h]ad Congress desired... courts to apply
RFRA in all free exercise cases ... it would have written RFRA unambiguously to achieve that purpose. 2 7 '
i. Free Exercise Claim
Like the Hardman majority, the majority in Wilgus applied the
Smith standard, but reached a different conclusion. 2 In this instance, the
court relied largely on Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, for guidance to determine whether the BGEPA is neutral and
generally applicable.2 7 1 "Neutrality," the court noted, is a "subjective
inquiry into the purpose or object of a law," while "general applicability"
274
is an objective inquiry as to its scope.
Because the BGEPA's purpose was protecting eagles, the court held
it was neutral despite its exceptions for Indian religious and other purposes such as scientific exhibitions, which do "not change the
[BGEPA's] purpose., 27" Even if the Indian tribal use exception was examined separately, the court found the law would not violate the neutrality principle because the object and purpose is to permit members of federally recognized tribes to use eagle feathers in their worship, not to prohibit non-Indians from doing So.276 The court asserted that a fundamental
difference exists between laws having the purpose to accommodate religious practices and those that prohibit or burden religion.277 By analogy,

267. Also on this panel were J. McWilliams, concurring, and J. Baldock, dissenting. Id. at *2.
268.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, *6-7.
269. Id. at *9 (citing Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 1995)).
270.
United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 at *67 (10th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1)).
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at * 10-11.
271.
272. Id. at *12-15.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *12-15 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu
273.
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 533 (1993)).
274. Id. at *14.
275. Id. at *15-16 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668a).
276. Id. at *16.
Id. at *16-17. When a generally applicable statute incidentally burdens religion, recent
277.
Supreme Court decisions suggest legislative attempts to relieve such government-imposed burdens
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Judge Ebel explained that if he permits his daughter to drive his car, his
purpose is not to prohibit his son from driving the car "even if that is the
practical effect." 278 Though exceptions made for certain religious groups
may support a conclusion that a "covert purpose of a legislative scheme
is to discriminate. . . 'adverse
279 impact will not always lead to a finding of
impermissible targeting.'
Although the Supreme Court had defined a neutral law as one that
neither burdened nor benefited religious conduct, here, the Tenth Circuit
applied a narrower definition that looked only to whether the regulation
at issue burdened religious practice. 280 The court employed a textual
analysis comparing the word "prohibiting" in the Free Exercise Clause
281
with the "more general word 'respecting' in the Establishment Clause .
Thus, in applying the narrower view of neutrality, the court concluded
that the BGEPA is neutral because the purpose of the law's exceptions is
to "benefit members of federally recognized Indian tribes ... and not to
burden anyone., 2s' The court buttressed its conclusion that the BGEPA
was neutral by asserting the Indian tribal use exception was designed to
benefit a political group rather than a racial or religious group, citing
several examples in which federal law has recognized Indians' special
281
status as a permissible political classification.
The court also found the BGEPA satisfied the "objective half of the
argued general applicability does not mean
Smith analysis. ' 284 The court
"universal applicability. '251 "Rather, 'general' should be given its customary meaning of 'widespread,' 'predominant' or 'prevalent,' admit[ting] the possibility of some minor exceptions or deviations. 286 Because the BGEPA's proscription against possessing eagle feathers is a

on free exercise are "permissible accommodations" that do not offend the Establishment Clause. See
Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act, 17 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & L. 185, 191 (1996).

278. Id. at *17.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *18-19 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu
279.
Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535). Wilgus notes that a city's general prohibition against ritual animal
slaughter constituted "an impermissible attempt to target" a specific church's religious practices). Id.
at *18 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535).
280. Id. at * 19-22 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 532).
id. at *22.
281.
282. Id. at *24.
Id. at *25-28. (quoting Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
283.
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) ("[Tihe peculiar semi-sovereign and constitutionally
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment..."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552
(1974) ("Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes . . . single out for special
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians."); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977)
("[Federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes . . . is not based upon impermissible racial
classifications...").
284. Id. at *28.
285.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *30.
286. Id.
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prohibition imposed on "almost all of society," the court found it fits
squarely within its definition of generally applicable.287
By applying the Smith standard to find the BGEPA both neutral and
generally applicable rather than RFRA's more rigorous compelling interest test, the court avoided the necessity of evaluating the strength of the
government's interests. The court also dismissed what it referred to as
the "'Sherbert exception,"' arguing that its mandate to apply strict scrutiny to individual exemptions in the post-Smith era applies only to unemployment compensation cases.288 Thus, the BGEPA "falls within the
Smith safe harbor" and does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, "de'
spite its incidental effect on Wilgus's religious practice."289
ii. Establishment Clause Claim
Wilgus also argued the BGEPA violated the Establishment Clause
by creating "impermissible denominational and racial preferences" by
permitting members of federally recognized Indian tribes to possess eagle feathers but denying him that privilege. 290 The court, again, looked to
precedent recognizing the unique relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. It determined that the government need only
show that the special treatment the BGEPA bestows on Native Americans is "rationally related to the government's extraordinary duty to Indians." 29' Here, in contrast to Saenz, the court concluded that the "Indian
tribal use" exception to the BGEPA was "rationally related to the government's
unique obligation to preserve Indian tribes' heritage and cul29 2
ture.9
c. Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Baldock disagreed with the majority's application of Smith. 293 He argued that the majority unjustifiably
ignored RFRA's "heightened legislative standard," against which Congress "undoubtedly intended courts to measure laws such as the
BGEPA.''294 Like Judge McKay in his Hardman dissent, Judge Baldock
found "RFRA's plain language and tone" unambiguous in its intent that
RFRA applies "'in all cases where free exercise of religion is substan287. Id. at *31.
288. Id. at *31 n.16 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
289. Id. at *32.
290. Id. at *32.
291.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *33-34 (citing Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (explaining the Court
"has repeatedly held that the peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally recognized status of Indians
justifies special treatment on their behalf when rationally related to the Government's 'unique
obligation toward the Indians"').
292. Id at *34.
293. Id.
294. Id. at *35.
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tially burdened.' 29" Because the BGEPA's substantial burden on Wilgus's
exercise of his religious beliefs was undisputed, RFRA should ap296
ply.

With respect to the majority's argument that the court need not apply RFRA because Wilgus failed to raise it as an affirmative defense,
Judge Baldock argued that the district court's error in concluding that the
United States Supreme Court had held RFRA unconstitutional was
among the "exceptional circumstances" in which an appellate court could
and should raise the issue to correct the defect - particularly in a criminal
case in which the defendant's substantial rights are affected.297 In fact,
Judge Baldock suggested that Wilgus might have thought he was precluded from asserting his RFRA claim on appeal based on the district
298
court's erroneous conclusion that RFRA was unconstitutional.
Judge Baldock stopped short of concluding the BGEPA failed to
meet constitutional muster under RFRA. Rather, he argued more facts
were needed to determine, for example, the effect of the recent reclassification of bald eagles from endangered to threatened and the number of
non-Indians who practice Native American religions that require eagle
feathers.29 9
Judge Baldock also stated that the majority's discussion of Wilgus's
Establishment Clause claim was unnecessary and premature. 3°° He reasoned that if the BGEPA survived RFRA's strict scrutiny, "it will pass
any level of scrutiny applicable to Establishment Clause challenges. 30 '
Alternatively, if the BGEPA failed strict scrutiny, Wilgus's conviction
30 2
would fall and his Establishment Clause challenge would be moot.
C. Analysis
Two other circuits have ruled that the Indian tribal use exception
withstands strict scrutiny review under RFRA, even when challenged by
ethnologically Indian practitioners of religious ceremonies that require
the use of eagle feathers.3 3

295.
Id. at *38 (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1)); see also Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17702, at *61.
296. See id. at *38.
297.
Wilgus, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700, at *39-40.
298. See id. at *40 n.4.
299. Id. at *41.
300. Id. at *42 n.5.
301.
Id.
302. Id. at *42 n.5.
303.
See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v.
Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). In Hugs, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
challenged regulation under RFRA, even though City. of Boerne was then pending before the
Supreme Court. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378 n. 1. The court reasoned that because it found the regulation
survived strict scrutiny under RFRA, it would also survive a less stringent test if the court
invalidated RFRA. Id.
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In United States v. Hugs, the Ninth Circuit held the BGEPA and
permit system "provide the least restrictive means of conserving eagles
while permitting access to eagles and eagle parts for religious
purposes."3°4 In this case, two Native Americans were convicted of taking, attempting to take and purchasing eagles without a permit in violation of the BGEPA as a result of an undercover operation conducted by a
state game warden on the Crow Reservation. 35 Though the defendants
admitted they trapped, shot at and killed eagles, they claimed they did so
to obtain eagle feathers and parts for religious use and that the BEGPA
infringed on their free exercise of religion. 3° The court was not asked to
evaluate the government's interest in protecting eagles, because the defendants stipulated the interest was compelling. 30 7 However, the court
found the BGEPA's legislative history reflected "the importance of protecting eagles because of their religious significance to Native Americans. '" 3 8 It specifically rejected the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico's holding that the BGEPA was unconstitutional
because the government had failed to establish a compelling interest in
eagle conservation, since the golden eagle was not endangered and "the
permit system was 'utterly offensive and ultimately ineffectual. ' ' 3°9 The
court then determined the information required to obtain a permit was
"the minimum necessary to assure that eagles and eagle parts will be
used for religious purposes," and, therefore, satisfied RFRA's least restrictive means requirement.30 In Hugs, the Ninth Circuit was asked to
invalidate the permit system as facially unconstitutional without regard
to the distinction between Indians who are members of federally recognized tribes and those who are not.

In Gibson v. Babbitt, 31 however, this distinction was central to
Eleventh Circuit's analysis. Here, a Native American challenged the eagle feather permitting system under the First Amendment and RFRA
after the FWS denied his request for a permit because he was not enrolled in a federally recognized tribe. 13 In a per curiam decision, the Gibson court first analyzed the BGEPA under RFRA and found the govern304. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378.
305.
Id. at 1377.
306. Id.
307. See id.
308. Id; see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-44 (1986) (discussing the legislative
history of the BGEPA and the exception for Indian religious use of eagle feathers and eagle parts).
309. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1379 (citing United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.M.
1986)).
310. Id. at 1378.
311.
See id. at 1379; see also De Meo, supra note 16, at 796-97; Perkins, supra note 16, at 703
(arguing the permitting system is unconstitutional because it is an unduly burdensome infringement
on Indian religious practices).
312.
223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (lith Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (explaining that the issue on appeal
narrows to permit applicants who are members of federally recognized Indian tribes).
313. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1257.
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ment had a compelling interest in "fulfilling its treaty obligations with
federally recognized Indian tribes. 314 In so doing, the court declined to
address the government's other asserted interests in protecting eagles and
preserving Native American religions." 5 The court found the demand for
eagle parts by members of federally recognized tribes exceeded the supply.1 6 Therefore, extending permits to other Indians would increase the
already prolonged delays "in providing eagle parts to members of federally recognized Indian tribes, thereby vitiating the government's efforts
to fulfill its treaty obligations."3 '7 The court then concluded the permitting system was the least restrictive means to achieve the government's
compelling interest in fulfilling its obligations to federally recognized
tribes. 3 By the same test, the court also determined the regulation did
not violate the First Amendment.3 9
Notwithstanding the factual differences among the Ninth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits' challenges to the Indian tribal use exception to the
BGEPA and the MBTA, these cases represent the collision of several
important issues that surely will remain controversial regardless of how
the Tenth Circuit rules on rehearing.
Even if one agrees with the commentators and jurisdictions that
have construed City of Boerne as invalidating RFRA as applied to federal
actions,3 20 the critical issue is whether the regulation should be analyzed
as "legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special treatment"3 2 under Morton or as a Free Exercise challenge under Smith. 322 If
viewed as favoring benefits for members of federally registered tribes,
Morton suggests the Indian tribal use exception would be constitutional
as long as the court finds "the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government. 323
Under Smith, however, the starting point is determining whether the
requirement is neutral and generally applicable' 2 - a point on which the
32
Tenth Circuit was split in its initial decisions in Hardman and Wilgus. 1
If the court finds the Indian tribal use exception is not neutral and gener314. Id.at 1258.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Gibson, 223 F.3d. at 1258.
319. Id. at 1258-59.
320. See Hamilton, supra note 20; Blatnik, supra note 21; Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475,
481 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 678 (2001).
321.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974).
322. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
323. Morton, 417 U.S. at 555.
324. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-81.
325.
See United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702 (10th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2001), vacated by 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Wilgus, No.
00-4015, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17700 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001), vacated by United States v.
Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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ally applicable, as did the Hardman majority, it must subject the regulation to strict scrutiny." 6 The regulation might survive heightened scrutiny
if viewed as a burden the non-Indian majority has imposed on itself to
relieve the burden the BGEPA and MBTA would otherwise impose on a
political minority's religious freedom. Alternatively, the regulation
would be less likely to pass constitutional muster if found to favor one
individual's religious practice over another.
If the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny under Smith or RFRA,
the question becomes whether the court will find any of the government's asserted interests sufficiently compelling to satisfy the first prong
of the test. From a civil liberties perspective, these cases may turn on
whether the government's interest is characterized as protecting the
unique status of federally recognized Indian tribes as a political classification, protecting individual's religious practice without regard to denomination, protecting a religious minority or, as in the Hardman case,
fulfilling the United States' treaty obligations to Mexico under the
MBTA.327
If the court extends permit eligibility to all Indians, it must also
overcome an equal protection argument that would create a constitutionally suspect class based on race. If the court extends permit eligibility to
all individuals who engage in Indian religious practices, it could encounter Establishment Clause problems.32 Furthermore, any expansion of
the permitting system might also provide additional fodder for those who
argue eagle conservation is less than compelling.329

326. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *36.
327. See Hardman, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *54-55. In this regard, future claims may
turn on whether the government is seeking to enforce the MBTA, which implicates international
treaty obligations, or the BGEPA, which does not. See also United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d
1199, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Are there any relevant differences between the MBTA and the
BGEPA such that we should analyze their effect on religious exercise separately?").
328. But see Corrada, supra note 277, at 252-81. Corrada asserts that under the "burden lifting"
model advanced by Justice Scalia, most accommodations of religion would be constitutionally valid.
Id. at 265. The ultimate test of a legislative accommodation under this model, which Corrada views
as being consistent with Smith, would be whether the exemption "alleviate[s] a government-imposed
burden on religion." Id. Thus, an argument can be made that the Establishment Clause is not a
constitutional obstacle to extending eligibility for permits to all practitioners of Indian religions (or
even any religion that might require the use of eagle parts) to the extent that the BGEPA and MBTA
are viewed as laws by which the government has burdened such practitioners' religion and the
permitting system is characterized as an accommodation to lift that burden. At the same time,
Corrada describes other accommodation models that are less tolerant of religious accommodations.
Id. In particular, strict application of the three-pronged test first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman
"would serve to invalidate virtually any statutory religious exemption from generally applicable
laws." Id. at 253, 272 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) declaring a government
accommodation of religious freedom violates the Establishment Clause unless it (1) serves a "secular
legislative purpose;" (2) has a "principal or primary effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;" and (3) does not foster an "excessive government entanglement" with religion.).
329.
Environmental organizations were notably absent from the list of amici who submitted
briefs when the Tenth Circuit considered this issue on January 15, 2002. See supra note 15.
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III. CONCLUSION
In Kikumura, the court unequivocally established that RFRA lives
in the Tenth Circuit for federal claims, a fact acknowledged in the three
subsequent cases.33° However, RFRA's vitality remained questionable.
Implicit in Kikumura is the notion that RFRA could sustain a plaintiff's
asserted free exercise claim as a statutory matter, even if the challenged
federal law or regulation
satisfied rational basis review under the Smith
33
First Amendment test. '
Kikumura, however, did not reach the issue of whether RFRA was
strong enough to carry a religious freedom claim when it was not specifically asserted or when it bumps up against an Establishment Clause
claim.332 These questions and others did surface in the three Indian tribal
use exception cases in which opinions were issued, vacated and ordered
for rehearing en banc as directed by United States v. Hardman.333
Clearly cognizant of the conflicts among the jurists over fundamental questions of law, the court set forth more than twenty questions for
rehearing. 3' The first is whether RFRA or the less onerous First
Amendment standard set forth in Smith applies to Free Exercise Clause
cases.333 Specifically, should claims arising from burdens on religious
freedom be subject to RFRA's statutory strict scrutiny analysis, as urged
by Judges McKay and Baldock, in lieu of the courts' traditional First
Amendment analysis, even when parties have not raised RFRA below or
on appeal? 336 Additionally, what difference, if any, exists between
RFRA's least restrictive means requirement and the First Amendment
analysis' narrow tailoring requirement for laws that are not neutral and/or
generally applicable? A related issue is the precedent of Werner, in
which the Tenth Circuit applied the RFRA despite its absence in the
pleadings, after City of Boerne.337
The remaining enumerated issues specifically focused on the applicable standard for a Free Exercise Clause analysis of the MBTA and
BGEPA, but may provide clues as to how the Tenth Circuit might analyze other cases implicating the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.338 Do the BGEPA and MBTA fall within Smith's "safe harbor"
330. See generally Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
331.
See id.
332. See id.
333. 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
334. Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200-02.
335. Id. at 1200.
336. Id.
337. See id.; Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
338. See Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200. This article approaches the serendipitous occurrence of
three factually similar, though not identical, situations as a potential opportunity for the court to
illuminate and advance the understanding of the interplay between the Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses in a way that might have utility beyond its application to the Indian tribal use
exception to the BGEPA and MBTA. See United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
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as laws that are neutral and generally applicable? 339 If so, should the court
extend to free exercise cases the rational relationship standard other circuits have applied in the Establishment Clause context when analyzing
laws based on the unique relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes? 340 If the Acts are not neutral, not generally applicable
nor establish "a system of individualized exemptions," will they survive
strict scrutiny?M ' What level and type of scrutiny should the court give to
Establishment Clause challenges - rational basis, strict
scrutiny, the
32
Lemon v. Kurtzman test, or one of its modern variants?
Kathryn S. Kanda

At the same time, the difficulties the Tenth Circuit encountered which led to inconsistent results
from the first hearings could indicate such expectations are unrealistic. See generally William P.
Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the
Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 243 (1989) (supporting his thesis that "the search for a
comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately futile" by noting the "baselines"
against which the constitutionality of religious benefits and deprivations may be measured "may not
even remain constant within one constitutional protection").
339. Id.
340. Id.; see Rupert v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992); Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying the rational basis
test to Establishment Clause cases).
341.
Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (requiring application of First Amendment strict scrutiny to
non-neutral laws that are not generally applicable); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling interest to support laws that create systems
of individualized exemptions); cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990) (holding
the Sherbert test inapplicable to free exercise challenges of governmental actions that substantially
burden a religious practice).
342.
Hardman, 260 F.3d at 1200-01; see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see also
Rupert v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992); Peyote Way Church of
God v. Thomburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying rational basis scrutiny to Establishment
Clause cases); cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (analyzing "whether the
government entanglement with religion is excessive"); Corrada, supra note 277.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OR LEGAL FICTION?
NOTED EXCEPTIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION

Under the Fourth Amendment,' a search occurs when the government seeks to intrude into an area in which a person has manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy that is recognized by society as being
reasonable.2 In authorizing the government to conduct a search, the Supreme Court has noted a strong preference for the issuance of warrants.3
"Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-

delineated exceptions."'4 Yet, if one were to look across the landscape of
Fourth Amendment law, this statement from the country's highest court
would seem to be fatally flawed.' For as Justice Scalia observed in California v. Acevedo,6 the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement has become "so riddled with exceptions that it [i]s basically unrecognizable."7
However, as stretched and maligned as the Fourth Amendment may be,8
it is the one protection that we, as citizens, have against governmental
intrusion into what we "seek[] to preserve as private."9
This survey addresses cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from September 2000 to August 2001,
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
3.

2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH

AND SEIZURE:

A TREATISE

ON THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 4.1,
at396 (3d ed. 1996).
4.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
5. See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 512 (1991)("Over about the last twenty years, the warrant has
evolved from being an absolute prerequisite of police intrusions upon persons and their possessions
and to the use of the fruits of any search or arrest, to a procedural requirement sometimes
acknowledged and rarely enforced." (internal citations omitted)).
6. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
concurring).
7. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J.,
See id. (noting that one commentator had catalogued some twenty exceptions to the
8.
warrant requirement, including: "searches incident to arrest ... automobile searches . . .border
searches... administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent circumstances ... search[es]
incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause .. .boat boarding for document checks ...
welfare searches .. .inventory searches .. .airport searches .. .school search[es] .... (quoting
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74
(1985))).
9. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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which deal with exceptions the Tenth Circuit has recognized in allowing
searches to take place without a search warrant based on probable cause.
Part I analyzes the validity of consensual searches when they are preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation. Part II discusses the ability of
law enforcement officials to execute searches of homes based on arrest
warrants. Part III addresses administrative searches related to a regulated
industry, specifically, motor carriers. Finally, Part IV focuses on the
ability of secondary schools to conduct suspicionless searches of students.
I. CONSENSUAL SEARCHES PRECEDED BY FOURTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS

A. Background
One of the most well-established and utilized exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is a
search based on the individual's consent.'0 There are several reasons for
this occurrence, including: administrative convenience of the police," the
ability of the police to search when there is no probable cause,'2 and the
perception of the individual to be searched that consenting will allow
him to clear his name and get about his business.' 3 In some cases, consent
to search is even sufficient to overcome a preceding illegal search or
seizure conducted by the police.' 4 While "evidence derived from the exploitation of an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed" as "fruit of
the poisonous tree,"'" if the government can establish that "the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come at... by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint,"' 16 itcan "refute
the inference that the evidence was a product of the constitutional violation."' 7
In a case that presents a valid search or seizure by the police, and
thus no initial Fourth Amendment violation, courts will review the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the subsequent consent
was voluntary, and not "the product of duress or coercion."'" However,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
3 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 596.
12. Id. at 597.
13.
See id.
14.
See United States v. McGill, 125 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997)(concluding consensual
search of vehicle proceeding illegal search was valid); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1164
(8th Cir. 1994) (concluding consensual search of vehicle following illegal stop was valid); United
States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1013 (10th Cir. 1992)(concluding consensual search of
home following warrantless entry was valid).
15. United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998).
16. United States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471,488 (1963)).
17. Miller, 146 F.3d at 279.
18. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
10.

11.
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when the initial search or seizure violates the Constitution, the burden on
the government is heightened,' 9 and the government must demonstrate
that the consent was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful invasion."20 The Tenth Circuit has held that the factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois,2 ' are especially important in determining if consent preceding a Fourth Amendment violation is "sufficiently voluntary to purge the primary taint" of
the illegal search or seizure. "Among the factors which warrant consideration are '[t]he temporal proximity of the [Fourth Amendment violation] and the [consent], the presence of intervening circumstances, and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."' 23 In
United States v. Caro,24 the Tenth Circuit reviewed the admissibility of
evidence discovered during a consensual search of a vehicle based on a
stop that was unconstitutional in its scope.25
B. United States v. Caro
1. Facts
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery pulled over Caro after
he noticed that the windows of the car Caro was driving appeared to be
darker than the law of Utah permitted.26 After Trooper Avery asked Caro
for his license and registration, he noticed that the license was from Iowa
and in Caro's name, while the registration was from Nebraska and in
another person's namef 7 Caro appeared shaky and nervous, and told
Trooper Avery that the car belonged to his friend, but was unable to recall his friend's last name.28 A subsequent check revealed that the license
was valid and that the car was not stolen; however, the car color was
different than the color listed on the registration.29 Caro's nervous behavior, his inability to remember the car owner's name, and the color
discrepancy led Trooper Avery to suspect that the car was stolen.
Trooper Avery next sought to compare the Vehicle Identification
Number ("VIN") listed on the registration to the VIN plate visible
through the windshield on the car's dashboard.3' After Trooper Avery
determined that the two matched, he asked Caro if he would exit the ve19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Miller, 146 F.3d at 279.
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992).
Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1011 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04).
248 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001).
Caro, 248 F.3d at 1248.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Caro, 248 F.3d at 1243.
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hicle so that he could also compare the VIN on the driver's door.3 2 Caro
complied, but Trooper Avery was unable to find a VIN on the driver's
door.33 However, while searching for the VIN plate on the door, Trooper
Avery noticed air fresheners hanging in the car, as well as a bottle of air
freshener. 34 This discovery made Trooper Avery suspicious that drugs
might be in the car, which led him to ask Caro if any drugs were
present. 35 After Caro responded in the negative, Trooper Avery asked for
Caro's consent to search the car, which was subsequently given.36
Trooper Avery did not return Caro's license and registration until
Caro opened both the trunk and hood of the car.37 After an inspection of
the trunk, Trooper Avery looked under the hood of the car.3s Trooper
Avery noticed that the battery appeared oversized, and upon further inspection, found two packages containing methamphetamine.39
The district court denied Caro's motion to suppress the drug evidence. 40 The court stated, "from the totality of the evidence presented...
the investigative detention which occurred after the stop was supported
by an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity."'', Furthermore,
the court held that Caro had voluntarily consented to the search of the
car.

42

2. Tenth Circuit Decision
The first issue the Tenth Circuit addressed was whether "Trooper
Avery exceeded the lawful scope of detention."" The court noted that
based on the suspicious circumstances presented, including the discrepancy in the car's registered color and Caro's inability to identify the
owner's name, Trooper Avery had reasonable suspicion which justified
further questioning after the initial stop for the traffic violation.44 However, the court stated:
[W]here the dashboard VIN plate is readable from outside the passenger compartment, that VIN matches the VIN listed on the registration, and there are no signs the plate has been tampered with, there
is insufficient cause for an officer to extend the scope of a detention

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1242-43.
Id. at 1243.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Caro, 248 F.3d at 1243.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting district court memorandum decision and order).
Id.
Caro, 248 F.3d at 1244.
Id. at 1246.
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by entering a vehicle's passenger compartment for the purpose of
further examining any VIN.45
Thus, the court held that "Trooper Avery's actions exceeded the permissible scope of the detention and violated Mr. Caro's Fourth Amendment
rights."4
The next issue the Tenth Circuit considered was "whether the search
[for an additional VIN] was nevertheless justified by Mr. Caro's consent."4'7 The court stated that, "a search that is preceded by a Fourth
Amendment violation may still be valid if the defendant's consent to that
48
search 'was voluntary in fact under the totality of the circumstances.'
The government must be able to show that there was "a sufficient attenuation or 'break in the causal connection between the illegal detention
and the consent."' 4 9 The court relied on factors pronounced by the Supreme Court in Brown as guidance in determining whether Caro's consent to search was capable of purging the taint of the impermissible
stop5 0 Specifically, the court considered: 1) the lapse of time between
Caro's illegal seizure and his consent; 2) whether there were any intervening circumstances; and 3) whether Trooper Avery's conduct was deliberate or flagrant.5"
The Tenth Circuit held that based on the totality of the circumstances, Caro's consent to the search for an additional VIN was "insufficient to purge the taint of his unlawful detention. 5 2 First, there was no
attenuation because when Trooper Avery asked for Caro's consent, he
still possessed Caro's license and registration, as well as a warning citation for illegal tint.53 Furthermore, Trooper Avery failed to instruct Caro
that he could leave the scene or refuse consent. 54 Second, the Brown factors demonstrated that Caro's consent was not voluntary." No time
elapsed between Caro's illegal seizure and consent, no intervening circumstances were present, and Trooper Avery's conduct was deliberate,
since he knew when he asked for consent that the dashboard VIN
matched the VIN on the registration.56 Accordingly, the court ruled that

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
1996)).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Caro, 248 F.3d at 1247 (quoting United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Caro, 248 F.3d at 1247.
Id. at 1247-48.
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any evidence derived from Trooper Avery's search for an additional VIN
must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree.""
The final issue the Tenth Circuit addressed was whether the general
search of Caro's vehicle, based on the discovery of the air fresheners
during the search for an additional VIN, was justified by consent5 8 The
court stated that the air fresheners discovered by Trooper Avery could
not "provide a valid foundation for enlarged suspicion, as they were
'come at by the exploitation of [the] illegality."' '59 In addition, the court
believed that the same Brown factors that tainted the initial search for the
VIN were "still present and unmitigated" when Caro consented to the
60
general search.
Thus, Caro's consent did not remove the taint of the
6
'
stop.
illegal
C. Other Circuits
The Eight Circuit achieved a different outcome in United States v.
McGill,62 In McGill, Officer Parker was summoned to the scene of an
accident in which McGill was involved. 63 As part of the investigation,
Officer Parker required the VIN numbers of the vehicles involved in the
accident. 64 In order to view the VIN number of McGill's truck, Officer
Parker stuck his head through the driver's side window, even though the
VIN number was visible through the windshield.65 In doing so, Officer
Parker was confronted with the smell of marijuana from inside McGill's
truck.' Upon relaying his discovery to McGill, Officer Parker asked for
consent to search the truck, which was subsequently given.' A search of
the truck uncovered "marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray and baggies of
marijuana behind a loose dashboard panel plate." ' Officer Parker arrested McGill, and a subsequent search of the truck at the police station
revealed the presence of a firearm, from which the federal charges implicated in this case arose.'
At the trial level, McGill filed a motion to suppress the firearm,
arguing that the Fourth Amendment was violated when Officer Parker
stuck his head into McGill's truck to read the VIN, and that the gun was

57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1248.
See id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996)).

60.

Id.

61.
62.
63.

Caro, 248 F.3d at 1248.
125 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997).
McGill, 125 F.3d at 643.

64.
65.

Id.
Id.

66.
67.

Id.
Id.

68.

Id.

69.

McGill, 125 F.3d at 643.
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the fruit of an illegal search.' The district court denied McGill's motion
to suppress, finding that the "marijuana was inevitably discoverable.'
The court stated that Officer Parker would have eventually either smelled
the marijuana emanating from the truck or have checked the VIN number
on the inside of the driver's door.72
On appeal, the Eight Circuit affirmed.73 Without addressing the legality of the initial search,74 the court noted that, "McGill's voluntary
consent was sufficiently an act of free will, even if Parker's motive in
requesting consent was supplied by an unlawful prior search. 75 In making its determination, the court relied on the factors outlined in Brown.6
The court recognized that Officer Parker's request for consent took place
immediately following the purported unlawful search, absent any intervening circumstances.77 However, the court noted that McGill was aware
of his right to refuse consent.78 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
the most important factor, "the nature of Officer Parker's Fourth
Amendment violation," demonstrated that Officer Parker was acting appropriately in response to an automobile accident that was caused by
McGill. 79 Accordingly, the circumstances demonstrated that McGill's
consent was sufficient to purge the taint of the assumed illegal search by
Officer Parker.'
D. Analysis
Consensual searches are the most commonly used weapon within the
arsenal of law enforcement. 8 1 Police conducting these searches do not
have to make the same outside efforts that are required by the warrant
system, 82 and people are often willing to allow the police to conduct a
search in order to avoid the hassle of a prolonged seizure.83 However, the
rule that the Tenth Circuit enunciated in Caro permits evidence that
would normally be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree to be
cleansed of its unconstitutional taint, if the consent was voluntary in fact

70.
71.

See id. at 644.
Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 645.
74. Id, at 644.
75. McGill, 125 F.3d at 645 (internal quotations omitted).
76. See id. at 644.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 644 ("Ascertaining the vehicle's VIN number and determining whether McGill's
driving had been impaired by drugs or alcohol were highly relevant to th[e] investigation.").
80. Id. at 645.
81.
See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 596; see also MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F.
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 212 (1998)("In most jurisdictions, the police conduct far more

consensual searches than those justified by probable cause or a search warrant.").
82. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 596.
83. See id. at 597.
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and not the product of an illegal search or seizure. 8 This rule goes one
step further because consent can not only overcome the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but can also
brush aside the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine that is imbedded in
our jurisprudence.
II. SEARCHES OF HOMES PURSUANT TO AN ARREST WARRANT
A. Background
In Payton v. New York, 5 the Supreme Court adopted the stance that
while a "man's house is his castle, 8 6 it is "constitutionally reasonable to
require him to open his doors to the officers of the law., 87 This decision
allowed law enforcement officers to gain constitutional admittance to
people's homes based on an arrest warrant founded on probable cause
and a reasonable belief the person was home. 8 However, on the trail of
this case was Steagald v. United States,s9 which the Supreme Court decided a year later. Steagald sought to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of innocent individuals from governmental intrusion by limiting
the ability of law enforcement officers to search houses based on an arrest warrant for a third party guest. 90 However, as United States v. Gay9'
demonstrates, the Tenth Circuit has interwoven the rationales of the two
tests92 and one must now question who is a third party guest, and when is
a resident susceptible to police intrusion.
B. United States v. Gay
1. Facts
Gay was arrested for "possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)." 93 While out on bail, Gay

fled, and the United States Marshal Service tried for two years to serve a
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) arrest warrant on Gay.'
Subsequently, Deputy McNeil of the United States Marshal Service
received information from an informant regarding the whereabouts of
Gay, who was supposedly living with his uncle at the time. 95 Officers
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001).
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Payton, 445 U.S. at 596.
Id.at 602-03.
Id.at 603.
451 U.S. 204 (1981).
See Steagald,451 U.S. at 205-06.
240 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2571 (2001).
See Gay, 240 F.3d at 1226.
Id.at 1224.
Id.
Id.
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obtained and executed a search warrant for the uncle's residence, but
Gay was not present. 96 However, an informant at the residence stated that
Gay did not live at his uncle's residence. 97 Instead, the informant knew
from "personal experience and numerous visits" that Gay lived at a different location two miles away. 98 The informant escorted the law enforcement officers to the location of Gay's duplex, which he pointed out,
and told them Gay was presently inside. 99
After arriving at the new residence, Deputy McNeil, accompanied
by other officers, knocked on the door and announced "police."' ° After
hearing a "thud" and waiting a few seconds, the police forcibly entered
the residence and found Gay.'0 ' At Gay's feet was a gun and in plain
view was crack cocaine. ' 02 Gay was arrested and admitted to owning the
gun and drugs.' 3 The district court denied Gay's motion to4 suppress and
Gay subsequently pled guilty to drug and firearm charges."'
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
Gay argued that in order for the officers to have lawfully arrested
him at the second residence, a search warrant was required.' 5 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed.'" The court noted that under Steagald, when the home
to be searched involves a third party, a search warrant is required "absent
exigent circumstances or consent. ' °7 However, when there is "a reasonable belief the arrestee (1) live[s] in the residence; and (2) is within the
residence at the time of entry," a Payton analysis is required and an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause is sufficient.'0 In light of the circumstances presented, the court believed the Payton test was applicable.' °
First, the Tenth Circuit considered whether it was reasonable for the
officers to believe Gay lived at the second residence when the search was
conducted."0 The court noted that the officers' belief that the suspect
lived in the residence was based on an objective standard, and "need not
prove true in fact.""' Furthermore, the suspect need not actually live in
the residence, "so long as he 'possesses common authority over, or some
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1224-25.
Id. at 1225.
Gay. 240 F.3d at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Gay, 240 F.3d at 1225.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981)).
Id. (citing Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999)).
Id.
See Gay, 240 F.3d at 1226-27.
Id. at 1226 (quoting Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225).
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other significant relationship to, the residence entered by police."' 2 This
is because "people do not live in individual, separate, hermetically-sealed
residences[, but] live with other people[;] they move from one residence
to another."" 3 Based on the detailed information provided by the informant, the court held that the 4belief that Gay lived at the second residence
was objectively reasonable."
Second, the Tenth Circuit considered whether it was reasonable for
the officers to believe Gay was inside the residence at the time of the
search." 5 The court noted that the officers need not actually see the suspect because criminals often attempt to evade detection." 6 Based upon
the knowledge of the informant and the fact that he "explicitly told the
officers Mr. Gay was currently in his home," as well as the "thud" which
was heard after knocking on the door," 7 the court held it was reasonable
to believe Gay was present at the second residence when the search took
place." 8
Accordingly, after considering the "totality of the circumstances,"
the court held that the officers' beliefs were reasonable and that' 9 the
search of the second residence was authorized by the arrest warrant.
C. Other Circuits
In Watts v. County of Sacramento,'20 plaintiff Christopher Pryor and
his girlfriend Binti Watts brought a civil action claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 after police officers mistakenly entered their home trying
to execute an arrest warrant. 2 ' The police had received an anonymous tip
informing them that Chris Burgess, a wanted murder suspect, had been
seen in front of the plaintiffs' house.'22 Acting on the tip, the police assembled on Watts' house to execute an arrest warrant already issued for
Burgess on charges of murder and assault. 2 3 After Pryor opened the door,
the police recognized that he fit the general description, as well as answered to the name Chris.'24 Pryor was handcuffed and Watts and her
children were placed under guard, until the police discovered that they
had seized the wrong person. 25 The district court granted defendants'
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. (quoting Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225).
Id. at 1226-27(quoting Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225).
Id. at 1227.
See id. at 1227-28.
Gay, 240 F.3d at 1227 (citing Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1226).
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id.
256 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2001).
Watts, 256 F.3d at 887.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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motion2 6for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful entry
claim.
12 7
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
The court stated that in order for a search based on an arrest warrant to
be valid against "a co-resident of the third party ..... [the] officer must
have a reasonable belief that the suspect named in the arrest warrant resides in the third party's home and that he is actually present at the time
of entry into the home.', 2' Based on the facts of the case, the court held
that the police officers could not have established a reasonable belief that
Pryor lived at the residence. 29
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit has transformed the rationale behind Payton and
Steagald with its adoption of an objective, reasonableness standard to
coincide with the Payton test. Payton and Steagald set up a simple line,
if it's your house and the police have a valid arrest warrant, the government's interests in safety and crime reduction take priority over the arrestee's privacy rights.'3' However, when the subject of the arrest warrant
is at the home of a third party, then the innocent third party's interests
triumph over the government's."3 By employing the standard that was
used in Gay, whereby the court looks to see if the police possessed a
"reasonable belief [that] the arrestee lived in the residence,"'33 the protection that was once afforded the innocent third party is jeopardized.
While this is not a new take for the Tenth Circuit, " it seems to bear resemblance to a general warrant,'35 allowing law enforcement officials to
search wherever a person may decide to frequent based solely on an arrest warrant. Accordingly, while the Tenth Circuit has stated that the
"warrantless entry of the home is the 'chief evil against which . . .the

126. Id. at 888-89.
127.
Watts, 256 F.3d at 891.
128.
Id. at 889-890 (citing United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1996); Perez v.
Simmons, 900 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1990)).
129. Id. at 890.
130. See United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
131.
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
132. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981).
133.
Gay, 240 F.3d at 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
134.
See, e.g., Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220. 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1999). The court
stated:
[E]ntry into a residence pursuant to an arrest warrant is permitted when "the facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the
totality. ...warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect's
dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry."
Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225-26 (quoting United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.
1995)).
135.
"[A] general warrant . .. authorize[s] the agent to search private premises, without
specifying the place to search or the things to seize." MILLER & WRIGHT. supra note 81, at 136.
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Fourth Amendment is directed," ' 36 its actions demonstrate that the court

does not hold this belief inviolate if the government is allowed to gain
admittance based on a minimal showing under the reasonable belief
standard.
III. SEARCHES OF CLOSELY REGULATED INDUSTRY

A. Background
In New York v. Burger,'37 the Supreme Court enunciated that business owners who take part in a "closely regulated" industry have an attenuated expectation of privacy, such that warrantless searches are justifiable. 38 The Court recognized that if the government has a substantial
interest in regulating an industry, the inspections further the goal of the
regulation, and a statute gives notice of the inspections and limits discretion, the Fourth Amendment would not be discredited. 3 9 In United States
v. Vasquez-Castillo,' ° the Tenth Circuit utilized the Burgertest to decide
whether warrantless searches of 4commercial carriers in New Mexico
were constitutionally permissible.
B. United States v. Vasquez-Castillo
1. Facts
Pursuant to New Mexico law,
leaving New Mexico

. .

42

"all commercial carriers entering or

." are required to stop at ports of entry for in-

spection "to determine whether the vehicles, drivers, and cargo are in
compliance with state laws regarding public safety, health, and
welfare.' 4 3 If commercial carriers have a "Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance" (CVSA) inspection sticker, they typically only undergo a brief
inspection; however, if the commercial carrier does not have an inspection sticker, then the inspection will be more thorough.' 44 While passing
through the port of entry, Vasquez-Castillo's truck was directed to undergo the most thorough inspection, based upon several factors, including the lack of an inspection decal,
non-current logbook, and irregulari5
ties regarding the bill of lading.'

136.
United States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
137. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
138.
Burger, 482 U.S. at 691.
139. Id. at 702-03.
140.
258 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).
141.
See Vasquez- Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1210-12.
142.
See N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 65-5-1 (2001).
143.
Vasquez- Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1209.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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After the outside of the truck and trailer were inspected, the Inspector, Pacheco, decided to inspect the "blocking and bracing," to make
sure the cargo was secured and did not shift while in transit.'4 Upon entering the trailer, Inspector Pacheco perceived the amount of cargo
Vasquez-Castillo was carrying to be unusually small in relation to the
truck size. 4 7 As he moved further into the trailer, Inspector Pacheco
smelled raw marijuana.' Inspector Pacheco also noticed a space "between the inner wall and outer hull of the trailer," footprints on the trailer
49
wall, and an "air vent in the trailer that appeared to lead to nowhere."'
After asking Vasquez-Castillo for consent to search behind the wall, and
having Vasquez-Castillo sign a consent form, Inspector Pacheco opened
the wall and found "over 800 pounds of marijuana concealed in the compartment."' Vasquez-Castillo was subsequently arrested and his motion
to suppress the evidence was denied by the district court.' 5'
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied the three-prong test annunciated in Burger to determine "whether a warrantless inspection of a closely regulated
industry violates the Fourth Amendment.' ' 2 Specifically, the test required the following:
First, there must be a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is
made. Second, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme ....Finally, the statute's inspection pro-

gram, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application,
must
53
provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
The court determined the first prong was satisfied because New4
Mexico has a substantial interest in promoting safety on its highways.'
The court also determined that the warrantless inspection was necessary
to further the regulatory scheme because commercial carriers traveling
on the highway move quickly in and out of the State's jurisdiction. 55
Therefore, the second prong was also met.
The third prong, requiring the inspection program to be an "adequate substitute for a warrant," provided the court with the most in-depth
analysis.'5 6 The court noted that in order to satisfy the third prong, the
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1209 n.2.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1209-10.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987)).
Id. at 1211.
Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1211.
Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 79:3

New Mexico regulation must inform commercial carriers that their trucks
are susceptible to inspections for specific purposes, must inform them
who may undertake the inspections, and must limit the inspectors' discretion "in time, place, and scope.' 57 The court determined the regulation
satisfied this third prong, and that Vasquez-Castillo "could not help but
be aware that his property was subject to periodic inspections undertaken
for specific purposes, including inspection of the blocking and
bracing."'" 8
Because the New Mexico regulatory statute satisfied all three
prongs, the court held that Inspector Pacheco was authorized to be within
the trailer prior to his detection of the marijuana smell.'59
The court next considered whether Inspector Pacheco had probable
cause to search between the walls of the trailer." Based on the "totality
of the circumstances," including the smell of marijuana, the, internal irregularities in the trailer, and the irregularities found by Inspector
Pacheco concerning the bill of lading and log book, the court held that
Inspector Pacheco had probable cause to search between the walls and
that the search did not violate Vasquez-Castillo's Fourth Amendment
constitutional rights.' 6' In doing so, the court relied on the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, which allows for the search of an
automobile based
62 on probable cause alone, without consent or exigent
circumstances.
C. Other Circuits
In United States v. Fort,'63 the Fifth Circuit, in a case of first impression, adopted the stance that commercial trucking is a closely regulated
industry and falls within the warrant exception annunciated by the Court
in Burger.'6' In Fort, the defendant's commercial truck was randomly
stopped and inspected, and a cargo of 561.2 pounds of marijuana was
discovered.'65 The court concluded that the stop and search were permitted because the regulatory program satisfied the three Burger requirements.' 66 Specifically, the court noted that: 1) Texas had an interest in
protecting travelers on its roads and reducing the costs incurred by taxpayers from injuries caused by commercial vehicles;' 6' 2) "warrantless

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. at 1212 (quoting United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id. at 1212-13.
Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1213.
See id. at 1212.
248 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001).
Fort, 248 F.3d at 480.
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 480-82.
Id. at 480.
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stops and inspections are necessary" to promote highway safety and because "commercial trucks pass quickly through states and .. jurisdictions of the enforcement agencies;"' and 3) the Texas statute provided
commercial carriers with notice that their vehicles were susceptible to
search and seizure, and limited the discretion of the officers conducting
the inspections.' 69
D. Analysis
In Vasquez-Castillo, the Tenth Circuit sought to apply the closely
regulated industry exception outlined by the Supreme Court in Burger to
motor carriers. 7 Unlike most exceptions the Tenth Circuit has recognized, this exception, while balancing the interests of the individual and
the government, also contains a check to act as a warrant substitute.'
Specifically, the State or agency must set up a regulation to serve as notice to those who might be affected by its actions, while at the same time
limiting the scope of its own discretionary actions. 72 As such, while other
exceptions might involve a reasonableness inquiry based solely on the
perceptions of individuals, the Burger test is more codified and structured.
IV.

SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES IN SCHOOLS

A. Background
In Vernonia School District47J v. Acton, 73 the Supreme Court held
that suspicionless searches of school children may be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment if the government's interests in a school policy
outweigh the students' privacy interests which are compromised by the
policy.' 74 The Supreme Court noted that a "search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . . 'when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable. '"1 75 According to the Supreme Court, the
public school forum qualified for the "special needs" exception to the
warrant requirement because the warrant requirement would interfere
with the ability of schools to maintain order and discipline.'7 6 In a case of
first impression, the Tenth Circuit, in Earls ex rel Earls v. Board of Edu-

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 481.
Id. at 482.
See United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1210-12 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1211.
Id.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 646.
Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
Id.
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cation,'77 sought to apply the reasoning of the Vernonia Court to a drugtesting program administered by an Oklahoma high school.'78
B. Earls ex rel Earls v. Board of Education
1. Facts
Students of Tecumseh High School in Oklahoma brought a civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Board of Education and
the School District.'7 9 The students sought to challenge "the constitutionality of the random suspicionless urinalysis drug testing policy which the
District implemented for all students participating in competitive extracurricular activities.""'8 The testing policy adopted by the School District
required every student who wished to participate in extracurricular activities to "sign a written consent agreeing to submit to drug testing prior
to participating in the activity, randomly during the year while participating, and at any time while participating upon reasonable suspicion."' 8 '
The testing itself was done based on a strict procedure and the information was kept confidential. 2 The testing results were only disclosed to
specific school personnel who "ha[d] a need to know," and never to "any
law enforcement authorities."'83 If a student did not wish to be drug
tested, he/she could not participate in the school's extracurricular activities. '8 At the trial level, the district court held that the drug testing policy
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'85
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
In considering whether the suspicionless drug testing policy adopted
by the School District violated the Fourth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit
was required to determine if the policy fell within the "special needs"
doctrine.'86 "[U]nder the special needs doctrine, the [c]ourt identifies a
special need which makes impracticable adherence to the warrant and
probable cause requirements, then balances the government's interest in
conducting the particular search against the individual's privacy interests
upon which the search intrudes.' 87 The court noted that the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment would interfere

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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187.

242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Earls ex rel Earls,242 F.3d at 1264, 1270-78.
Id. at1266.
Id.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1267-68.
Id. at1268.
Earlsex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268.
Id. at 1266.
Id. at1269.
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with the disciplinary needs of the School District and their ability to
maintain order.'8
The court next sought to determine the reasonableness of the search
based on a balancing test of the interests of the parties involved.'89 The
first factor the court considered was the "nature of the privacy interest
upon which the search . . .intrudes."' 9° The court initially noted that a
student's expectation of privacy should not be diminished just because
they voluntarily choose to participate in an activity; however, the court
went on to reason that because students are required to follow rules in
order to participate in extracurricular activities, either from a coach or
teacher, their personal freedom is constrained to some degree.' 9' Thus,
participants in extracurricular activities expect less privacy than those
students who choose not to participate.' 92
The second factor considered was "the character of the intrusion
that is complained of."' 93 The court determined the invasion of privacy to
the student was minimal based on the manner in which the testing94took
place, the information obtained, and how the information was used.'
The final factor the Tenth Circuit considered was "the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of
this means for meeting it."' ' The court noted that the safety concerns
raised by the School District were lacking because the policy "too often
simply tests the wrong students."' 96 For instance, the court stated that
students who participate in choir are tested out of concern for injury, but
students who participate in shop or school labs, where an injury is more
perceivable, are not required to submit to the testing. 97 Furthermore, the
court recognized that there did not even appear to be a "measurable drug
problem" in the School District, which diminished the efficacy of the
drug testing greatly.' 8 The court stated, that "[s]pecial needs must rest on
demonstrated realities." '99 For if a school district did not have to demonstrate a perceivable problem before acting, their ability to invade upon
the rights of the students would be limitless.''

188. Id.at 1270.
189.
Id.
190. Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 654 (1995)).
191.
Id.at 1276.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 658).
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 660).
196. Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199.
Id. at 1278 (quoting United Teachers v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 857 (5th
Cir. 1998)).
200.
Id.
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Accordingly, based on a balancing of the three major interests concerned, the court concluded that the drug testing policy adopted by the
School District was unconstitutional and violated the students' Fourth
Amendment protections. 201
C. Other Circuits
The Eleventh Circuit also employed the analysis presented by the
Supreme Court in Vernonia, in determining whether suspicionless
searches of school children were constitutional in light of the Fourth
Amendment. 202 In Thomas ex rel Thomas v. Roberts, a fifth grade teacher
and a police officer, on campus to do a drug prevention demonstration,
conducted strip searches of students after one student's school trip
money disappeared in class. 2 3 The students affected filed suit claiming
they had been deprived of their constitutional rights, including a Fourth
Amendment claim.2°4 Although ruling that the strip searches were unconstitutional, the district court held that the individual defendants were
shielded by qualified immunity.05
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a "search may be conducted without individualized suspicion when 'the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and ...an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion. ' '' 20 Applying this test to the facts
of the case, the court concluded that the theft of the student's money did
not present a threat to the discipline or safety of the school such that students could be strip searched without individualized suspicion.0 7 Accordingly, the court held
20 8 that the searches were unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment.
A different result was reached by the Seventh Circuit in Joy v.
Penn-Harris-MadisonSchool Corporation.°9 In Joy, students brought
suit against Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation ("PHM"), challenging the constitutionality of a policy that provided for "random, suspicionless drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities
and of students driving to school.,, 2'0 The policy sought to test for "drugs,
alcohol, and tobacco,' and required students who participated in extra-

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
See Thomas ex relThomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1167-69 (11 th Cir. 2001).
See Thomas ex relThomas, 261 F.3d at 1163-64.
Id.at 1165.
Id.
Id. at 1167 (quoting'Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)).
Id. at1169.
Id.
212 F.3d 1052, 1067 (7th Cir. 2000).
Joy, 212 F.3d at 1054.
Id.
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curricular activities or who received a parking permit to sign a consent
form agreeing to be tested. 2 The policy outlined a strict procedure for
the testing, and provided for confidentiality of the results. 2 '3 Furthermore,
a student "receiving a positive test result, [could] be subject to exclusion
from any extracurricular activities and/or to revocation of parking privileges." 24 At the trial level, the district court upheld the testing of both
students involved in extracurricular activities and those who drove to
school.2 5
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that it had addressed the issue
of student drug testing in Todd v. Rush County Schools,2 6 in which 2'it7
upheld suspicionless testing of students for drugs, alcohol, and nicotine
without reviewing the factors enunciated in Vernonia.28 Notwithstanding
its decision in Todd, the court stated that if "we were reviewing this case
based solely on Vernonia and Chandler, we would not sustain the random drug, alcohol, and nicotine testing of students seeking to participate
in extracurricular activities.",2'9 The court subsequently undertook an
analysis of PHM's testing policy based on the factors enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Vernonia.220
First, the court noted that the "expectation of privacy for students in
extracurricular activities... [was] greater than the expectation of privacy
for athletes, 22'which the Supreme Court assessed in Vernonia. Second,
the court stated that the "character of the intrusion [wa]s not overly inva,222
sive." Third, the court noted that PHM failed to demonstrate any connection between students involved in extracurricular activities and drug
use, nor did it "explain[] how drug use affects students in extracurricular
activities differently than students in general., 223 Fourth, the court noted
that there was no indication that testing students involved in extracurricular activities would address the problem.224 Furthermore, PHM failed
to demonstrate how requiring individualized suspicion would be unfeasible. 225 Thus, based on the Vernonia factors, the court believed that the
PHM testing policy was unconstitutional. 226 However, applying the doc-

212.
213.
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216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
activities
226.

Id. at 1055.
See id. at 1057.
Id.
See id.
133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).
See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1061 (citing Todd, 133 F.3d at986-87).
Id.
Id. at 1063.
See id. at 1063-65.
Id.at603.
Id. at1064.
Joy, 212 F.3d at1064.
Id. at1065.
See id. ("PHM has made no showing that teachers, staff and sponsors of extracurricular
would not be able to observe the students for suspicious behavior.").
Id.
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trine of stare decisis and its prior ruling in Todd, the court affirmed the
district court's decision permitting testing of students involved in extracurricular activities.227
In addressing the suspicionless testing of student drivers, the Seventh Circuit reached a similar result, concluding that testing for drugs
and alcohol was reasonable, but withholding the ability to test for nicotine. '221 In reaching this decision, however, the court relied on the analysis
outlined in Vernonia, instead of precedent.229 Specifically, the court recognized "a legitimate and pressing need for drug and alcohol testing of
students driving vehicles on school property, 230 because the risk imposed
was substantial in nature 23' and requiring individualized suspicion was
233
not feasible. 232 The need to test for nicotine, however, was unjustifiable
because there was no demonstrated risk and the policy could punish students for legal behavior.M
D. Analysis
In deciding Earls, the Tenth Circuit was presented with a case of
first impression. 235 The court used the factors adopted by the Supreme
Court in Vernonia as guidance in determining if the drug testing policy
was reasonable by balancing the privacy interests of the high school students involved and the governmental interests in effectuating the
policy. 236 Unlike the Supreme Court in Vernonia, however, the Tenth
Circuit was faced with a negligible drug problem at Tecumseh High
School 137 and was unwilling to allow suspicionless drug testing of students without a showing that the intrusion would redress the problem at
hand.238 While the Tenth Circuit was restrained in its unwillingness to
allow for searches based on such a non-demonstrable showing, the "special needs" exception adopted to analyze the issue is but one more test
which centers on the reasonableness of the governmental policy and pays
little heed to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.

227. Id. at 1066.
228. Id. at 1065.
229. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1063-65.
230. Id. at 1064.
231.
See id.
232. Id. at 1065.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1064.
235. See Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd.of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2001).
236. See Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1275-78.
237. See id. at 1272-75.
238. Id. at 1278 ("Unless a [school] district is required to demonstrate such a problem, there is
no limit on what students a school may randomly and without suspicion test. Without any limitation,
schools could test all of their students simply as a condition of attending school.").
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V. CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit continued to adopt new
and broadening exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Supreme Court, and the Tenth Circuit with it, "has shifted...
from a conjunctive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to an interpretation that is increasingly disjunctive and, for searches unrelated to
criminal investigations, reliant upon the special needs balancing test to
' While the saying that the Fourth Amenddetermine reasonableness."239
ment has a preference for warrants might have once been true, the past
year does not mirror that sentiment in the Tenth Circuit. At this current
pace, the exceptions might soon swallow the warrant and probable cause
rule, leaving the private individual to the discretion of the police and
unable to rely on the impartiality and detachment of a neutral and informed magistrate.
Charles W. Chotvacs

239. Jennifer E. Smiley, Rethinking the "Special Needs " Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing
of High School Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
811, 836 (2001) ("Under the conjunctive approach.... the Fourth Amendment does not permit
warrantless searches and seizures, while under the disjunctive approach, warrantess searches are
allowed, provided that they are 'reasonable."').

DEPORTABILITY, DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
INTRODUCTION

Immigration Law encompasses a substantial number of sub-topics,
ranging from determinations of asylum status to judicial jurisdiction to
hear appeals to consular access.' Plenary power over immigration belongs to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution,
which grants the federal legislature the power "to establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States."2 Congress's
authority over immigration and naturalization has faced little challenge
throughout the nation's history, as the United States Supreme Court has
held that the right to exclude aliens is a "fundamental act of sovereignty.",3 However, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held "that
all individuals within U.S. borders enjoy constitutional protection,'"
Congress's actions as they relate to aliens in America must be consistent
with Due Process. 5
Because of the massive scope of Immigration and Naturalization
Law, the following survey will focus only on two major sub-topics: the
aggravated felony category and the detention of lawful permanent residents. Part I addresses the aggravated felony category, which may be
applied to aliens in two ways - first, by making a lawful permanent resident deportable, 6 and, second, by increasing the sentence of a previously
deported alien found to have illegally entered the United States after deportation.7 Part II will discuss the detention of aliens, under the Illegal
I.
For an updated discussion of developments in the full range of Immigration Law, see
Federal Court Update: Summaries of Recent Immigration Decisions, 78 No. 36 INTER. REL. 1485
(Sept. 2001). West Group releases these updates, containing a report and analysis of immigration
and nationality law, monthly.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
2.
3.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). For a general
discussion of Congress's plenary power over immigration law, see Daniel R. Dinger, When We
Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?:An Analysis of the Rights of DeportableAliens Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim Procedures Governing Detention, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1551, 1555-63 (2000) (discussing the intersection of Congress's plenary power over immigration
with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process provision); see generally Melinda Smith, Criminal
Defense Attorneys and Noncitizen Clients: Understanding Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law &
How Recent Changes in Those Laws May Affect Your Criminal Cases, 33 AKRON L. REV. 163
(1999) (examining both the sociological and legal history of immigration in America).
4. Lisa Cox, The Legal Limbo of Indefinite Detention: How Long Can You Go?, 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 725, 742 (2001).
5.
See id. at 742-43.
6.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001) (classifying as deportable "any alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission").
7.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2001) (making it a crime to re-enter the United States following a
deportation). Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1 .2(b)(l)(A) allow a sixteen-level increase in base offense
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Immigration Reform and Death Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IRIRA"), which provides for the detention of an alien pending removal as an aggravated felon, prior to the completion of such removal
proceedings.!
I. THE AGGRAVATED FELONY REQUIREMENT: 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(III)
A. Background: The Evolution of the Aggravated Felony Definition

The aggravated felony penalty as applied to aliens first appeared in
a 1988 anti-drug law, reflecting a Congressional effort to rid the nation
of its least desirable aliens.9 Although the original aggravated felony
category included only murder, drug-trafficking and firearms
trafficking," ° the categorical definition has expanded with virtually every
major crime and immigration act since then." Both the 1996
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA")'2 and the
4
3
category.
IIRIRA greatly expanded the
Today, the category includes a lengthy list of crimes, ranging from
the original offenses of the 1988 act to prostitution and pornography offenses, from fraud and forgery to a repeat conviction for drug
possession.'5 Perhaps the most significant expansion of the category was
accomplished by reducing the minimum sentencing requirement.' 6 While
the category formerly included offenses receiving a five-year minimum
sentence, today the category includes offenses with only one-year minimum sentences; "[t]he effect of this is to render virtually all nonregulatory felonies aggravated felonies ...
Notably, the definition re-

level for an alien who re-enters after deportation based on a conviction for an "aggravated felony."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) (2001).
8.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2001) (allowing the Attorney General to release an alien
deportable under § 1227 only if that release is necessary for the purposes of a separate criminal
investigation, provided that "the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of
property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding").
9.
See 1988 Anti Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 100-690 § 7342 (hereinafter 1988 Act). For a
general overview of the evolution of the Aggravated Felony category, see Kari Converse, Criminal
Law Reforms: Defending Immigrants in Peril, 21 AUG. CHAMPION 10, 11-12 (1997); Robert James
McWhirter, Hell Just Got Hotter: The Rings of Immigration Hell and the Immigration Consequences
to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revisited, II GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 515 -20 (1997).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2001).
11.
See McWhirter, supra note 9, at 518.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (hereinafter AEDPA).
13.
Pub. L. No. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656 (1996) (hereinafter IIRIRA).
14.
See McWhirter, supra note 9, at 515-20.
15.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2001).
16.
See Converse, supra note 9, at 11 -12.
17.
Id.
at 11.
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ceives retroactive application, with potentially devastating consequences
for some resident aliens."
In the years since the passage of the 1996 acts, many lawful permanent residents have faced deportation proceedings, including several
whom Congress most likely would not have considered undesirable or
deportable.' 9 Some of these aliens may have received only suspended
sentences at a time when their offenses were not considered aggravated
felonies for deportation purposes, and have lived in the United States for
several years since their convictions, with no further criminal activity. 20
Consider Xuan Wilson, who came to America from Vietnam at age
four, wrote a forged check for $19.83 in 1989, and "now faces deportation to a homeland she hardly remembers, as well as a permanent bar
against any future re-entry into the United States.",2' Likewise, Sokhom
Oeur, a Cambodian refugee who arrived in the States as a teenager, now
faces deportation based on an assault conviction, for which he received
only a suspended sentence, stemming from his self-defensive use of a
weapon when threatened by a group of young men in 1995.22 By greatly
expanding the aggravated felony category, and by applying it retroactively, "Congress cast a big net, and they're catching some dolphins in
,,
it. 2

This survey will focus on two categories of crimes used by the INS
as a basis for invoking deportation proceedings. First, this survey will
address the transportation of aliens as a potential "aggravated felony."
While the IRIRA refers to an offense "relating to alien smuggling,"24 the
courts have recently had an opportunity to determine if the offense includes the transportation of aliens strictly within American borders.25
Both the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have held that the transportation of aliens falls within an aggravated felony category for deportation
purposes, and have, thus, further expanded the category from its original
form in 1988.26
Second, the survey will address another frequent conviction that
may result in deportation, driving Under the influence. The Tenth Circuit
has disagreed with all other circuits in its interpretation of the "crime of
violence" sub-category within the aggravated felony category, particuSee Smith, supra note 3,at 194 (discussing the potential of AEDPA to "put legal resident
18.
aliens in jeopardy of removal for even minor offenses which may have been committed years ago").
19. See generally Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught inCongressional Fishnets - Immigration
Law's New Aggravated Felons, 12 IMMIGR. L.J. 589 (1998).

at590-92.
20. See id.
Id.at591.
21.
22. See id.
23. Id.at589 (quoting Russ Bergeron, INS spokesman).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(N) (2001).
25. See United States v. Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001); Ruiz-Romero v.
Reno, 205 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2000).
26. See Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d at 1248; Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 840.
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larly as it applies to drunk-driving convictions.27 The definition of aggravated felony includes "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of
title 18, United States Code, but not including a purely political offense)
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.''28 While four
other circuits have considered the issue and determined that a DUI conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony,29 the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that a DUI conviction constitutes a "crime of violence,"
and, therefore, satisfies the aggravated felony requirement for the institution of deportation proceedings.30
B. Transportationof Aliens as an Aggravated Felony
1. Tenth Circuit: United States v. Salas-Mendoza3'
a. Facts
In United States v. Salas-Mendoza, the defendant, Leobardo SalasMendoza, was convicted of one count of re-entry of a removed alien in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) 2 The district court, in sentencing him to
84 months imprisonment, increased his base offense level by 16 points as
required by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).33 The Sentencing Guidelines require that where a defendant is initially deported based upon an aggravated felony, his base sentence be increased by 16 points.34 SalasMendoza was previously convicted of transporting aliens in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). 3 Salas-Mendoza challenged the court's
finding that a conviction for the transportation of aliens constituted an
aggravated felony for sentencing purposes, noting the distinction between "alien smuggling," which necessarily requires cross-border
movement, and mere transportation, which involves only intra-country
movement.36

27. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
28.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Title 18, section 16, defines "crime of violence" as "(a) an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2001).
29. See United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257
F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); BazanReyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
30. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001).
31.
237 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001).
32. See Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d at 1246.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1247.
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b. Decision
Salas-Mendoza's claim that the definition of "aggravated felony" as
found in 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(N), which includes "an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of §1324(a) of this title (relating to
alien smuggling)," is limited by the parenthetical text, was rejected by
the Tenth Circuit.37 The court expressly rejected the defendant's claim
that the "smuggling of aliens, by definition, requires the movement of
aliens across the border between Mexico and the United States whereas
transportation of aliens involves the movement of aliens solely within the
United States."38 The Tenth Circuit's analysis relied on case law from the
Fifth Circuit, which ruled that the parenthetical "relating to alien smuggling" served to describe, rather than to limit, the offenses listed in §
1324(a).39
The court further found a clear relationship between the transportation and smuggling of aliens based on both the language of the statute
and congressional intent.' ° The court noted that the enumerated offenses
listed in § 1324(a) all involve "the transportation, movement and hiding
of aliens whether crossing into or within the United States."' It bolstered
this reading by contrasting the parenthetical in § 1101(a)(43)(N) with
those parentheticals elsewhere in § 1101 that expressly limit offenses. 2
Additionally, the court inferred from Congress's continuing expansion of
§ 1324 since its initial passage an intent to include the act of transportation within the anti-smuggling laws.43 Having determined that the transportation of aliens fell within the offenses listed in the aggravated felony
category, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Salas-Mendoza's increased sentence.44
2. Fifth Circuit: Ruiz-Romero v. Reno 5
a. Facts
Less than a year prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in SalasMendoza, the Fifth Circuit had the occasion to consider the same issue in
Ruiz-Romero v. Reno. Here, the defendant, who had achieved lawful
permanent resident status in 1990, was convicted of transporting eight

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1247.
See id. (citing United States v. Monjares-Castaneda, 190 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1999)).
See id.
Id.at 1247.
See id. at 1248.
See id.at 1247.
See Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1248.
205 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Mexican aliens within the state of New Mexico alone, in violation of §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).4 The law penalizes:
[Any person who] knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move
such alien within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law.47
Ruiz-Romero was consequently facing deportation proceedings
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)A)(iii). 48 The defendant moved to terminate the deportation proceedings on the ground that his conviction for
the transportation of aliens did not constitute an "aggravated felony. ' 4 9
After the immigration judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") upheld that order, the defendant appealed to the
Fifth Circuit. °
b. Decision
As in Salas-Mendoza, the Fifth Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether the parenthetical phrase found in § 1101 (a)(43)(N) ("relating to
alien smuggling") limited or described the statutory definition of aggravated felony preceding it." Here, the court relied on its own precedent of
52 which held in a sentencingUnited States v. Monjaras-Castaneda,
guidelines context that the parenthetical phrase served only a descriptive,
rather than restrictive, purpose. 3 Reaffirming the statutory construction
found in Monjaras-Castaneda,the Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA's finding
that the transportation of aliens within American borders constituted an
aggravated felony for deportation proceedings. 4
3. Analysis
The combined rulings of the Tenth Circuit, in Salas-Mendoza, and
the Fifth Circuit, in Ruiz-Romero, suggest that the transportation of aliens
within American borders constitutes an aggravated felony for both sentencing and deportation purposes." However, the broad definition and
sweeping categorical approach applied by the courts may result in some
extremely harsh consequences for some aliens. Consider the following
hypothetical. A lawful permanent resident lives in a tight-knit immigrant
46.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1997).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
See Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 838.
See id.
See idd.
See id
190 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999).
See Monjaras-Castaneda,190 F.3d at 329.
See Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 839.
See Salas-Mendoza, 237 F.3d at 1246-47; Ruiz-Romero, 205 F.3d at 839.
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community in San Antonio, Texas. He agrees to drive a group of his
neighbors to Dallas, Texas. Not having determined the legal status of any
of his passengers, the lawful permanent resident, through his "reckless
disregard" for the illegal status of his neighbors, has committed an aggravated felony and will be subject to deportation proceedings for his
neighborly act. Surely, this is not the sort of activity that Congress intended to target.
Consider the following actual scenario. One resident alien, originally from Canada and married to a United States citizen, was ruled deportable for what most would consider a harmless exercise of poor
judgment. 6 In 1985, Gabriela Dee, at the age of twenty, sought to help
her Israeli boyfriend sneak across the Canadian border into the States. 7
The brief legal proceeding that followed imposed only a $25 fine for her
"alien smuggling" conviction.5 ' Eleven years later, when the INS was
reviewing Dee's application for permanent residency, they discovered
the conviction, "retroactively applied the new aggravated felon provisions to Dee's case, and commenced deportation proceedings against
her."5 9

In both of these situations, a seemingly innocent (or at least relatively harmless) act renders the actor, an otherwise lawful and upstanding American resident, subject to deportation proceedings. But these
actors are not committing the heinous crime most of us imagine when we
refer to "alien smuggling." Contrast their actions with the 1993 "Golden
Venture" tragedy, where a dilapidated freighter carrying approximately
285 illegal Chinese immigrants washed upon the shore of the Rockaway
Peninsula in Queens, New York, resulting in the death of at least six passengers. 6° More recently, Jesus Lopez-Ramos plead guilty to alien smuggling charges after smuggling in dozens of illegal immigrants across the
Mexican border, leaving 14 of them to die in the Arizona desert.6' Surely
these are the sorts of criminal acts Congress envisioned when it added
the offense of "alien smuggling" to the aggravated felony requirement. 62
By construing the "alien smuggling" category so broadly, the courts have
expanded its scope with unintended consequences for countless resident
aliens.

See Coonan, supra note 19, at 590-91.
See id. at 591.
See id.
Id.
See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Maritime Slave Trade: A 21' Century Problem?, 7 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495, 501 (2001).
61.
See Man Admits Alien Smuggling, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 2001, at A, available at
2001 WL 28417985.
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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C. Driving Under the Influence: Aggravated Felony?
In the past year, several circuits have addressed the issue of whether
a drunk driving conviction (either a DUI or a DWI) constitutes a "crime
of violence" so as to fall within the aggravated felony category,63 thereby
resulting in either deportation or an increased sentence following an illegal reentry into the United States. 64 Out of the five circuits addressing the
issue, only the Tenth Circuit found that a drunk driving conviction constitutes a "crime of violence" as intended by the Immigration and Nationality Act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).65 The remaining circuits all
construed the "crime of violence" definition as excluding drunk-driving
offenses, based not only on a reading of the definition itself, but also on
the distinction between the definition as found at 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and
as found in the Sentencing Guidelines. 6
1. Tenth Circuit: Tapia Garciav. INS 7
a. Facts
Jose G. Tapia-Garcia was a Mexican citizen but a legal permanent
resident of the United States when he received a conviction for driving
under the influence in Idaho in 1998. 8 Tapia-Garcia served only two
months of his five year sentence before being released, and the INS subsequently commenced deportation proceedings against him based on his
conviction for an "aggravated felony" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 69 An immigration judge concluded that Tapia-Garcia's
DUI offense satisfied the "crime of violence" category of the "aggravated felony" conviction, and ordered Tapia-Garcia's removal to Mexico. 70 The BIA affirmed the judge's finding, dismissing Tapia-Garcia's
appeal and issuing a final removal order that resulted in Tapia-Garcia's
deportation to Mexico.7'
b. Decision
The central issue before the court was whether Idaho's DUI offense
constituted an "aggravated felony," and therefore rendered Tapia-Garcia

63.
See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-Garza
243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).
64. See discussion regarding the significance of an aggravated felony conviction supra Part IA.
65. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
66. See discussion infra Part I-C, 2 -5.
67.
237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
68. See Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1217.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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subject to deportation proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)." In order to determine the issue, the court looked to
the definition of aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F),
which included "crime of violence" as described in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
Tapia-Garcia claimed that Idaho's DUI offense did not constitute a
crime of violence "because it does not 'by its nature involve a substantial
risk that physical force... may be used in the course of committing the
offense,"' as required by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 4 Rather, argued the defendant, the statute was written broadly, so as to encompass both violent and
nonviolent crimes.75
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the defendant's argument,
declining to consider the DUI offense in light of the particular facts of
the defendant's case, and instead applying a "categorical approach that
considers only the generic elements of the offense. 7 6 The court's analysis relied upon BIA precedent, which called for a categorical approach to
the "crime of violence" analysis, requiring that "'the nature of the crime
- as elucidated by the generic elements of the offense - is such that its
commission would ordinarily present a risk that physical force would be
used against the property of another' irrespective of whether the risk
develops or harm actually occurs.' ' 77 Moreover, the court invoked another BIA decision, which held that a state DUI offense constituted a
"crime of violence," so long as the offense was considered a felony under state law, and which noted that "the statutory definition of crime
of
78
violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) did not require intentional conduct.
Finally, the court looked to federal precedent, including its own,
which held that driving under the influence constituted a "crime of violence" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. 79 Based on the categorical approach to the "crime of violence" analysis, and the federal
Sentencing Guidelines precedent, the Tenth Circuit concluded that an
Idaho DUI offense constituted a "crime of violence" within the aggravated felony definitions, and therefore rendered the defendant subject to
deportation proceedings.8s

72.
See id.
73. See id.
at 1221.
74.
Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1221.
75. See id.
76.
Id. at 1221-22.
77.
Id. at 1222 (quoting Matter of Magallanes-Garcia, Interim Decision 3341, 1998
WL133301 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998) (quoting Matter of Alcantar, 20 1. & N. Dec. 801 (BIA 1994),
available at 1994 WL 232083).
78.
Id. (citing Matter of Puente-Salazar,Interim Decision 3412, 1999 WL 770709 (BIA Sept.
29, 1999).
79. See Tapia Garcia,237 F.3d at 1222-23.
80. See id at 1223.
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2. Fifth Circuit: United States v. Chapa-Garza8'
a. Facts
In United States v. Chapa-Garza,the Fifth Circuit considered the
consolidated appeals of five defendants separately convicted of unlawful
presence in the United States after being deported.82 All defendants faced
increased sentences upon a finding that their prior removal from the
United States was based upon an "aggravated felony., 83 As in Tapia
Garcia,the court's decision turned upon whether a conviction for a state
drunk driving felony, here a Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI") charge,
constituted a "crime of violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). '
b. Decision
The Fifth Circuit's analysis set forth three reasons for determining
that the DWI does not constitute a "crime of violence," and therefore is
not an aggravated felony that would result in increased sentences for the
defendants.85 First, the court declined to interpret the "crime of violence"
language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to include the same offenses as the definition set forth in Sentencing Guideline § 4B 1.2(a)(2), which includes "any
offense that involves 'pure recklessness,' i.e. a conscious disregard of a
substantial risk of injury to others. 8 6 Instead, the court relied upon an
alternative reading of § 16(b), which "applies only when the nature of the
offense is such that there is a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator
will intentionally employ physical force against another's person or
property in the commission thereof."87 In reaching this decision, the court
distinguishes Sentencing Guideline § 4B 1.2(a)(2), which considers the
effect of the defendant's conduct, from 8 U.S.C. § 16(b), which considers
the conduct itself.88 Moreover, the court noted that the definition of crime
of violence found in the Sentencing Guidelines was changed in 1989
from a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) to the new, broader definition currently found there. 89 The Fifth Circuit then concluded that this change in
definition suggests that the two standards must be interpreted
differently. 9°
The second reason given by the Fifth Circuit for its holding was that
the relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), "'substantial risk that physi81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001).
See Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 923.
See id.
See Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 923.
See id. at 924.
Id. at 925.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 926.
See Chapa-Garza,243 F.3d at 926.
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cal force... may be used' contemplates only reckless disregard for the
probability that intentional force may be employed." 9' The court viewed
this construction, which favors a requirement of intentional conduct on
the part of the defendant, as opposed to requiring only an "accidental,
unintended event," as the most reasonable interpretation of the phrase
"may be used." 92
Finally, the Fifth Circuit stated, "the physical force described in §
16(b) is that 'used in the course of committing the offense,' not that force
that could result from the offense having been committed., 93 Again, the
focus is on the intent of the perpetrator and on the conduct itself, as opposed to the unintended effects that may result from such conduct. Based
on these factors, the Fifth Circuit determined that force is not intentionally "used" against another person by the perpetrator of a DWI, and,
therefore, a DWI felony does not constitute a "crime of violence," as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 94
3. Seventh Circuit: Bazan-Reyes v. INS' 5
a. Facts
In Bazan-Reyes v. INS, the Seventh Circuit addressed the consolidated appeals of three resident aliens facing removal based on state
drunk driving offenses under Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin law. 96 Defendant Bazan-Reyes, a Mexican citizen, had been a legal resident in the
United States for eleven years prior to his Indiana DWI conviction. 9 Defendant Maciasowicz, a Polish citizen, had been a lawful permanent resident for nearly five years when he pled guilty to two counts of homicide
by intoxicated use of a vehicle under Wisconsin law.98 The third defendant, Gomez-Vela, was a Mexican citizen admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 197 1.99 After twenty-five years of residence, Gomez was
charged with aggravated driving under the influence based on two prior
DUI convictions in Illinois.'00
b. Decision
The Seventh Circuit faced the question of whether state drunk driving offenses constituted "aggravated felonies" for deportation purposes,
as all three defendants had received removal orders from the INS based
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 924 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 926.
Id. at 924.
See id. at 927.
256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 602.
See id.
See id. at 603.
See id.
See id.
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on their convictions.' °' The court ultimately rejected decisions by the INS
and the BIA, which had ruled that state drunk driving offenses constituted aggravated felonies because they were crimes of violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16.102
Relying on its own precedent, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
their prior "finding that the word 'use' requires volitional conduct prohibits a finding that drunk driving is a crime of violence under §16(a). '' 3
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in Chapa-Garza,
distinguished between "crime of violence" as defined in § 16 and as defined in the Sentencing Guidelines.""' Accordingly, the court held that a
"crime of violence" finding, for aggravated felony purposes, "is limited
to crimes in which the offender is reckless with respect to the risk that
intentional physical force will be used in the course of committing the
offense."' 0 5 The court then applied a categorical approach to the drunk
driving statutes, and determined that "intentional force" is almost never
used to commit such offenses.' ° The court concluded, therefore, that the
drunk-driving offenses did not constitute crimes of violence, and that the
defendants were therefore not convicted of aggravated felonies for removal purposes. '°7 In reaching its decision, the court specifically rejected
the Tenth Circuit's contrary determination that drunk driving is a crime
of violence.'08
4. Second Circuit: Dalton v. Ashcroft' °9
a. Facts
In Dalton v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit reviewed the decision of
the BIA, which upheld an immigration judge's order of removal based on
a resident alien's DWI conviction." ° The petitioner, Thomas Anthony
Dalton, although a citizen of Canada, had been living in the United States
as a lawful permanent resident since 1958, prior to his first birthday.'"
Dalton's parents and siblings were also residing in the United States at
the time of his deportation proceedings.' 2 In 1998, Dalton pled guilty to
a DWI offense, and based on two previous convictions within the pre-

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 604.
See Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 605.
Id. at 609.
See id.
Id. at 612.
See id.
See id. at612.
See Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 610.
257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001).
See Dalton, 257 F.3d. at 203.
See id. at 202.
See id.
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ceding ten years, Dalton's crime and sentence were increased to a class
D felony under New York law." 3
Subsequently, while Dalton was serving his prison sentence, the
INS began removal proceedings against him as an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony. ' 4 An immigration judge ordered Dalton removed
without the opportunity to request relief, and the BIA affirmed."5 The
BIA's decision relied on its own precedent, as well as a Fifth Circuit
opinion which was later withdrawn, in determining that a DWI conviction under New York law constituted a "crime of violence," and therefore fell within an aggravated felony category.116
b. Decision
The Second Circuit applied a categorical approach to its statutory
interpretation of the New York DWI statute. ' ' 7 In doing so, the court relied upon recent language of the New York Court of Appeals regarding
the statute, which noted the "sweeping" nature of conduct covered by the
statute. ' 8 The court noted the many situations in which a person could be
convicted under the New York statute, including situations where an
intoxicated person is found asleep at the wheel of a car that is neither in
motion nor running.'"9 Comparing the broad range of conduct covered by
the New York statute to the federal "crime of violence" definition, the
court concluded that a New York DWI conviction did not necessarily
involve the "use of physical force" as required by the "crime of violence"
definition.' 2 The Second Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in Chapa-Garza,
distinguished between the "risk of injury" and a risk of the "use of physical force," thereby focusing
on intent and conduct, rather than potential
2
and unintended effects.' 1
22

5. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Trinidad-Aquino'
a. Facts

In United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a prior deportation based on a California DUI conviction should
result in an elevated sentence due to the aggravated felony penalty.' 23 The
defendant, Trinidad-Aquino, received a 1994 conviction for driving un-

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
See id. at 203.
See id.
See Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203.
See id. at 204.
See id. at 205.
See id.
See id. at 206.
See id. at 207.
259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1142.
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der the influence of alcohol with bodily injury under California law and
was subsequently deported. 24 Five years later, Trinidad-Aquino pled
guilty to illegally re-entering the United States following a deportation
order.' 25 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, if a defendant was previously
deported after receiving an "aggravated felony" conviction, a sixteenlevel increase in base offense will be applied to his sentence. 126 The district court, ruling that Trinidad-Aquino's prior DUI conviction did not
satisfy the "aggravated felony" definition,28refused to apply this sentencing increase.'2 7 The government appealed.'
b. Decision
The Ninth Circuit upheld the determination of the district court that,
because the DUI conviction required merely "a negligence mens rea"
under California law, the offense was not a "crime of violence" and
therefore did not constitute an aggravated felony for sentencing
purposes. 129 In reviewing the district court's finding, the Ninth Circuit
applied a categorical approach, based on the statutory definition of the
crime. 30 Following its own precedent of United States v. Baron3
Medina,1
1 the court ruled that, because "'[c]rime of violence'
is not a
traditional common law crime ...

it can only be construed by consider-

ing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the language
Congress used in defining the crime.' ' 32 The court relied on the word
"use" in the statutory definition for a "crime of violence," holding that
the word "use" as commonly understood involves a "volitional requirement absent from negligence.' 33 In applying this understanding of the
"crime of violence" to the case at bar, the court considered not the specific facts of Trinidad-Aquino's crime, which may have involved a mens
rea above negligence, but only the DUI statute as a whole, which allows
a conviction for mere negligence. ' 3 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a DUI conviction under California law35was not sufficient to result in
an elevated sentence for Trinidad-Aquino.'

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1142.
See Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d at 1146.
See id. at 1143.
187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999).
Trinidad-Aquino,259 F.3d at 1144.
Id.
See id. at 1146.
See id.
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6. Analysis

In the last year, five circuits considered the precise issue of whether
a drunk driving violation could constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of both removal proceedings and sentence enhancements after being convicted of illegal reentry. 3 6 Four circuits found that such an offense cannot constitute an "aggravated felony.' 3 7 Only the Tenth Circuit
has determined within the last year that a DUI is a "crime of violence,"
and therefore an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes."'
However, because the Tenth Circuit issued its decision on January 19,
2001, while the other circuits issued their decisions in March, July and
August of 2001,39 it is questionable whether the Tenth Circuit ruling will
stand, should the same issue arise again.
II. THE MANDATORY DETENTION REQUIREMENT: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
A. Background
1. Generally
IIRIRA provides for the detention of an alien pending removal as an
aggravated felon, prior to the completion of such removal proceedings.'o
IIRIRA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to include § 236(c), which requires the Attorney General to "take into custody
any alien who ... is deportable by reason of having committed" an aggravated felony, as expanded under IIRIRA.14 ' The 1996 amendment was
not Congress's first attempt at such a stringent detention provision. The
1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act ("ADAA") provided a similar detention requirement for those aliens who had committed "aggravated felonies"'' 2 albeit under a much narrower definition of "aggravated felony.' 43 The
majority of courts who reviewed the ADAA's mandatory detention provision declared it unconstitutional as violating due process.'" Consequently, Congressional amendments in 1990 and 1991 allowed for the
discretionary release of lawful aliens who could demonstrate that they
posed neither flight nor public safety risks.'4 5 The current mandatory de136. See cases cited supra notes 66, 80, 94, 108, 121.
137. See cases cited supra notes 80, 94, 108, 121.
138. See Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
139. See cases cited supra notes 66, 80, 94, 108, 121.
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (allowing the Attorney General to release an alien deportable
under § 1227 only if that release is necessary for the purposes of a separate criminal investigation,
provided that "the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is
likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding").
141.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).
142. ADAA § 73 4 3(a).
143. See supra notes 8 - 17 and accompanying text.
144.
See Ellis M. Johnston, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal? Unconstitutional
Presumptions for Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens, 89 GEO. L.J. 2593, 2597 (2001).
145. See id.
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tention provision represents a Congressional response to a growing public perception of the danger of criminal aliens."
The ongoing debate over the rights of lawful permanent resident
aliens within the United States, and the mandatory detention of an alien
prior to a final removal order, has become extremely relevant in light of
the recent terrorist attacks on America and the subsequently enacted legislation.'47 On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the USA Patriot
Act, a stark piece of anti-terrorism legislation swiftly drafted and passed
in response to the September 11' terrorist attacks on America.14 8 A key
provision of the new law allows "the attorney general to hold foreigners
considered suspected terrorists for up to seven days before charging them
with a crime or beginning deportation proceedings."'4 9 The provision was
a compromise insofar as the administration had initially sought
the
50
authority to detain immigrants suspected of terrorism indefinitely.'
Whether the seven-day limit included in the bill will place any actual restraints on the government's treatment of immigrants is questionable. The executive branch detained some 700 to 800 immigrants in the
weeks following the attacks,' 5 ' and has invoked a variety of justifications
for doing so. 152 First, the government may hold people as material witnesses if "they are thought to have pertinent information and prosecutors
want to depose them or get them to testify before a grand jury. A material witness has a right to' 53a hearing but can be held without bail if he is
considered a flight risk.' 1
A second group involves individuals detained by the government on
immigration charges, who "can be held virtually indefinitely once deportation proceedings have begun.' 54 Although the period of time be-

146. See id. at 2596-97.
147. See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, But
With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL-NYT 0128600053. The
legislation requires the Attorney General to release suspects after seven days, or to charge them with
a criminal or immigration violation. See id.
148.
See Bush Signs Sweeping New Laws to Combat Terrorism, Oct. 26, 2001, at
http://news.findlaw.com/politics/s/20011026/attackbushdc.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
149. Id.
150. See Adam Clymer, Senate Passes Anti-Terror Bill to Expand Government's Powers, Oct.
26,2001, N.Y.TIMES NEWS SERV., availableat 2001 WL-NYT 0129900024.
151. See Mae M. Cheng, Detentions Raise Legal Concerns: Some Immigrants held for long
periods, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 9257317; Laurie P. Cohen, The Response
to Terror:Material-Witness Warrants in U.S. Draw Criticism, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2001, at
12, available at 2001 WL-WSJA 22059219.
152. See Judy Peres, War on Terror: The Detained,CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2001, at 8, available
at 2001 WL 4126317.
153. Id.
154. Id. The authority to detain these immigrants virtually indefinitely is discussed in Part II of
this survey. See also Anita Ramasastry, Indefinite Detention Based Upon Suspicion: How the Patriot
Act Will Disrupt Many Lawful Immigrants' Lives, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
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tween detention and the decision to commence deportation proceedings
was traditionally regulated at 48 hours, Attorney General Ashcroft recently expanded it to "48 hours except in emergencies or extraordinary
circumstances, where you can be detained for any reasonable time."'55
With the authority to invoke the current state of "emergency" facing the
country, the Attorney General may effectively detain immigrants guilty
of even the slightest immigration infringements for an unlimited period
of time.
Civil rights groups and attorneys have reacted with great concern
56
over the detention of immigrants following the September 1 1h attacks.
Some of the common concerns include the federal government's failure
to release information regarding "the nationality or ethnicity of many of
the detainees, the criteria authorities are using to pick them up, what kind
of access they have been given to attorneys or how many people have
been released."' 57 So far, a great deal of anecdotal evidence has emerged
to reinforce these concerns. 5 8 Some of the more egregious examples include the beating of a Pakistani student being held in a Mississippi jail, 9
the holding of a Middle Eastern man for two weeks without allowing him
to contact his attorney, '6° and, for a Saudi man in Texas, the denial of "an
attorney, a mattress, a blanket, a drinking cup and a clock to remind him
when to say his Muslim prayers."' 6 '
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
Under section 1226(c), the Attorney General is authorized to release
such "deportable" aliens only if such release:
is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a
person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity,
or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness , or person cooperating with such an investigation, and
the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a

20011002_ramasastry.html (last visited Nov. 11,2001) (discussing the potential for detention based
on secret evidence as a serious threat to the constitutional rights of lawful permanent residents living
in the U.S.).
155. Peres, supra note 152.
156.
See Toner & Lewis, supra note 147; Editorial, Protect Public, Constitution, SUN
SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 2001, 28A, availableat 2001 WL 22763920; William Carlsen, Rights Violations,
Abuses Alleged by Detainees: Beatings,Lack of Legal RepresentationCited, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19,
2001, AI2, availableat 2001 WL 3417445; Cheng, supra note 151.
157. Cheng, supra note 151.
158. See Cheng, supra note 151; Sun Sentinel Editorial, supra note 156; Carlsen, supra note
156.
159.
See Carlsen, supra note 156.
160. See Cheng, supra note 151.
161.
Sun Sentinel Editorial, supra note 156.
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danger to the safety of other persons62or of property and is likely to
appear for any scheduled proceeding.
Thus, section 1226(c) presents a two-fold problem for so-called
"deportable" aliens: (1) it deprives them of an individual consideration of
whether they ought to be detained or ought to be released on bond, prior
to any actual decision that a removal order will result; and (2) by omitting any mention of a time limit for such detention or for the determination of whether to issue a removal order, it places them in jeopardy of a
potentially unlimited detention, without any hearing. 63
Once an alien has received a final removal order, their detention and
deportation is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. '64 However, many aliens
facing removal orders are unable to be deported, "either because their
foreign citizenship cannot be clearly established or because their country
of origin is unwilling to accept them.' 65 In Ho v. Greene,' 6 the Tenth
Circuit considered the detention of a removable alien under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), and found statutory authority to indefinitely detain an alien
who cannot be removed within the ninety-day removal period and who
the Attorney General determines to present either a flight risk or a security risk. 167 In upholding the constitutionality of such indefinite detention,
the Tenth Circuit determined that an alien who has been ordered removed retains no liberty interest,
and therefore has not been deprived
68
constitutional Due Process.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Zadvydas v.
Davis,'69 and rejected the authority of the INS to indefinitely detain these
"un-deportable" aliens.' 70 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
expressly overturned both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, finding that the
indefinite detention of a resident alien facing a final removal order raises
serious Fifth Amendment Due Process issues.' 7' The Supreme Court held
that the post-removal detention period of an "un-deportable" alien under
§ 1231 must contain an implicit reasonableness limitation, and that the
presumptive limit would be six months.' 72 In light of the Supreme Court's

162. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (1999).
163. See § 1226(c)(2).
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2001).
165. Barry J. Lipson, Federally Speaking, 3 No. 18 LAW. J. 6, 6 (2001). See generally Victoria
Cook Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial: The Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United
States, 79 TEx. L. REv. 769, 773-74 (2001) (discussing the plight of the so-called "stateless" aliens,
those without citizenship of any country, who therefore cannot be deported).
166.
204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000).
167. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1056.
168. See id. at 1058-59.
169.
121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001).
170. See Zadvydas, 121 S.Ct. at 2505.
171.
See id. at 2498.
172. See id. at 2505.
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decision in Zadvydas, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ho likely carries
little precedential value.
However, neither the Zadvydas decision, nor the Tenth Circuit ruling in Ho, is directly binding upon whether the mandatory detention of
aliens who have yet to receive a final removal order is constitutional.' 73
With neither binding Supreme Court nor Tenth Circuit precedent as to
the matter of the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c), it is not
surprising that the district courts are split as to the constitutionality of the
provision.' 74 This survey examines the split within the Tenth Circuit as to
this issue, and discusses the Seventh Circuit decision that directly considered and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory detention provision."

B. Current Confusion under § 1226(c)
1. Tenth Circuit Split: Mandatory Detention as Unconstitutional
76

a. Son Vo v. Greene'
i. Facts

In Son Vo v. Greene, the District Court considered the detention,
without bond, of Son Dien Vo, a lawful permanent resident facing potential deportation due to his conviction for Bank Fraud and aiding and
abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.177 Vo, a native of Vietnam, had been living in Denver as a lawful permanent resident of the United States at the time of his conviction.' Vo appealed the
immigration judge's determination that Vo was statutorily ineligible for
bond as an aggravated felon, claiming that the mandatory statutory detention requirement violated both his procedural and substantive Due
Process rights. 1
79

ii. Decision

173.
Although the Supreme Court briefly addressed section 1226(c) in dicta, it specifically
limited its holding to those aliens already facing removal orders but who are nonetheless "undeportable," stating that "the issue we address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself
unable to remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United
States." Id. at 2503.
174. See Son Vo v. Greene, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (D. Colo. 2000); Gonzalez-Portillo v.
Reno, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999); Kwon v. Comfort, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Colo. 2001).
175. See Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999). Despite the continuing disagreement
as to the constitutionality of the provision, no other Circuit has directly confronted this issue since.
See Son Vo v. Greene, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (D. Colo. 2000).
176.
109 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D. Colo. 2000).
177. See Son Vo, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1282.
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In assessing the constitutionality of the provision, Judge Kane rejected the reasoning of three prior bench decisions, which followed the
Seventh Circuit decision in Parrav. Perryman8 upholding the constitutionality of § 1226(c). 8 ' Judge Kane distinguished Parra,where the alien
was fully deportable to Mexico, with the case at bar, where Vo could not
8 2
be deported to Vietnam even if he received a final removal order.1
Judge Kane, in enjoining the INS from applying § 1226(c) to Vo, held
that the mandatory provision "deprived [Vo] of his liberty without due
process of law," concluding that "due process requires that a person
'charged' with being an aggravated felon be afforded the opportunity to
present evidence establishing that he is not what he is merely 'charged'
to be."'83
b. Gonzalez-Portillo v. Reno'8"
i. Facts
A few months after Judge Kane's decision in Son Vo, Federal Magistrate Judge Coan considered the detention of a lawful permanent resident facing deportation proceedings based on her convictions for multi85
ple crimes of moral turpitude and for her aggravated felony conviction.'
The petitioner, Gonzalez-Portillo, although a citizen of El Salvador who
originally entered the United States as an undocumented alien, obtained
lawful permanent resident status in 1989.186 Eleven years later, GonzalezPortillo pled guilty to two counts of forgery, a third degree felony. 8 7 She
not to exceed five years,
received a sentence of an indeterminate term,
88
but served only fifteen days in county jail.
Subsequently, the INS initiated removal proceedings.'89 GonzalezPortillo challenged her removability, claiming that her status as a lawful
permanent resident provided her with immunity from removal, that she
did not commit an aggravated felony for deportation purposes, and that
the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) violates her Fifth
Amendment right to Due Process and her Eighth Amendment right to
reasonable bond."'
ii. Decision

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999). See discussion, infra, Part ll.B.2.a.
See Son Vo, 109 F.Supp. 2d at1283.
See id.
Son Vo, 109 F. Supp. 2d at1283-84.
2000 WL 33191534 (D.Colo.2000).
See Gonzalez-Portillo,2000 WL 33191534,at*1.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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After rejecting her first two claims, the court considered GonzalezPortillo's claim of the unconstitutionality of the mandatory detention
provision.' 9' First, the court determined that a strict scrutiny standard
must be applied to the government's provision, requiring that the INS
"demonstrate that the detention of aliens without opportunity for release
pending finalization of removal proceedings is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest." '92 Next, having determined that the
Congress has a compelling interest in preventing the flight of criminal
aliens and the commission of additional crimes, the court considered
whether section 1226(c)'s
detention requirement was excessive in rela93
tion to that interest.
Here, the court considered the mandatory nature of the provision,
which "does not afford the Attorney General any discretion to make an
individualized determination about whether the reasons justifying Congress' enactment of the detention statute apply to a particular alien."' 9
Additionally, the court noted the indefinite nature of the requirement, as
the provision failed to provide any specific time limit for the issuance of
a final removal order.' 95 Based on both the inflexible nature of the provision, and the potentially indefinite detentions that it authorized, the magistrate deemed § 1226(c) unconstitutional and ordered that the INS must
provide Gonzalez-Portillo with an individualized bond hearing "to determine whether she presents a substantial risk of flight or a threat to
persons or property. ' 97
c. Mandatory Detention as Constitutional: Kwon v. Comfort

i. Facts
In Kwon, a Colorado district court considered the mandatory detention provision of IIRIRA as it addressed an appeal from a lawful permanent resident facing immigration proceedings pursuant to his conviction
for an aggravated felony.'98 The petitioner, a Korean citizen but a lawful
permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of second and
third degree sexual assault and received a sentence of nine months in jail

191.
See id at *5.
192. Id. at *7.In reaching this decision, the court relied upon the language of Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), which "distinguished the juvenile alien's liberty interest from a
fundamental liberty interest such as 'freedom from physical restraint' in the sense of a barred cell."
Id. at *6.
193. See id. at *8.
194. Id. at*10.
195. See id.
196. Id.
at*12.
197. 174 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Colo. 2001).
198. See Kwon, 174 F. Supp. 2d at1143.
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followed by eight years of probation.'" Subsequently, the INS initiated
removal proceedings against Kwon as an aggravated felon.2 °
ii. Court's Reasoning
Here, the court rejected the petitioner's argument that the mandatory
detention provision is unconstitutional, and instead followed the Seventh
20' The court's analysis focused first on ConCircuit's decision in Parra.
gress' "near-complete power over immigration," which stems from more
than mere Constitutional authority, but also from an inherent sovereign
right "to determine which aliens it will admit or expel. ' 2tO Next, the court
applied a relaxed standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the provision, requiring only that the provision be "bas[ed] upon a facially legitimate and bona fide reason." 203
In applying this "facially legitimate" purpose test, the court concluded that the detention requirement, along with IRIRA as a whole,
serves a legitimate governmental purpose by preventing the risk of flight
as well as the risk of further criminal activities through the duration of
the removal proceedings.2 0 Moreover, the court noted that even prior to
IIRIRA, the release of an alien pending removal proceedings was a matter of discretion, rather than entitlement.205 Finally, the court asserted that
the detention under § 1226(c) "is not indefinite but is limited to the time
it takes to adjudicate the removal proceedings, consider any request Petitioner makes for relief from removal ... and, if relief is rejected, to exe-

cute the final order of removal. ' 2 6 Based on these considerations, the
court in Kwon upheld 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) as constitutional.O'
2. Other Circuits
a. Parrav. Perryman208
i. Facts
In Parra v. Perryman, the Seventh Circuit considered and upheld
the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), requiring the mandatory detention of a deportable alien pending removal proceedings. 209 Manuel
Parra, a Mexican citizen convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault,

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1146.
Id.at 1144-45.
Id. at 1146 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794-95 (1977)).
Kwon, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
See id.
Id.
See id at 1144.
172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
See Parra, 172 F.3d at 958.
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was held by the INS pending a final removal order.2t In his appeal, Parra
conceded both that he was an alien and that he had been convicted of an
aggravated felony for removal purposes."' Accordingly, Parra presented
no doubt as to the fact that his removal order would be made final, but
only challenged whether the INS could detain him until such an order
was officially issued.2 2
ii. Decision
In addressing Parra's claim, the Seventh Circuit relied both on the
plain language of § 1226(c), which mandates the detention of aliens who
are "deportable," and on the immediate facts before it. 2 3 The court noted
that Parra's case, where his ultimate deportability was not in question,
presented no dilemma but that there might be closer cases:
[I]t is easy to imagine cases - for example, claims by persons detained under § 1226(c) who say that they are citizens rather than aliens, who contend that they have not been convicted of one of the
felonies that authorizes removal, or who are detained indefinitely because the nation of which they are citizens will not take them back in which resort to the Great Writ may be appropriate. Today's case
presents none of these possibilities, however, for Parra concedes that
he is an alien removable because of his criminal conviction, and
214
Mexico accepts return of its citizens.
After comparing Parra's liberty interest with the government's need to
prevent his flight, the Seventh Circuit found no constitutional bar to
Parra' s detention.2 3
3. Analysis
The Seventh Circuit's holding must be construed extremely narrowly, for it evaluated the constitutionality of the mandatory detention
26
requirement not on its face, but only as applied to these particular facts.
The court assessed Parra's liberty interest not as "liberty in the abstract,
but liberty in the United States by someone no longer entitled to remain
in this country but eligible to live at liberty in his native land. 2 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit did not actually address the constitutionality of the detention as applied to a resident alien contesting either his or
218
her legal status or the nature of the criminal conviction.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See
Id.
See

id. at 955.
id. at 956.
id
id. at 957.
Parra,172 F.3d at 958.
id. at 957.
id at 957.
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In Kwon v. Comfort, the Colorado district court's reasoning is
flawed in two major ways. First, in upholding the statute's detention provision, the court describes the decision to release an alien pending removal as one that has traditionally been discretionary." 9 Based on this
premise, the court ultimately ends up preserving a statute that removes
this traditional discretion, and instead requires a mandatory detention.2
Second, the court's reliance on Parramay be misplaced. While Parra
focused specifically on a defendant who conceded all aspects of his removability,22' the court in Kwon makes no mention of whether the defendant had conceded his ultimate removability. 2
With no on-point precedent as to the constitutionality of the mandatory detention of lawful permanent residents prior to a final removal
order, the confusion within the Tenth Circuit is understandable. However, given the recent surge in INS activity as against both illegal immigrants and aliens lawfully present within the United States, the Due Process limitations on alien confinement will become increasingly important.
CONCLUSION

Throughout American history, our national crises have been reflected in our legal treatment of immigrants, from the restrictions on
Japanese-Americans following the attack on Pearl Harbor 223 to the recent
USA Patriot Act, passed in swift response to the September I 11h terrorist
attacks on America.224 While excluding or deporting those aliens who
lack any established ties to and who pose significant safety threats to
American society is certainly a worthwhile goal, the achievement of this
goal must be tempered with reasonableness and limited by the constitutional restraint of Due Process, particularly regarding those aliens lawfully present.
The "aggravated felony" category, as repeatedly expanded by Congress and broadly interpreted by the courts, has resulted in total upheaval
for countless non-citizens who have lived peaceably in the United States
for the majority of their lives. Additionally, these same non-citizens face
a mandatory detention prior to any final determination of their removability, regardless of any flight or safety risk they pose. The allowance of
this constitutionally questionable practice not only risks the integrity of
the Due Process clause, but drains INS resources on the detention of
219.
See Kwon, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
220.
See id. at 1146-47.
221.
See Parra,172 F.3d at 957.
222. See id. at 956.
223.
See generally Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding as
constitutional federal legislation placing both curfew restrictions and geographic exclusions upon all
persons of Japanese ancestry, whether U.S. citizens or immigrants).
224. See notes 148-162, supra, and accompanying text.
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relatively harmless individuals rather than in the pursuit of the truly dangerous elements in our society. In order to ensure a constitutional and
level response to threats on our national security, the courts must be
vigilant in reviewing the legal treatment of immigrants in America in the
coming months.
Kathleen O'Rourke

COMBATING THE ILLICIT INTERNET: DECISIONS BY THE
TENTH CIRCUIT TO APPLY HARSHER SENTENCES AND
LESSENED SEARCH REQUIREMENTS TO CHILD
PORNOGRAPHERS USING COMPUTERS
There is no adequate way to measure the damage caused by those
who produce and sell child pornography. Child pornographers rob
children of their innocence and leave them harmed for life. Society
must not tolerate this behavior, and the federal government must
have the resolve and the necessary tools to combat it.

...In light of these significant harms, it is essential that those who
are caught and convicted for this conduct be punished severely.'

With its inexpensive, unlimited and instantaneous transmission
characteristics, the Internet has been termed "the most efficient pornography distribution engine ever conceived., 2 About one-fifth of worldwide
Internet users regularly visit a commercial pornography site,3 making the
Internet the "primary medium for pornography transmission." Estimates
of the annual U.S. sales revenue from child pornography approach one
billion dollars.5
In 1994, about twenty-three percent of federal child pornography
cases involved the use of a computer.6 In 1995, that number increased by
more than one-fifth, to twenty-eight percent. In response to such growth,
Congress enacted legislation to stiffen the penalties assessed against
child pornographers.8 The legislation subjects suspected child pornographers to lessened search and seizure requirements and subjects convicted
pornographers to increased sentencing terms. 9 If crimes were committed
by using the computer, the pornographers may have restrictions on Internet use that reach into their parole terms.'0 The lessened search and sei-

1. H.R. REP.No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
2.
Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against Child
Pornography,30 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 541, 541 (1998) (quoting Bill Frezza, Morality and
Imagination:Technology ChallengesBoth, COMM. WK., Jan. 13, 1997, at 31, 1997 WL 7691238).
3.
See Kelly M. Doherty, Comment, www.obscenity.com: An Analysis of Obscenity and
Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REV. 259, 263 (1999).
4.
Esposito, supra note 2, at 541.
5.
See HOWARD A. DAVIDSON & GREGORY A. LOKEN, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION 1 (1987).
6.
See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST
CHILDREN, at 30 (1996), http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/scac.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).

7.
8.
9.

See id.
See H.R. REP.No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
See id

10.

See discussion infra Parts I.B. & II.B.
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zure standard applies whether authorities discover pornography, or even
merely believe it may exist, on the defendant's computer."
During this past year, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
expanded the definition of "solicitation" of a minor, 2 supported offenselevel enhancements for child pornographers who use computers to commit crimes,'3 upheld Internet restrictions on paroled child pornography
defendants,' and widened the scope of warranted searches to encompass
all material on computer hard drives and disks.'5 The change in the
court's traditional interpretation is in response to the realization that
computers present extraordinarily wide distribution capabilities and, by
exploiting a child's fascination with computers, 16may be effective in enticing minors to engage in pornographic activity.
As presented in several cases that came before the Tenth Circuit in
2000-2001, this survey examines the current movement toward reinterpreting traditional search and seizure requirements, and increasing penalties for defendants convicted of child pornography crimes involving
computer usage. Part I examines the legislation behind the increased
sentencing and parole penalties, and the Court of Appeals' corresponding
interpretation of that legislation. Part H continues that analysis, focusing
on the lowered standards applied to both the execution of search warrants, and the search and seizure of computer equipment.
I. PENALTIES INCREASE WHEN A COMPUTER IS USED IN THE
SOLICITATION OF MINORS

A. Legislation that Controls the Crime of Child Pornography
The federal crimes constituting sex offenses against children fall
into three major categories: pornography, transportation, and criminal
sexual abuse. 7 This paper focuses on the first category.
Sex offenses against children constitute a small percentage of the
total federal criminal sentencings.'8 In 1995, courts sentenced only fiftyeight defendants for committing child pornography crimes, constituting
0.2% of all federal sentencings.' 9 That same year, the total number of
federal convictions for violations of all child sex crime laws numbered

17.

See discussion infra Part fl.C.l.a.2.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
See discussion infra Part I.C.I.a.
See discussion infra Part I.D.
See discussion infra Part ll.B. .a.3.
See, e.g., United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2001) (construing
No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61).
1.
See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at

18.
19.

See id. at 2.
See id.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
H.R. REP.
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209, approximately 0.6% of all federal convictions.' However, federal
prosecutions account for only a small number of child pornography defendants.2' In cases involving the rape of a minor, which is one category
from which accurate state and federal numbers may be drawn, state
courts convicted an estimated 8,662 offenders in 1992.22 Using this estimated figure, federal convictions constituted only 1.6% of the total nationwide convictions for rape of a minor. 23 These numbers suggest that
child sex offenders commit a staggering number of crimes in the United
States each year.
Federal law criminalizes the production of child pornography under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252.24 Section 2251 provides:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . any sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be
punished ...if such person knows or has reason to know that such
visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce
or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using materials that
have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.25
In the United States, pornography is "more freely available over the
Internet than in other mass communications media., 26 The increasing use
of the Internet to purchase, trade, and download pornographic materials
subjects many child pornographers to the interstate transport clause of §
2251 .2 Courts may impose sentences ranging from ten years to life imprisonment for violations of § 2251.28
In addition to restricting production, federal law also prohibits the
interstate transport, receipt, reproduction, and sale of child
pornography.29 Similar to § 225 1's provision, § 2252A explicitly provides

20. See id. (citing fifty-eight sentences for child pornography, six sentences for transportation
of a minor, and 145 sentences for criminal sexual abuse).
21.
See id.
22. See id.
23. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6,at 2.
24. See id. at 1.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 225 1(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
26. Anthony L. Clapes, The Wages of Sin: Pornography and Internet Providers, COMPUTER
LAW, July 1996, at 1.
27. See Esposito, supra note 2, at 541 ("the Internet has caused a surge in the production and
distribution of child pornography"); Clapes, supra note 26, at I ("pornography is not rampant on the
Internet; it is, however, more freely available over the Internet than in other mass communications
media in the United States").
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 225 1(d).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000).
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that interstate transport includes transmission via computer.3" A violation
of § 2252A carries a penalty of up to thirty years of imprisonment.3
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter "Sentencing Commission") to develop and maintain
uniform sentencing guidelines for use by federal judges. The guidelines
established base offense levels for each federal crime.33 As part of the
guidelines, the Sentencing Commission also established sentence-level
M
enhancements, which increase the offense level of the crime committed.
Balancing such enhancements against any applicable credits results in a
"total 'offense level' number" that "corresponds to a sentencing table
which, together with considerations of prior criminal history, sets forth
the appropriate sentencing range (in months) that the judge must employ
when sentencing an offender."3 Each year, the Sentencing Commission
proposes revisions to its published guidelines, which enter into effect
unless Congress acts to modify or block them.36
A defendant's use of a computer to produce or solicit child pornography subjects the defendant to sentence enhancement under the U. S.37
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines").
Similarly, sentence enhancements also apply when the defendant used a
computer to transmit child pornography.38
B. Pornography's"SignificantHarms" CausedCongress to Callfor
IncreasedSentence Terms
Federal legislation protecting children from sexual exploitation has
existed at least since 1977, when Congress enacted the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.' 9 That law made it
illegal to engage a minor in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, when such depiction
would
beonly
transported
interstateCongress
commerce.'
Sincethethelaw1977
act resulted in
a single via
conviction,
modified
by passing

30.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).
31.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b).
32.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760.
33.
See id.
34. See id.
35.
Id.
36.
See id.
37.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B) (2001).
38. See id. at § 2G2.2(b)(5).
39.
Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1977) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53
(2000)). See Anthony Miranda, A Survey of Federal Cases Involving the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 483, 484 (2000).
40. See Miranda, supra note 39, at 484.
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the Child Protection Act of 1984,' itself amended by the Child Sexual
Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986.2
Congress continued to refine the law by passing the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, ' 3 which criminalized using
a computer "to transport, distribute, or receive child pornography."
Later reforms included the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 19904' and the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995," discussed below. Congress next passed the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 47 which was a turning point because the act regulated content rather than conduct48 by criminalizing
"visual depictions [made by computer] that create the impression that
children are involved in sexually explicit acts. ''49 Congress recently reformed the law by passing the Protection of Children from Sexual
Predators Act of 1998.50
In the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Congress increased the penalties for certain sex crimes against children that
involved the use of a computer.5 These changes found their genus in the
Family Reinforcement Act, which addressed crimes against children, and
need to control child pornography.52 Perceiving
Congress' perceived
"significant harms" 53 arising at the nexus between computer use and child
pornography, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1240.-4 In the
words of the House Committee on the Judiciary:
Distributing child pornography through computers is particularly
harmful because it can reach an almost limitless audience. Because of
its wide dissemination and instantaneous transmission, computerassisted trafficking is also more difficult for law enforcement officials
to investigate and prosecute. Additionally, the increasing use of com-

41.
Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53).
42.
Pub. L. No. 99-628 § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251).
See Miranda, supra note 39, at 484.
43.
Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2251A-2252).
44. Miranda, supra note 39, at 484.
45.
Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 301, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered titles
of the U.S.C.).
46.
Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774 (1995) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423
(1995); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1995)).
47.
Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered titles
of the U.S.C.).
48. See Dawn A. Edick, Note, Regulation of Pornography on the Internet in the United States
and the United Kingdom: A ComparativeAnalysis, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 437,445 (1998).
49. Miranda, supra note 39, at 485.
50. Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the

U.S.C.).
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
Id. at 4.
See Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774.
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puters to transmit child pornography substantially increases the likelihood that this material will be viewed by, and thus harm, children.
Finally, the Committee notes with particular concern the fact that pedophiles may use a child's fascination with computer technology as a
lure to drag children into sexual relationships.55
Essentially, the House Committee not only feared that pornographers would entice children to engage in pornographic acts by merely
enabling children to view images, but also that computer usage might
increase the overall number of images disseminated due to the ease with
which pornographers can copy and transmit material to a virtually unlimited market. In the Sentencing Commission's words: "Persons who
transmit the images... may be mailing a single photo to a friend, or they
may be more similar to a person who opens an adult bookstore in every
city in the world. 56 However, § 2G2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines
"does not distinguish between persons who e-mail images to a single
voluntary recipient and those who establish a BBS [bulletin board system] and distribute child pornography to large numbers of subscribers."57
Finding great potential for significant harm to children, the House
concluded "it is essential that those who are caught and convicted for this
conduct be punished severely." 58 Thus, H.R. 1240 directed the Sentencing Commission to "increase the base offense level by at least 2 levels
for an offense committed under section 2251(c)(1)(A) and 2252(a) of
title 18, United States Code, if a computer was used to transmit the notice or advertisement to the intended recipient or to transport or ship the
visual depiction. 59
The Sentencing Commission complied, and on April 30, 1996,
submitted to Congress the guidelines that increased those sentences. 6°
Increasing the offense level directly resulted in an increase to the sentencing term: in the case of a child pornography producer, the sentence
increases from the original range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months, to
seventy to eighty-seven months per count; in the case of a child pornography trafficker, the range increases from the original range of eighteen
to twenty-four months, to twenty-four to thirty months per count. 6 ' By

55. H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4.
56. U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at 29.
57. Id. at 30.
58. H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 4.
59. Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-71 § 53, 109 Stat.
774.
60.
See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at i. H.R. 1240 ordered the Sentencing
Commission to complete this report within 180 days of the enactment of the Sexual Crimes Against
Children Prevention Act of 1995. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 2.
61.
See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at 4 tbl. 1.
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simply using a computer to commit a child pornography offense, a person increases his or her sentence by roughly twenty-five percent.62
C. The Expanded Definition of "Solicit"
Taking the House Committee on the Judiciary's concerns as a mandate, the Sentencing Guidelines provide offense-level enhancement if a
computer is used to solicit participation by a minor in sexually explicit
conduct.63 In United States v. Reaves,64 the Tenth Circuit confronted an
issue of first impression: what is the definition of the term "solicit? 65
Interpreting the House Committee on the Judiciary's "broad concerns,"
the Court expanded the meaning of solicitation of a minor to include any
situation in which a computer is used, whether or not that use is directly
related to a common notion of "solicitation. ' 66
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. Reaves67
i. Facts
In Reaves, the defendant acquired several child pornography images
from the Internet. 68 Using his computer, the defendant showed those images to children to entice and lure them into sexual relationships, and to
produce sexually explicit materials. 69 The defendant pled guilty to five
counts of producing child pornography, and "one count each of interstate
70
transportation, distribution, and possession, of child pornography."
Reasoning that "the computer played an integral part in a solicitation scheme presumably designed to accustom the minors to child pornography and encourage the sexual conduct depicted therein," the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming determined that the
defendant's actions constituted solicitation, which thus subjected him to
the offense-level enhancer § 2G2.1(b)(3). 7' Following those guidelines,
the district court increased the defendant's offense level by two.72 The
defendant appealed, arguing that because he did not directly ask or re62. See id. at ii.
63. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.I(b)(3)(B) (2001).
64.
253 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2001).
65. See Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1202.
66. Id. at 1205; see also discussion infra Part I.C.2.a.2.
67. 253 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2001).
68. See Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1203.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1202. The defendant's production of pornography violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). See
id. The defendant's "interstate transportation, distribution, and possession, of child pornography"
violated "18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1), (a)(2)(B) and (b)(1), and (a)(5)(B) and (b)(2),
respectively." Id.
71.
Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1203.
72. See id. at 1202-03.
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quest children to participate in creating the pornography, he did not "solicit" minors via his computer, and therefore the offense-level enhancement did not apply.73
ii. Decision
Noting that § 2G2.1 provides no definition of "solicit," the Tenth
Circuit struggled to determine whether the phrase "if a computer was
used to solicit participation" meant "if a computer was used to directly
request participation," or "if a computer was used to lure or entice participation. 74 In order to determine the intent of the Sentencing Commission, the Tenth Circuit turned to the congressional mandate underlying
the Sentencing Commission's change to the guidelines.75
After considering the House Commission on the Judiciary's statements outlining the reason for the offense-level enhancing statute, the
Court noted that "[1]imiting 'solicit' ... to 'direct requests' ... solely
penalizes how a pedophile exploits a child's fascination with computers
rather than if a pedophile does so-an unacceptable result given Congress's broad concerns. 76 The court concluded that "solicit" was not
narrowly limited to situations where a defendant used a computer to directly contact a victim; rather it applied in a more general sense, to situations where a defendant used a computer at all.77 The Tenth Circuit thus
upheld the offense-level enhancement. 8
2. Other Circuits
79
a. United States v. Brown

Brown represents the only other appellate opinion to address the
solicitation definition issue presented in Reaves. Brown extended the
scope of solicitation to include the defendant's use of a computer as a
desensitizing tool, which enabled him to obtain minors' cooperation in
the creation of pornography.8 °
i. Facts

73. See id. at 1203.
74.
Id. at 1204-05. The court applied the version of the offense-level enhancing statute in
force at the time of defendant's commission of the crime, which provided for an increased sentence
"[ilf a computer was used to solicit participation by or with a minor in sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of producing sexually explicit material." Id. at 1202 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1 (b)(3) (1998)).
75. See Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1204-05.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1205.
78. See id.
79. 237 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2001).
80. See Brown, 237 F.3d at 629.
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As part of a worldwide child pornography investigation, the United
States Customs Service learned that Internet Relay Chat (hereinafter
"IRC") software was being used to exchange child pornography images.8'
During the course of the investigation, British authorities seized a computer belonging to a member of a private IRC group, which used the
computer to exchange child pornography.82 The seized computer revealed
several IRC nicknames, including one that U.S. law enforcement officials ultimately tied to the defendant, who officials subsequently arrested 3
The defendant pled guilty to three counts of "producing child pornography for transportation in interstate commerce" and one count of
"possessing child pornography using materials shipped via interstate
commerce," among other charges The United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan determined the defendant "allowed his
victims unmonitored access to the computer wherein they observed that
other children were being filmed and sexually abused by adults." 85 Finding the defendant thus used his computer to solicit the children's participation in the production of pornography, the district court applied §
2G2.1(b)(3) and sentenced the defendant to a 405-month term of imprisonment.86
ii. Decision
On appeal, the defendant argued that § 2G2.1(b)(3)'s sentence enhancement did not apply because he did not use a computer to solicit
minors' participation in the creation of pornography. 87 The defendant
interpreted "solicit" to require that he "specifically ask minors [via his
computer] to engage in sexually-explicit conduct."88 The Sixth Circuit
disagreed, determining that Congress did not intend such a narrow definition of the term "solicit. 8 9 In a short analysis, the Court held that allowing children to view child pornography gave them the "impression
that this is acceptable conduct," which aided in the defendant's ability to
use those children to produce child pornography. 9° The Sixth Circuit con81.
S.

ORIN

See id. at 626-27. IRC allows users to communicate without using their real names. See
KERR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING

ELECTRONIC

EVIDENCE

IN

CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIONS

91

(2001),

http://www.usdoj.gov/

criminal/cybercrime/searchmanual.pdf (Feb. 16, 2001).
82. See Brown, 237 F.3d at 627.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 626. The defendant's production of child pornography violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a).
See Brown, 237 F.3d at 626. The defendant's possession of child pornography violated 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B). See Brown, 237 F.3d at 626.
85. Brown, 237 F.3d at 628.
86. See id. at 626.
87. See id. at 628.
88. Id.
89.
See id. at 628-29 (construing H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61).
90. See id. at 629.
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cluded that because the defendant used his computer "to desensitize his
victims to deviant sexual activity, he was using it to solicit participation"
in the creation of child pornography.9
3. Analysis
As the Tenth Circuit noted, § 2G2. 1(b)(3) provides no express definition of the term "solicit., 92 In both of the above cases, the appellate
courts deduced the meaning of the term by using the House Committee
on the Judiciary's statements regarding the dangers of computer usage in
association with child pornography.93 Both the Tenth Circuit and the
Sixth Circuit interpreted the broad concerns outlined by the House
Committee on the Judiciary as requiring a defendant's mere use of a
computer in connection with child pornography to suffice as
solicitation." The common notion of solicitation cannot be strictly applied because, as Congress recognized, the dangers found at the nexus
between computers and child pornography are very high-so
high that
95
there may be no way to adequately measure the damages.
The Tenth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the term "solicit"
comports with the only other appellate opinion on this issue. It remains
to be seen whether this expansive view will become the court's standard
interpretation.
D. A Defendant's Use of a Computer May Promptthe Court to Institute
Post-Sentence ParoleRequirements
Child pornography, coupled with computer use, may result in penalty increases that reach beyond sentencing. In some circumstances, this
coupling can affect a defendant's parole term when a court mandates
compliance with special conditions. In the cases below, the Tenth Circuit
permitted parole-phase Internet restrictions on convicted child pornographers, provided courts narrowly construe such restrictions.
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. White96
i. Facts
Responding to an Internet advertisement posted as part of a United
States Customs Service sting operation, the defendant ordered three

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Brown, 237 F.3d at 629.
See United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Brown, 237 F.3d at 628-29; Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1204-05.
See Brown, 237 F.3d at 629; Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1205.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
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videotapes advertised as containing child pornography.9 7 United States
Customs officers made a controlled delivery, which triggered the defendant's arrest. 98 A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for violating a
federal statute that prohibits a person from receiving child pornography,
among other charges.' The defendant pled guilty and served a two-year
sentence.1°°
One week after serving out his sentence, the defendant violated a
requirement of his supervised release by consuming alcohol.'' After a
second such violation, the government then filed a petition to revoke the
defendant's supervised release. 0 2 In a subsequent hearing, the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced the defendant to six months incarceration followed by a two-year period of
supervised release.' 3 The court imposed five special conditions upon the
supervised release.' ° One of these conditions prevented the defendant
from possessing sexually explicit material and any computer with access
to the Internet.' 5 The defendant challenged this special condition by arguing that a "plea to a single count of receiving child pornography which
he ordered over the Internet ...is not 'reasonably related' to prohibiting
him from all access to the Internet."' ° The defendant further argued that
this "special condition [wa]s 'greater than necessary' in the 0equation
7
balancing protection of the public with the goals of sentencing."'
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that while a federal statute'0 8 permitted the
district court to exercise discretion in imposing a term of supervised release, the district court is limited by the requirement that it "shall impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary."' 9 The court held
that the special condition preventing the defendant from owning a computer with Internet access potentially is both too narrow and overbroad." °
The court found the condition potentially too narrow because the terms
97. See White, 244 F.3d at 1201.
98. See id.
99.
See id. (noting the grand jury indicted the defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(2)(A), among other statutes).
100. See id.
101.
See id.
102.

See id.

103.
See White, 244 F.3d at 1201.
104. See id.
105. See id. The provision in question provided that the defendant "shall not possess erotica, or
any other sexually explicit material, and shall not possess a computer with Intemet access
throughout his period of supervised release." Id.
106.
White, 244 F.3d at 1201-02, 1205.
107. Id.
108.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2001).
109.
White, 244 F.3d at 1204 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
110.
See id. at 1206. The relevant portion of the condition provided that the defendant "shall
not possess a computer with Internet access throughout his period of supervised release." Id
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of the condition were too indeterminate and, thus, the condition did not
bar the defendant from accessing to the Internet, but simply from owning
a computer with such access."' The court found the condition potentially
too broad because the district court could have intended for the word
"possess" to restrict all of the defendant's Internet and computer usage,
2
From that
even usage unrelated to the defendant's underlying crime."
3
necessary."'
than
"greater
was
sentence
viewpoint, the
The Tenth Circuit determined that instead, the district court should
have limited the condition to use of the Internet, as opposed to possession of a computer with an Internet connection, as many alternative
means existed by which the defendant could have accessed the Internet
without owning a computer. ' 4 The court thus found the restriction "neither reasoned nor reasonable" and remanded the case for clarification on
the condition prohibiting the defendant from owning a computer with
Internet access.'5
Although restrictive, the Tenth Circuit's decision is not as strict as
the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Crandon,' 6 below, where
the Third Circuit supported the total ban on a defendant's possession of,
procurement of, purchase of, or other access to any form of computer
network, including networks operating outside the Internet."'
2. Other Circuits
8

a. United States v. Crandon'1
i. Facts

The defendant solicited a minor via e-mail, then traveled to her location and "engaged in sexual relations with her."" 9 The defendant took
forty-eight photographs of the minor.' 20 Two of the photographs portrayed sexually explicit activity, including one photograph of the defendant and the minor participating in oral sex. 2 ' The defendant mailed the
film to a Seattle film developer and received the developed pictures by

Seeid. at 1205.
112. See id. at 1206.
113. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
114. See id. at 1206-07.
115.
White, 244 F.3d at 1207 (holding that "any condition limiting [the defendant's] use of a
computer or access to the Internet must reflect these realities and permit reasonable monitoring by a
probation officer. The purpose of the special condition must be articulated and enforceable as
defined. As presently written, the special condition is neither reasoned nor reasonable.").
116.
173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
117. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125.
118.
173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
119. Id.
120. See id.
121.
See id.
Ill.

2002]

COMBATING THE ILLICIT INTERNET

return mail.' 22 After his return to New Jersey, the defendant continued to
contact the minor.'23 The defendant again traveled to the minor's location, and this time he picked her up and began to return home.'24 Soon
after their departure from the minor's home, the defendant discovered the
police were looking for him. 25 The defendant sent the minor home on a
bus and then returned to his home state. 2 6 The police later arrested
the
27
defendant and seized his cache of pornographic photographs.'
The defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography in violation of a federal statute.'2 8 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced the defendant to seventy-eight months of
imprisonment and three years of supervised release.' 29 The terms of the
defendant's parole "included a special condition directing that [the defendant] not 'possess, procure, purchase or otherwise obtain access to
any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange
format involving computers unless specifically approved by the United
States Probation Office. ' ,"130 The defendant appealed on the basis that the
special condition "unnecessarily infringe[d]
upon his liberty interests and
131
b[ore] no logical relation to his offense."
ii. Decision
The Third Circuit held that because the defendant "used the Internet
as a means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl
over a period of several months[,] . .. the condition of release limiting
[the defendant's] Internet access is related to the dual aims of deterring
him from recidivism and protecting the public.' 32 As such, the Third
Circuit upheld the restriction on Internet use as a reasonable limitation,
noting that "[a] sentencing judge is given wide discretion in imposing
supervised release.' 33

122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. (noting the defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)).
129. See id.
130. Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125.
131.
Id.at 127.
132. Id. at 127-28.
133. Id. at 127. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The court read 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) to hold
that
a District Court may order any appropriate condition to the extent it:
(1) is reasonably related to certain factors, including (a) the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (b) deterring
further criminal conduct by the defendant, or (c) protecting the public from further
criminal conduct by the defendant; [and] (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of deterrence and protection of the
public.
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The court further held that even though this special restriction "may
hamper his employment opportunities upon release," and infringe upon
the defendant's First Amendment rights, "the restrictions ... are permissible because the special condition is narrowly tailored and is directly
related to deterring [the defendant] and protecting the public."''
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit strictly adhered to Congress's expressed intent.
Not only will a defendant be subjected to an increased term of incarceration, but when that defendant returns to society upon rehabilitation, his
parole restrictions may legally include restrictions upon Internet use.135
The Third Circuit took that notion farther, expressly comparing the relative harm to a defendant's constitutional rights with the risk of public
harm, and determined that a total ban on Internet use is permissible, provided that 36the restriction remains narrowly construed towards averting
that harm.1
After determining that Internet restrictions are proper, the Tenth
Circuit discussed the technical means by which effective control of
Internet use could occur.'37 One method is to install a database-centered
software program specifically designed to restrict access to pornographic
sites.'38 The mayor of Boston, Massachusetts, Thomas Menino, required
the Boston Public Library to install such software "on every computer
accessible to children.' ' 39 The program, CyberPatrol, prevents access to
web sites listed in its database of objectionable web sites.'40 An alternative means of preventing access to pornographic web sites is to employ a
program that scans the target site for objectionable
words and blocks web
41
sites containing these objectionable words.
While useful, neither restriction method is perfect: in the case of a
database restriction method, someone must continually update the data42
base to afford protection from an expanding number of Internet sites.
In the case of objectionable word scanning, such software may restrict
access in an overbroad fashion.1 3 For example, such a program might

Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127 (alteration in original).
134. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128.
135. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).
136. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127.
137.
See White, 244 F.3d at 1206 (noting the availability of filtering software capable of
monitoring the defendant's Internet usage).
138.
See id.
139. Edick, supra note 48, at 449.
140. See id.
141.
See id.
142. See White, 244 F.3d at 1206.
143. See Edick, supra note 48, at 449-50.
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restrict access to "medical and
educational information on 'breast' cancer
M
'
and 'Middlesex, England.
II. LESSENED SEARCH AND SEIZURE REQUIREMENTS APPLY WHEN
COMPUTERS ARE INVOLVED IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY INVESTIGATIONS

While the previous section focused on the penalties applicable to a
defendant who used a computer when committing a child pornography
crime, this section analyzes the pre-trial effects upon search and seizure
requirements when the defendant's commission of the crime involved a
computer. As above, the defendant's use of a computer changes the way
courts view and treat such a defendant.
A. Background
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides for freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure.145 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's protections are only available upon the showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy. ' 46 The
"reasonable expectation" determination requires both that a defendant
have "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the
expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as
47
'reasonable.'"
Before officers may conduct a search, they must establish probable
cause and must ensure the search warrant describes with particularity the
property to be seized.'4 Probable cause is established when "given the
totality of the circumstances, 'there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 4 9 On the
issue of particularity, the Tenth Circuit has held that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment requires that a search warrant describe the things to be
seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings."'" The reason for the particularity requirement is to leave the officer serving the warrant no discretion,

144. Id.at 450.
145. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U. S.CONST. amend. IV.
146. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), accord Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990).
147. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
148. See U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
150. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999).
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thereby preventing general searches.'-' A warrant's description qualifies
as sufficiently particular if it "enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.' 52
When computers are involved, several issues complicate the particularity requirement: the ability of a computer to store large quantities
of data, the computer's ability to hide data,'53 and the fact that a file's title
need bear no relation to that file's content. 5 4 These issues may require
law enforcement officials to seize a computer and
remove it from a loca55
tion in order to search the computer's contents.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, two potential seizure
options exist, and the option selected by law enforcement officials depends upon the role of the computer in the underlying crime:
If the hardware is itself evidence, an instrumentality, contraband, or a
fruit of crime, agents will usually plan to seize the hardware and
search its contents off-site. If the hardware is merely a storage device
for evidence, agents generally will only
56 seize the hardware if less disruptive alternatives are not feasible.

When a defendant uses a computer in the transmission of child pornography, the government considers the computer an instrumentality of the
crime. 7 As such, seizure of the entire computer is the usual practice.'58
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure comports with this
assessment. 9 In a case where seizure of the computer itself becomes

151.
See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("The requirement that warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible, and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.").
152. United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 1982).
153. According to the U.S. Department of Justice:
[f]iles may be stored on a floppy diskette, on a hidden directory in a suspect's laptop, or
on a remote server located thousands of miles away. The files may be encrypted,
misleadingly tilted, stored in unusual file formats, or commingled with millions of
unrelated, innocuous, and even statutorily protected files.
KERR, supra note 80, at 29. See also Erickson v.Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 937 F.2d 1548, 1554
(10th Cir. 1991) (noting that drug trafficking activity is often concealed or masked by deceptive
records).
154. See Stephan K. Bayens, The Search and Seizure of Computers: Are We Sacrificing
PersonalPrivacyfor the Advancement of Technology?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 239, 263 (2000).
155. See KERR, supranote 81, at 31.
156. Id.
157. See id.; see also Davis v. Gracey, Ill F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
computer equipment used to display and distribute pornographic images constitutes an
instrumentality of the crime).
158. See KERR, supra note 81, at 32. When the instrumentality is not a single computer, but
instead is a network, the impossibilities of seizure are obvious. In such a case, "agents will want to
take a more nuanced approach to obtain the evidence they need." Id.
159. The rule provides:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits
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necessary, the Tenth Circuit requires both that the search warrant adequately describe the hardware and that the hardware seized by law enforcement officials fits within the warrant's description."o
B. What StandardApplies to the Search and Seizure of Evidence Contained In Computer HardDrives?
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. Campos '
i. Facts
In Campos, a jury found the defendant violated a federal statute that
prohibits the transmission of child pornography in interstate commerce62
when the defendant e-mailed pornographic images over the Internet.'
The recipient of the images notified the FBI and gave agents copies of
the e-mailed images. 63 FBI agents determined that the defendant sent the
images.' 6 The agents received a warrant enabling them to search the defendant's home and computer for those images.'65 The FBI found and
seized the defendant's computer.' 66 In examining the computer's hard
drive, agents located the two pornographic images sent over the Internet,
plus six more pornographic images containing children. 67 At trial, the
defendant motioned to suppress the images.'" The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied that motion.'6 9 Subcourt sentenced the
sequently, a jury convicted the defendant, and the
70
defendant to thirty-seven months of incarceration.
ii. Decision
On appeal, the defendant argued that the search was overbroad, as
agents "had grounds to search only for the two images that had been
sent."' 7'' The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding the warrant within permissible bounds because the warrant specified that it covered "items relating
of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended
for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or (4)
person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (b).
160. See Davis, 11 F.3d at 1478.
161.
221 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000).
162. See Campos, 221 F.3d at 1145 (noting the court convicted the defendant for violating 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)).
See id.
163.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1145-46.
167. See id. at 1146.
168. See Campos, 221 F.3d at 1146.
169. See id.
170. See id.
Id.
171.
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to child pornography.""' The court held that although the warrant permitted agents to seize anything related to child pornography, the warrant
did not authorize
"an unfocused inspection of all of [the defendant's]
73
property." 1
The court reiterated testimony given by an FBI agent during the
district court proceeding, in which the agent stated that due to the ability
to conceal evidence on a computer, "all the stored data [must be examined] to determine whether it is included in the warrant.' ' 174 The court
agreed with this assessment, distinguishing this situation from its decision in United States v. Carey, 75 below, by stating that "the officers here
did not expand the scope of their search in a manner not authorized by
the warrant.', 176 Rather, the search warrant in Campos specified the exact
type of material the agents found: child pornography.' 77 Thus, the court
upheld the agents' search of all files on the computer hard drive. 78
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit held that in order to determine which computer
files fall under the scope of the search warrant, FBI agents could examine all the data stored upon the computer's hard drive. 79 Interestingly, the
court noted that a computer search is constrained to information only on
that hardware and does not constitute the authorization of "an unfocused
inspection of all [the defendant's] property."' 80
Despite the broad search allowed in Campos, the court's opinion did
note several restrictions on the scope of a computer search.'"' First, when
an investigator finds intermingled documents, those "containing both
relevant and irrelevant information," the investigator should seal those
documents and await approval of a magistrate before proceeding.' 82 Second, the court pointed out that its holding does not permit an officer to
conduct a generalized search, where the discovery of the pornographic
images is collateral to the reason for the initial search.'83 In that case, it is

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Campos, 221 F.3d at 1146.
175.
172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
176. Campos, 221 F.3d at 1148.
177. See id. at 1147.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Id.at 1148.
181.
See id.
182. Campos, 221 F.3d at 1148.
183. See id.; see also discussion infra Part II.D.1.b. (discussing the court of appeals' approach
to an argument alleging a generalized search).
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improper for law enforcement officials to delve into every file on a defendant's computer t8
C. What Constitutes a "FairProbability" that the Search of a Residence
Will Uncover Material Evidence?
The search and seizure issues associated with finding the location of
a particular pornographic image are not limited to the search of computer
hard drives but extend to the search of residences. 8 ' Where the only indication of a file's origination is the Internet e-mail address of the sender,
does that provide probable cause that those images will be located at the
sender's home? The Tenth Circuit determined that it does provide probable cause, holding in United States v. Cervini,8 6 below, that a simple email header provided officers with probable
87 cause to search for pornographic images within the sender's home.
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
8

8
a. United States v. Cervini'

i. Facts
In this case, the defendant posted on an Internet newsgroup web site
two pornographic pictures containing children.'89 The e-mail header from
the posting contained an Internet protocol address that allowed investigators to subsequently link the photos to the defendant.' 90 The FBI obtained a search warrant and executed a search at the defendant's residence.' 9'
Authorities indicted the defendant for "knowingly transporting and
shipping child pornography in interstate commerce," in violation of federal statute.' 92 In addition, authorities also indicted the defendant for
"knowingly possessing an image of child pornography that was produced
using materials shipped and93 transported in interstate commerce," also in
violation of federal statute.

184.
Compare Campos, 221 F.3d at 1147 (inadvertent discovery of items related to child
pornography during search for drug-related evidence), with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268,
1271 (10th Cir. 1999) (discovery of items related to child pornography pursuant to a warrant
permitting a search for such items).
185. See United States v. Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. 865, 867 (10th Cir. 2001).
186.
16 Fed.Appx. at 865.
187. See id. at 866-67.
188.
16 Fed. Appx. 865 (10th Cir. 2001).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 867.
191.
See id.
192. Id. (noting authorities indicted the defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(I)).
193.
Id. (noting authorities indicted the defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
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The defendant motioned to suppress all evidence obtained from the
search of his home.' 94 The defendant argued that "the affidavit in support
of the warrant provided insufficient probable cause that evidence of
criminal activity would be found at his residence."' 95 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the defendant's motion. '96
ii. Decision
Upon review, the Tenth Circuit stated that a search warrant must
only "demonstrate a 'fair probability' that a search of [the] residence
would uncover evidence connecting [the defendant] to the pornographic
postings."'' 97 The court held that the e-mail header gave officers sufficient
probable cause, constituting a fair probability that officers would find
contraband or other criminal evidence at the sender's residence.' 98 Even if
other locations existed where such images could be found, the Tenth
Circuit found no requirement for the district court to "eliminate all other
possible conclusions which could be derived from the alleged facts"
when authorizing a search warrant.' 99 The court noted that "the totality of
the facts enable a reasonable person to draw the common-sense conclusion that evidence of the crime would be found at [the defendant's] residence." 2°°
Under United States v. Charbonneau,20 ' below, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that even an
illegal search of a residence does not require suppression of seized evidence because had a legal search occurred, officers would have inevitably discovered the evidence.2 °2
2. Other Jurisdictions
a. United States v. Charbonneau"3
i. Facts
In Charbonneau, an FBI agent investigating child pornography on
the Internet posed as a pedophile and monitored two private America
OnLine chat rooms titled "Boys" and "Preteen. '2 ' Chat room members
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. at 867.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 868 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000)).
See id.
Id.
Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. at 868.
979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
See discussion infra Part lI.C.2.
979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1179.

20021

COMBATING THE ILLICIT INTERNET

exchanged graphic child pornography image files. 0 The federal agent
recorded the typed conversations between chat room users. 2 6 Chat room
users e-mailed the agent pornographic images of children." 7
The
208 agent identified one sender, a chat room member, by his screen
name. Using a search warrant, the FBI identified the defendant as the
209
210
sender.' °9 Agents obtained a search warrant for the defendant's address.
"
The agents did not execute that search warrant. ' Instead, the agents entered the residence after obtaining a signed consent form from the defendant's wife. 1 2 The agents seized two computers and several computer
disks that contained child pornography.2 3
ii. Decision
The defendant motioned to suppress both the chat room conversations and the• physical
evidence seized from his home as a result of those
214
conversations. The defendant argued that both his freedom of speech
and reasonable expectation of privacy protected his chat room conversations.2" Finding the freedom of speech claim to be "[in]adequately supported by case law," the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio dismissed that claim as meritless.1 6
As to the reasonable expectation of privacy claim, the court reasoned that, like a letter, an e-mail message is protected while in the process of transmission. 21 7 However, once a recipient opens that e-mail, the
expectation of privacy dissipates.2 8 Making an interesting point, the court
stated, "a sender of e-mail runs the risk that he is sending the message to
an undercover agent.''2'9 Basing its decision on Hoffa v. United States,"
the district court determined that no expectation of privacy exists where
"a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."'22' In that case, the "letter" is
opened, and the recipient may reveal the contents to anyone. The court
noted that this rule of law applies to forwarded e-mail messages as well,

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1179.
See id. at 1180.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1183.
See id.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184.
See id.
See id.
Id.
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184-85 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302).
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stating that "messages sent to an addressee who later forwards the e-mail
to a third party do not enjoy the same reasonable expectations of privacy
once they have been forwarded., 22 The court applied this reasoning to
chat room transmissions, finding that "[m]essages sent to the public at
large in [a] 'chat room' ... lose any semblance of privacy. 223
On the question of illegal search and seizure, the court determined
that while the search of the defendant's home was illegal, the evidence
seized was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. 24 The
court determined that the agents had a valid search warrant, that absent
the permission to enter, the agents would have done so anyway, and that,
"the items seized would have been inevitably discovered through the
execution of the search warrant., 225 The court thus denied the defendant's
motions to suppress the physical evidence and statements. 226
3. Analysis
While the Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue of the expectation of privacy in e-mail communications, both the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals have done so. The court in Charbonneau held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect e-mail messages sent to an undercover federal agent: "an e-mail message, like a letter, cannot be afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy once that message is received., 227 The Sixth
Circuit concurred with the latter assessment, holding that "the e-mailer
would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose 'expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery' of the letter." 22 Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces has ruled that no expectation of privacy
exists if a user forwards that original e-mail message to another person. 229
Although no expectation of privacy exists for a received e-mail
message, while an e-mail message is in transmission the sender does
have an expectation of privacy.23 ° The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces has held that "the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a rea-

222. Id. at 1185.
223. Id. (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
224. See id. at 1187. The court found the search illegal because officers obtained the consent to
search through coercion. See id. at 1186. Among other coercive acts, the FBI agents told the
defendant's wife that if she did not consent to the search, the agents would break down the front
door to access their home. See id.
225. Id. at 1186-87.
226.
See id. at 1187 (although the court granted one of the defendant's motions, the court
denied both motions discussed herein).
227. Charbonneau,979 F. Supp. at 1184.
228. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. King, 55
F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)).
229. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,419 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
230. See id. at 418.
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sonable expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmission."'
D. Seizure Rules When Police Discover Child PornographyWhile Executing a Warrant Issuedfor Another Purpose
While the above cases dealt with probable cause issues surrounding
the search of a computer used in connection with child pornography
crimes, this section focuses on the seizure standard applied when child
pornography materials are discovered during a search authorized for
other purposes. Police only need to demonstrate a fair probability that
child pornography is located at a defendant's residence in order to receive a search warrant to search that home. 32 In the cases below, the
Tenth Circuit extended the fair probability standard to include the situation where police view possible child pornography while conducting a
search for other items. 33
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
2 34
a. United States v. Wolfe

i. Facts
While executing a search warrant for counterfeiting evidence, which
resulted in the seizure of the defendant's computer and several disks,
Secret Service agents noticed three items of possible child pornography
in the defendant's residence. 235 The agents chose not to seize those
items.3 6 After interviewing an accomplice, the agents, alerted to the possibility that the defendant was involved in child pornography, sought
another search warrant. 7
Once issued, that second search warrant permitted the agents to
search the defendant's computer hard drive and the previously seized
disks for evidence of child pornography. 21" The agents discovered an
"extensive" number of child pornography images. 239 The government
2
charged the defendant with possession of child pornography. 40
At trial, the defendant asserted that the affidavit submitted in support of the second warrant was insufficient as a matter of law to establish
probable cause that the defendant possessed child pornography on his
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
See United States v. Rabe, 848 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1988).
See discussion infra Part U.D.3.
No. 00-5045, 2000 WL 1862667 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2000).
See Wolfe, 2000 WL 1862667, at *1.
See id.
See id.
See id. at *2.
Id.
See id. (prosecutors charged the defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000)).
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computer, and thus the seized images were the result of an illegal
search.2"' The government argued that the affidavit supporting the warrant was sufficient to support a probable cause finding, based both on the
accomplice's statements that he had seen child pornography images on
the defendant's computer, and that the defendant told the accomplice he
downloaded those pictures onto his computer.142 The United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma
agreed, denying the defendant's
motion to exclude that evidence.243
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined that "the evidence presented to the
magistrate judge ... established a fair probability that a search of [the
defendant's] computer would reveal contraband within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. §§2252, 2256, such that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis' to determine that probable cause existed to issue the second search
warrant.",2" Namely, the three items of possible child pornography that
the agents observed in the defendant's home, plus the accomplice's
statement that he had seen an image of a nude child on the defendant's
computer monitor, and that the defendant told the accomplice he had
more pictures on his computer, together established "a 'fair probability'
that evidence of possession of child pornography would be found on the
hard drive of [the defendant's] personal computer" or disks. 245
,Obtaining a second search warrant is required; in United States v.
Carey,246 below, the Tenth Circuit suppressed child pornography images
seized collateral to an original search warrant where, unlike here,
authorities did not seek a second search warrant.2 47
248
b. United States v. Carey

i. Facts
During his arrest, the defendant, a cocaine dealer, consented to a
search of his apartment. 249 The defendant also consented in writing to the
removal of any property under his control, "if said property shall be essential in the proof of the commission of any crime in violation of the
Laws of the United States., 250 As a result of that search, the police seized
two computers under the belief that the computers "would either be sub241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See Wolfe, 2000 WL 1862667, at *2.
See id. at * 1-*2.
See id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271, 1276.
172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1270.
Id.
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ject , to' forfeiture or [provide] evidence of [the defendant's] drug dealing.
The police obtained a warrant to search "the [two] computers for
'names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled
substances.' ' ' 2 2 In the course of that warrant's execution, the police discovered a large number of "files with sexually suggestive titles and the
label 'PG.'''5'The police copied those files to a floppy disk and opened
them on another computer.5 The police discovered numerous images
containing child pornography.255
The defendant "was charged with ...possessing a computer hard
drive that contained three or more images of child pornography produced
' The defendant moved
with materials shipped in interstate commerce."256
to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the police seized the hard
drive as a result of an illegal "general, warrantless search,, 257 and that
"files not pertaining to the sale or distribution of controlled substances
were opened and searched, and [therefore] ...should have been suppressed." ' 58 The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
denied that motion to suppress. 259
ii. Decision
On appeal, the defendant argued that despite the clear specificity of
the warrant, the detective searched files that were outside the scope of
the search warrant. 26° The government counter-argued that the plain view
doctrine permitted the file discovery.26' Under the plain view doctrine,
[a] police officer may properly seize evidence of a crime without a
warrant if:
(1)the officer was lawfully in a position from which to view the object seized in plain view; (2) the object's incriminating character was
immediately apparent -- i.e., the officer had probable cause to believe

251.
Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. "JPG" is a code appended to a file's name (a "filename extension"), which designates
that the file has been compressed by a method developed by the Joint Photographic Experts Group.
See
Joint
Photographic
Experts
Group,
at
http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/
foldoc.cgi?Joint+Photographic+Experts+Group (Sept. 11,2000). JPG is one of a number of
compression schemes used to reduce the size of digital images for easy electronic transmission. Id.
254. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271.
255. See id.
256.
Id. at 1270 (noting that prosecutors charged the defendant with violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B)).
257.
Id.
258. Id.at 1272.
259. See id. at 1271.
260. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272.
261.
See id.
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the object was contraband or evidence of a crime;
and (3) the officer
6
2
had a lawful right of access to the object itself.2
The Tenth Circuit did not agree that the plain view doctrine applied, reasoning that while the detective did not expect to find child pornography
upon opening the first image file, after that point he had probable cause
to suspect that the rest of the image files contained child pornography.263
However, the detective improperly, and illegally, continued his search.26
"When he opened the subsequent files, he knew he was not going to find
items related to drug activity as specified in the warrant." 265 He knew he
would find additional pornographic images. 2' Therefore, the files were
not "inadvertently discovered"; they were illegally seized.267 Following
reasoning set out by the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, where the Supreme Court determined that "the 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges, 2 68 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit suppressed those files, stating that
"closed files ... [are] not in plain view. 269
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the government's argument that
the defendant's consent to search his apartment implicitly included his
computer files' contents.27 Because the police had the computers in their
custody, their search needed to proceed more cautiously. 7 ' The Tenth
Circuit concluded that the police "exceeded the scope of the warrant"
and should have used a more narrowly tailored method to search the
drive.7 The court suggested several less intrusive methods, including
"observing files types and titles listed on the directory, doing a key word
search for relevant terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the
memory., 273 Although the court based its decision only on the facts at
issue, it implied that when the police remove a computer from a defendant's home pursuant to a valid search warrant, the subsequent search of
that computer must not expand into a general search.274
A situation where the computer remains in the defendant's control is
distinguishable from this case, where authorities removed the computer
because "no 'exigent circumstance or practical reason [permitted] offi262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. (citing United States v. Soussi. 29 F.3d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1994)).
See id. at 1273.
See id.
Id. at 1274.
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274.
Id. at 1273.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272-73.
See id. at 1274.
See id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1273.
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cers to rummage through all of the stored data regardless of its relevance
or its relation to the information specified in the warrant. ' ' 275 The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit suggested that had the computers remained in the defendant's apartment, the detectives permissibly could
have searched each file or proceeded in a less circumspect manner.276
Courts likely would distinguish this situation from the situation where
detectives search for child pornography under a warrant. 277 In that case,
the detectives could search each file. 78 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, below, failed to base its decision on a
warrant's scope; when searching for specific information, irrespective of
the underlying crime, the search of a computer may include all of its
files.279
2. Other Jurisdictions
a. United States v. Grays°
i. Facts
Pursuant to a warrant, FBI agents conducted a search at the defendant's home for information relating to computer intrusions at the National Library of Medicine.28 ' The agents seized four computers and copied their hard drives onto CD-ROMs.282 Following the FBI's Computer
Analysis and Response Team practices, an agent opened and briefly reviewed each file in the directories and subdirectories, both to aid in the
discovery of warrant-specified material and to determine how many files
would fit on each CD-ROM. 2 ' The agent opened approximately eighty
percent of the files on each hard drive.2
During that process, the agent discovered a folder entitled "Tiny
Teen.,, 285 He opened the folder "because it was the next [one] listed and
he was opening all of the [folders] as part of his routine search for the
items listed in the warrant., 286 While the agent knew that the files he was
searching for were likely text files, he opened "picture files because
computer files can be misleadingly labeled, particularly if the owner of
275.

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275-76 (quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of

Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 107 (1994)).

276. See id.
277. See supratext accompanying note 184.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
279. See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528-29 (E.D. Va. 1999).
280. 78 F. Supp. 2d 524.
281.
See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
282. See id.
283.
See id. The Computer Analysis and Response Team is an FBI unit specializing in the
forensic examination of computers. See FBI Laboratory: Computer Analysis and Response Team, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/org/cart.htm (last visited Feb. 18. 2002).
284. See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
285. See id.
286. Id.
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those files is trying to conceal illegal materials. 287 The agent discovered
pornographic pictures, some of which he thought contained images of
minors. 8 The agent obtained a second search warrant that authorized a
search of the defendant's computer files for evidence of child pornography. 289 The defendant sought to suppress all the images discovered on the
computer, contending that the search of the folders "was beyond the
scope of the [original search] warrant. ' 290
ii. Decision
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
disagreed.29' While holding that a search warrant must be particular to be
executable, the court noted that
[i]n some searches, however, it is not immediately apparent whether
or not an object is within the scope of a search warrant; in such cases,
an officer must examine the object simply to determine whether or
not it is one that he is authorized to seize .... As a result, in any
search for records or documents, "innocuous records must be examined to determine whether they
into the category of those papers
2
2 19fall
covered by the search warrant.
The court held that an agent, acting under the authorization of a search
warrant "to search a home or office for documents containing certain
specific information [is] entitled to examine all files located at the site to
look for the specified information. 293 Thus, the district court determined
that the law permitted the agents to look at each file.294 In addition, the
court held that if, in the course of that search,
an agent sees, in plain view, evidence of criminal activity other than
that for which she is searching, this does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, for "[v]iewing an article
that is already in plain view does not involve an invasion of
privacy. 295
The court thus permitted seizure of those pornographic pictures under the
"plain view" exception and held that the investigator's search and seizure
of the images contained in the "Tiny Teen" folder "was not beyond the
scope of the search warrant."2"

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 527 n.5. See also supra note 153.
See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
See id. at 527-28.
Id. at 528.
Seeid. at 531.
id. at 528 (quoting United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246, 264 (D. Conn. 1997)).
Id. at 528.
See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
Id. at 528 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 528-29.
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3. Analysis
In the conclusion of Carey, the Tenth Circuit stated:
[The detective's] seizure of the evidence upon which the charge of
conviction was based was a consequence of an unconstitutional general search, and the district court erred by refusing to suppress it.
Having reached that conclusion, however, we are quick to note these
results are predicated only upon the particular facts of this case, and a
files based on different facts might produce a difsearch of computer
297
ferent result.
Foreshadowing the situation in United States v. Campos,298 Justice
Baldock's concurrence stated, "if the record showed that [the agent] had
merely continued his search for drug-related evidence and, in doing so,
continued to come across evidence of child pornography, I think a different result would be required." 299 The distinction here is that had the agent
continued to find evidence of child pornography collaterally, while remaining within the scope of his original search warrant, that collateral
discovery of pornography would have been admissible.?° Where, as here,
the detective exceeded the scope of the search warrant, the court found
the evidence inadmissible. 0
When authorities conduct a warranted search in a child pornography
case, authorities must open and examine each file, to counter the "hiding" issues.3 2 That search may turn up additional evidence of child pornography that the Court would find permissible. 33 The Court places a
find the pornographic mateauthorities
restriction upon this search
304
•
. •when
rial collateral to an investigation. In that case, the investigator must
stop and obtain a search warrant before proceeding. 305 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, however, sees this
the type of search disallowed by
issue differently and,
3 6 in Gray, permitted
the Tenth Circuit. 0
III. CONCLUSION
During this past year, the Tenth Circuit made several changes in
how it interprets and applies the law concerning child pornography. The

297. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999).
298. 221 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000).
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring). Cf discussion supra Parts II.B.2. and
299.
II.B.3.
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276-77 (Baldock, J., concurring). Cf discussion supra Parts
300.
I.B.2. and II.B.3.
301.
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.
302. See KERR, supra note 81, at 29.
303. See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 n.5, 531 (E.D. Va. 1999).
304. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring).
305. See id.
306. See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 530-3 1.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

Court made these changes in response to concerns Congress expressed
when enacting the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act.3 7 The
essence of Congress' worry was that the nexus of child pornography and
computers may produce particularly harmful effects. Not only might
children be enticed to engage in pornographic activity by merely viewing
pornographic images but, due to the ease with which a computer allows
people to copy and disseminate images over a virtually limitless market,
a computer's use may increase the overall number of images disseminated.O In response to Congress' concerns, the Tenth Circuit expanded
its interpretation of solicitation of a minor by computer, supported sentence-level enhancements for child pornography defendants who used
computers to commit their crimes, expanded traditional search and seizure standards by employing a fair probability standard to determine the
appropriateness of complete search of a computer, and supported Internet-use restrictions on paroled child pornographers.
While Congress' concerns are legitimate, the changes wrought by
the Court of Appeals' new interpretations are worrisome. Although we
no longer live in a society where "an eye for an eye" is our basis for determining punishment, we must strike a proper balance between actual
harm and its subsequent punishment. Perceived harm alone should not
form that basis. However, according to the Sentencing Commission, such
perceived harm may do just that.3°9 "[T]he federal cases sentenced to date
typically do not involve the type of computer use that would result in
either wide dissemination or a likelihood that the material will be viewed
by children."3 ' The Sentencing Commission made that statement in early
1996, when the Sentencing Commission examined each of the 423 cases
involving sex offenses against minors that came before the federal courts
during 1994 and 1995."' These cases were likely the same cases Congress had in mind when stating its reasoning for enacting the Sex Crimes
Against Children Prevention Act. Congress' fears thus may be unfounded, or at minimum, unrepresentative of the entire body of child
pornography defendants using computers.
The changes brought about by the Sex Crimes Against Children
Prevention Act have materially affected defendants' rights and sentencing. At least two circuit courts, the Tenth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit,
have relied upon Congress' concerns when interpreting child pornography laws. If Congress' underlying fears are either unfounded or unrepresentative of the whole, then the Sixth and Tenth circuits have expanded
laws and limited rights based upon faulty or misguided policy. Applying
307.
Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774 (1995) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423; 28
U.S.C. § 994).
308. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
309. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at i.
310. Id.
311.
See id.
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such inroads to all child pornographers using computers may therefore be
excessive, overreaching, and out of balance with the harm caused by
such computer use.
When the actual effect of that law abridges fundamental rights, as
here, Congress should reassess the law. While Congress has powerful
reasons to diminish a sex offender's rights, fear of the possible should
not become the basis for decision-making. Congress should reassess its
reasoning behind the passage of the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act, in light of the act's effect upon current case law. If Congress
finds its concerns currently founded, the changes should remain. Otherwise, Congress and the courts should limit the application of the Sex
Crimes Against Children Prevention Act to situations where a defendant
actually used a computer to entice minors to engage in pornographic
activity or to disseminate images containing child pornography.
Anton L. Janik, Jr.*

*

J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Denver College of Law.

SURVEY COMMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAX

LAW IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Tax Issues permeate a wide range of legal specialties from estate
planning to changes in a business entity's corporate status. During the
survey period of September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2001, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals published approximately 22 opinions dealing
with some aspect of tax law.' The Tenth Circuit decided three cases of
particular importance, which this comment analyzes.
The current state of tax law is still evolving. Each circuit court
places its own spin on how to interpret the tax law contained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Code"), as amended The first two Tenth
Circuit decisions discussed in this comment establish "new" law, while
the third decision simply reaffirms the past holdings of the Tenth Circuit.
The first case examined in Part I of this comment, addresses dateof-death valuation for determining individual estate tax liability. In Estate of McMorris v. Commissioner,3 a case of first impression, the Tenth
Circuit extended the date-of-death valuation rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States. The
Court held that "events which occur after a decedent's death may not be
considered in valuing" a § 2053(a)(3)' "claim against the estate" deduction.6
The second case discussed in Part II of this comment, addresses the
deductibility of suspended passive activity losses ("PALs") carried for7
ward to an S corporation. In St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Commissioner,
the
Tenth Circuit held that when a taxpayer corporation changes its status
from a C corporation to an S corporation, it is permissible to carry forward the suspended PALs, incurred during the years it was a C corporation, to the year it became an S corporation, and fully deduct those suspended PALs. 8
The third case considered in Part III of this comment, addresses the
test for determining the deductibility of salaries by a corporation as real.

Author's count based on Westlaw and Lexis searches.
See FRED W. PEEL, JR., UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO THE CODE AND ITS PROVISIONS 4(1988).
3.
243 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2001).
4.
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[t]he estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
5.
All statutory references and citations to sections in this comment are to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), Title 26 of the United States Code.
6. McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261 (emphasis added).
7.
232 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 2000).
8. St. Charles,232 F.3d at 779.
2.
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sonable business expenses. In Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v.
Commissioner,9 the Tenth Circuit rejected taxpayer corporation's invitation to adopt an "independent investor test," as recently embraced by
other circuits,"° in favor of stare decisis, reaffirming the use of the
"multi-factor test of reasonable compensation" set forth in its prior decision, Pepsi-ColaBottling Co. v. Commissioner."
I. DATE-OF-DEATH VALUATION FOR DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL
ESTATE TAX LIABILITY

A. Background
In 1916, the federal estate tax system was created in order to generate revenue for use in the United State's anticipated entry into World
War 1.12 Since its adoption,' 3 the federal estate tax system has taxed transfers of property at death, but has allowed deductions for all valid
claims.'4 Included in those allowable deductions is § 2053(a)(3), which
provides for "claims against the estate."' 5 This statute originated in part
from § 202 of the 1916 Act, which declared, "the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property."' 6 Read in conjunction with the Ways
and Means Committee of the House of Representatives' 1916 Report on
§ 203, which stated, "[i]n determining the value of the net or taxable
estate, deductions for all valid claims against the estate are allowed,' 7 §
2053(a)(3) can be construed to mean that Congress intended a deductible
claim to be fixed or valued at death. 8
Contrary to this statutory interpretation and legislative history, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") has historically
9. 249 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2001).
10. Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003-04.
It. 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
12. See WFr-CPET Ch. 17: The FederalGift and Estate Taxes, 2001 WL 423593, at *2.
13.
See generally Gary Robbins & Aldona Robbins, The Case for Burying the Estate Tax,
Institute For Policy Innovation, Policy Report #150, at 1-7 (1999), available at www.ipi.org
(discussing a historical overview of U.S. estate taxes and the developments of modem estate tax law
by providing a chronology of legislation, a detailed description, and purpose for the legislation).
14.
See Robert C. Jones, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events
Subsequent to Date of Death, 22 UCLA L. REV. 654 n.3 (1975) (explaining that a "valid claim"
includes "funeral expenses; administrative expenses; claims against the estate; mortgages or
indebtedness on property included in the gross estate; certain state and foreign death taxes; casualty
or theft losses incurred during settlement of the estate; public, charitable and religious contributions;
and bequests to the surviving spouse" (citations omitted)).
15.
Craig S. Palmquist, The Estate Tax Deductibility of Unenforced Claims Against a
Decedent's Estate, 11 GONz. L. REV. 707 (1976) (discussing how "claims against the estate" are
"the personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of death," which arise from a
"contractual arrangement or by operation of law" and are "enforceable under local law").
16. Id. at 709 (quoting Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 77).
17.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916)).
18.
See id. at 709-10.
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advocated that "a deduction be allowed only for a claim actually paid by
the estate and whose value is determined with accuracy, in light of all
events during the administration of the estate [as opposed to date-ofdeath]."' 9 Treasury Regulation § 20.203 1--1(b) defines "value" to mean
"fair market value" or "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts," 20 however the Code fails to specify how to value property, so "[tihe method of valuation is determined from regulations, IRS
rulings and case law.'
Commissioner's position also conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the date-of-death valuation approach12 set
forth in its 1929 unanimous decision, Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,23
in which decedent's trustee, Ithaca Trust Company, sued the United
States for recovery of taxes that were overpaid.2' Under the terms of decedent's will, testator's wife received the residue of the estate for her life,
and upon her death, the remainder passed in trust to certain charities.25
Initially, testator's estate used mortality tables to calculate wife's life
expectancy and thus arrive at the amount of the charitable deduction allowed for estate tax purposes.26 This valuation method was called into

question when wife died within six months of testator/husband.27 Since
wife "died before reaching her actuarial life expectancy, 28 the United
States argued that the actual date of wife's death applied in valuing the
amount of the charitable deduction, which resulted in Ithaca Trust Company paying a higher estate tax. 29 The Court rejected the United States'
argument and held in favor of Ithaca Trust Company paying a lower estate tax by calculating the charitable deduction "according to the wife's
life expectancy [using mortality tables] as of the date of the testator's
[husband's] death." 30 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained,
"[tihe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of the testator's

19.
20.

Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
ELAINE R. FORS ET AL., THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL

IV, at 1 (2000).
21.
Id.
22.
The date-of-death valuation approach fixes the amount of the claims against the estate
deduction at the date of decedent's death. See Palmquist, supra note 15, at 709. See also McMorris,
243 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing how "events occurring after a decedent's death are
irrelevant in valuing an estate's deduction under section 2053(a)(3)").
23. 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[tihe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
24. Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 153-54.
25. Id. at 154.
26. Id. at 155.
27. Id.
28.
Robert Don Collier, Survey Article: Federal Taxation, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 823, 827
(2001).
29. See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
30. McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
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death."3 ' Today, this pronouncement of the law as articulated by the
Court more than 70 years ago retains its precedential effect, and is
known as the "date-of-death valuation rule. 32
With respect to the Tenth Circuit, the date-of-death valuation topic
was one of first impression for the court when it agreed to hear Estate of
McMorris v. Commissioner.3 The issue for resolution was whether it was
proper in calculating a § 2053(a)(3) deduction to consider post-death
events.3 Since § 2053(a)(3) was silent on the issue and the pertinent tax
regulations provided no clear answer, 5 the Tenth Circuit was forced to
rely on its own discretion in whether to distinguish the holding of Ithaca
Trust or extend it to the facts of Estate of McMorris.
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Estate of McMorris v. Commissioner
1. Facts
Decedent's husband died in 1990, at which time decedent/wife inherited 13.409091 shares of NW Transport Service, Inc. stock 6 The
stock was appraised, at the date of decedent's husband's death, at a value
of $1,726,562.50 per share.37 Shortly thereafter, decedent/wife and NW
Transport entered into a stock redemption agreement for $29.5 million,
or approximately $2.2 million per share.38 Meanwhile, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue issued a notice to decedent's husband's estate disputing the value of the NW Transport stock.39 In January 1996, a settlement agreement was finalized between decedent husband's estate and the
Commissioner, which increasedthe value of the NW Transport stock to
$2.5 million per share (versus the original appraisal value of
$1,726,562.50 per share in 1990).'o Consequently, the capital gain of
$473,437.50 [$2.2 million per share minus $1,726,562.50 per share] that
decedent/wife had obtained from the stock redemption now resulted in a
loss of $300,000 [$2.5 million per share minus $2.2 million per share],
based on the new $2.5 million per share value set forth by the 1996 settlement agreement. 4' Given this loss realized from the NW Transport
stock redemption, decedent/wife's estate filed an amended federal tax
return requesting a $3,332,443 refund.42 In dispute between dece-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1260.
243 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001).
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1258.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1256. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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dent/wife's estate and the Commissioner was whether the 1996 settlement agreement was relevant in determining the value of the §
2053(a)(3) deduction taken by decedent/wife's estate in its amended federal tax return.4 '3 The Commissioner argued the 1996 settlement nagreement was relevant, while decedent/wife's estate argued it was not.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of decedent/wife's estate and extended the date-of-death valuation rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 45 to the instant case,
by holding that "events which occur after a decedent's death may not be
considered in valuing" a § 2053(a)(3) claim against the estate
deduction.46 Thus, the 1996 settlement agreement was not relevant for
purposes of calculating decedent/wife's estate tax liability.47
In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[s]ound
policy reasons" supported its adoption of the date-of-death valuation
principle. 4 In particular, the court reasoned that the date-of-death valuation principle created a "bright line rule," which would alleviate "the
uncertainty and delay in estate administration which may result if events
occurring months or even years after a decedent's death could be considered in valuing a claim against the estate."4 9 The court further explained
that its "bright line rule" would achieve a longtime "ideal" of the legal
community: bring "more certainty to estate administration., 50 However,
in making this determination, the court attempted to dispel any signs of
inherent favoritism such a bright line rule could create, by stating the rule
could just as easily benefit the Commissioner, rather than the taxpayer/estate depending on "the particular circumstances of each case."5 '
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit created new precedent by recognizing
the date-of-death valuation principle in calculating a § 2053(a)(3) deduction, which practitioners must now consider when valuing an individual
decedent's estate and calculating that estate's tax liability for federal and
state income tax purposes.

43. Id. at 1258.
44. Id.
45. 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[tihe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
46. McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1261.
49. Id. at 1261-62.
50. Id. at 1262.
51.
Id.
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C. Other Circuits
Despite the United States Supreme Court's unanimous pronouncement in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 2 the circuits are split on their
extension of the date-of-death valuation rule beyond charitable bequest
deductions.53
1. Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
In agreement with the Tenth Circuit are the Fifth, Ninth, and the
Eleventh Circuits," which accept the date-of-death valuation approach
and prohibit the consideration of post-death events in valuing claims
against the estate.
a. Fifth Circuit
55 the decedent, prior to her
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,
death, was being sued by Exxon Corporation to recoup an overpayment
of royalty proceeds that Exxon had made to decedent and other royalty
owners of oil and gas leases.56 Approximately fifteen months after decedent's death, decedent's estate settled the suit with Exxon for $681,840."
The Commissioner alleged that this settlement set the value of decedent's
estate's § 2053(a)(3) deduction. In a resounding rejection of this argument, the Fifth Circuit held that such post-death facts as the decedent's
estate's settlement with Exxon should not be considered in valuing a §
2053(a)(3) deduction.5 9 The court explained that "the claim generating
the estate tax deduction under § 2053(a)(3) ...must be valued as of the
date of the death of the decedent and thus must [be] appraised on information known or available up to (but not after) that date." 6 In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned that when the date-of-death valuation
principle was announced by the United States Supreme Court in Ithaca
Trust Co. v. United States, 6' it was making a determination about the
general nature of the federal estate tax.62 It is a tax imposed on transferred
property that is levied at a discrete time (at death), so it makes sense that

52.
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding "[tlhe estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of
the testator's death").
53. See McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1260.
54. See cases cited infra notes 55, 66, 72. See generally 34 A. AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation
§ 144,210 (2002) (discussing the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' mutual agreement regarding
the broad application of Ithaca Trust in their own jurisdictions).
55.
198 F.3d 515,517 (5th Cit. 1999).
56.
Smith, 198 F.3d at 517.
57.
See id. at 519 (emphasis added).
58.
See id. at 526.
59. See id. at 517-18 (emphasis added).
60.
Id. at 517.
61.
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
62.
See Smith, 198 F.3d at 524. See also Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155 (concluding that "the
value of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as of the time when the act is done").
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the value of the property transferred should be made at that same time.63
The court further reasoned that since Congress has enacted statutory exceptions to the date-of-death valuation rule, ' it knows how to derogate
from the rule when it wants to, but to date, Congress has "never seen65 fit
to overrule Ithaca Trust legislatively," so the courts should not either.
b. Ninth Circuit
Likewise, in Propstra v. United States,66 decedent's estate consisted
primarily of two parcels of land, which at the time of his death, were
encumbered by liens totaling $202,423.05.6 Approximately three years68
after decedent's death, his estate settled the lien claims for $134,826.23.
The Commissioner alleged decedent's estate was only allowed to deduct
the value of the settlement, or that amount actually paid in discharge of
the liens, which was less than the value of the liens at the time of decedent's death .6 In ruling in favor of decedent's estate, the Ninth Circuit
held that "§ 2053[(a)(3)] precludes the consideration of post-death events
in computing the value of certain and enforceable claims against an estate., 70 In reaching this conclusion, the court was persuaded by the
teachings of Ithaca Trust and the language of Treasury Regulation §
20.2053-4, which "designates 'the time of death' as the critical reference
point" for determining what amounts may be deducted as claims against
an estate.7'
c. Eleventh Circuit
Similarly, in O 'Neal v. United States,72 decedent's estate in seeking
a $1,883,762 estate tax refund claimed it was entitled to a $9,407,226
deduction under § 2053(a)(3) 73 for reimbursement of nine heirs' "transferee gift tax liability" on stock gifts received from decedent,74 prior to
her death. 75 Upon decedent's death, a timely filing of her estate tax return
was made, which was selected for audit by the government who chal76
lenged
§ 2053(a)(3)
A settlement
was was
reached
months the
after
decedent's deduction.
death, but decedent's
estate
heldsome
liablenine
for

63. See Smith, 198 F.3d at 524.
64.
See, e.g., funeral expenses in § 2053(a)(1) and estate administration expenses in §
2053(a)(2). See Smith, 198 F.3d at524.
65. Smith, 198 F.3d at524.
66. 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).
67. Propstra,680 F.2d at 1250.
68. See id. at 1250 (emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1257.
71. Id.at1255.
72. 258 F.3d 1265 (11thCir.2001).
73. O'Neal, 258 F.3d. at1270.
74. Id. at 1271.
75. Id. at1267.
76. See id at 1268.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

$1,883,762 in estate taxes because its § 2053(a)(3) deduction was reduced from $9,407,226 to $563,314..7 While decedent's estate paid the
increase in taxes, it then sought reimbursement by filing the abovementioned tax refund claim."' The issue for resolution by the Eleventh
Circuit was whether the post-death settlement, which was determined
more than nine months after decedent's death, should influence the value
of the estate's § 2053(a)(3) deduction.7 9 Aligning itself with the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits, the court held in favor of decedent's estate and concluded
that limiting Ithaca Trust to only charitable bequests was erroneous.8O
Instead, the court determined that the better-reasoned and more persuasive approach was to extend Ithaca Trust to cases, such as this one,
which involved § 2053(a)(3) deductions. 8 In such cases, the value of the
§ 2053(a)(3) deduction "must be valued as of the date of the decedent's
death. All events occurring after the decedent's death that alter the value
must be disregarded. 8 2 This included the $563,314 settlement amount
arrived at after decedent's death, which therefore could not be considered in valuing the estate's § 2053(a)(3) deduction.83
2. Second and Eighth Circuits
In contrast, both the Second Circuit ' and the Eighth Circuit85 have
rejected the date-of-death valuation approach and allow post-death
events to be considered in valuing a § 2053(a)(3) deduction.
a. Second Circuit
In Commissioner v. Estate of Shively," decedent/husband, prior to
his death, entered into a separation agreement with his wife, which was
later incorporated into their divorce decree that provided wife $40 a
week in spousal support until her death or remarriage, and if decedent/husband died first, the weekly payments would be a charge upon his
estate. 7 At the time of decedent/husband's death his wife had not remarried, but approximately one year after decedent's death, she did
remarry. Decedent/husband's estate paid wife her weekly support until
the date of her remarriage.8 9 However, when decedent's estate calculated

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See id.
See O'Neal, 258 F.3d at 1275.
See id. at 1273 n.25.
See id.
Id. at 1276.
See id. at 1275 (emphasis added).
See case cited infra note 86.
See case cited infra note 97.
276 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1960).
Shively, 276 F.2d at 373.
See id. at 373 (emphasis added).
See id.
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its § 2053(a)(3) deduction [formerly § 812(b) deduction], it relied on
wife's unmarried status as of decedent/husband's date of death.'O This
created an expectation of paying $27,058.30 for the duration of wife's
life, based on the $40 a week charge to decedent's estate for her
support.9' Ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the Second Circuit held
that the allowable deduction was limited to $2,079.96, or the amount of
the payments wife had received from the date of decedent/husband's
death to the date of her remarriage.92 The court explained, decedent's
estate may obtain "no greater deduction than the established sum, irrespective of whether this amount is established through events occurring
before or after the decedent's death." 93 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that to allow otherwise would defeat the purpose of the
deduction, which was "to define that portion of the property of a decedent that is subject to estate tax. '
What is noteworthy about this decision is the attention it brings to
the timing and order of events in an estate administration. As described
by the dissent, the majority relied upon the "fortuitous circumstance" that
the estate tax return was not filed until after wife had remarried." Had the
return been filed before wife's remarriage, or if wife had not remarried
until a few years after the audit, there would have been no grounds for
the Commissioner to challenge the estate's deduction.9
b. Eighth Circuit
Similarly, in Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner,97 the decedent's estate paid income tax on a gift of stock included in the estate at the time of
decedent's death. 98 Four years later, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act
of 1984, which resulted in a full refund of the income tax that that's estate had paid on that gift of stock. 99 Consequently, decedent's estate attempted to use the original income tax it had paid on the gift of stock,
prior to the refund, as a deduction and claim against the estate under §
2053(a)(3)." ° The estate argued that "since the estate's gross value was
diminished by that amount at the time of Sach's death,"'0 ' and the refund
did not occur until after decedent's date of death, it was entitled to the
deduction. 0 2 In ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 374.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 374.
Shively, 276 F.2d at 375.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 376 (emphasis added).
856 F.2d 1158, 1159 (8th Cir. 1988).
Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1159.
See id at 1159.
See id. at 1159-60.
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1160 (emphasis added).
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held that the estate could not deduct under § 2053(a)(3), "an income-tax
liability which was subsequently forgiven by Congress."'' 3 The court
explained, "an estate loses its § 2053(a)(3) deduction for any claim
against the estate which ceases to exist legally, regardless of whether the
nullification of the claim could have been foreseen."'0 4 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that Congress intended the § 2053(a)(3)
deduction to accommodate actual claims, those claims already paid or to
be paid, rather than just theoretical claims.' 5 The court further determined that Ithaca Trust was distinguishable and therefore not controlling
on the grounds that the date-of-death valuation principle enunciated by
the Supreme Court was intended to apply only in the narrow context of
charitable bequests, which this case was not. ' 06
D. Analysis
While the Tenth Circuit attributes its holding to a desire to avoid
uncertainty and delay in estate administration by adopting a "bright line
rule,"' 7 one must question whether the advantages of such a strict rule
really outweigh the unfairness that can result' ° when a court is unable to
exercise flexibility. The practicality of the Tenth Circuit's holding is also
questionable with regard to its ability to effectively avoid the uncertainty
and delay that all practitioners filing an estate tax return know: every
return is subject to audit and every estate has the potential of being
dragged out for years before a closing letter is received.' °9 Likewise,
practitioners know that when a deficiency notice is issued, there are typically several different issues, not just one."0 Therefore, "[i]t is unlikely
that a post-death event would be the sole cause of delay."''. When the
Tenth Circuit's holding is viewed in this light, allowing the valuation of
post-death events does not seem to create the hardship the court
suggests.12 As one team of commentators has observed, more fairness
would be achieved if, instead of the current distinction between date-ofdeath and post-death valuation, the cases were distinguished based on
situations where the final adjustments were due to factors out of the estate's control (such as audits or tax law changes) versus factors within the

103.
Id. at 1159 (emphasis added).
104.
Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1161.
105.
See id. at 1160.
106.
See id. at 1162.
107.
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261.
108.
See Robert E. Madden & Lisa H.R. Hayes, Estate Tax Deduction Not Altered By PostDeath Events, Rules CA-IO Estate of McMorris, 28 EST. PLAN. 325, comments (2001).
109.
See id.
110. See id.
111.
Id.
112.
See id. (emphasis added).
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estate's control (such as 3choosing to increase liability in order to eliminate future obligations).
In addition, the Tenth Circuit's reassurance that this "bright line
rule" can just as easily benefit the government, as it does the estate,"'
rings hollow in light of the fact that the Commissioner has historically
argued against the date-of-death valuation approach more often than
not. ' Consequently, this unconvincing statement by the court leads one
to conclude the professed fairness of the "bright line rule" is a sham and
in reality the rule weighs in favor of the estate more frequently than the
government."16
To make matters worse, by all indications, the split in the circuits
regarding date-of-death valuation is irreconcilable."' The only way to
resolve the conflict of whether Ithaca Trust should be read as broadly as
the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have done, or if instead it
should be construed as narrowly as the Second and Eighth Circuits have
done, is for Congress to enact specific legislation addressing the issue."'
Until that time, practitioners would be well advised to check the precedent of their local circuit court and be prepared to advise a client whether
or not to challenge a valuation of a post-death event depending upon the
approach adopted by their jurisdiction.'
II. DEDUCTIBILITY OF SUSPENDED "PALS" CARRIED FORWARD TO AN S
CORPORATION

A. Background
As a result of Congress's perception that taxpayers were eroding
federal tax revenues by using losses from one activity to offset taxable
income from another activity, the passive activity loss rules were

113.
114.

See id. (emphasis added).
McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1262.

115.

See Palmquist, supra note 15, at 709 (emphasis added).

116. See id.
117. See Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 522 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Estate of Van
Home v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 728, 736-37 (1982) (explaining how "all of the cases in this field dealing
with post-death evidence are not easily reconciled with one another, and at times it is like picking
one's way through a minefield in seeking to find a completely consistent course of decision in this
area") (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Robert C. Jones, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events
Subsequent to Date of Death, 22 UCLA L. REV. 654, 682 (1975) (encouraging Congress to aid the
executor by "providing a more definitive statement of valuation dates").
119. See Madden & Hayes, supra note 108. Nevertheless, while it is beyond the scope of this
comment, some recourse exists for preparers of estate tax returns by utilizing Code § 2032 or
"protective alternate valuation election (PAVE)," which "allows an executor to use the alternate
values and recalculate a lower tax after the return is filed -- even if the date-of-death values are used
when the return is initially filed." S. Dresden Brunner & Laird A. Lile, PAVE -- A Self-Help
Technique ForEstate Tax Valuation Methods, 75-Oct. FLA. B.J. 44, 44 (2001).
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created.' 20 While the legislative history reveals that several alternative
methods were considered, Congress adopted a system whereby "business
losses would only be permitted to offset nonbusiness income (e.g., wages
and interest) if the taxpayer materially participatedin the business that
generated the loss.' 2' Congress established this "material-participation"
standard in order to "prevent taxpayers from basing their investment decisions primarily upon the tax benefits they would receive.' ' 2 2 Consequently, a passive activity is "any business in which the taxpayer does
not materially participate;" or, in other
2 3 words, the taxpayer is not involved in the activity on a regular basis.
In general, the passive activity restrictions in § 469 "prevent a taxpayer who is not actively involved in a business from deducting losses
from the business as an offset against compensation... or ... portfolio
investments."' 24 However, § 469(c) defines real estate rental activity as a
per se passive activity "without regard to the taxpayer's level of participation in the activity."' Passive activity losses ("PALs") occur when
"the amount, if any, by which the passive activity deductions for the taxable year exceed the passive activity gross income."'26 For example, if a
corporation has total gross income from its real estate rental activities
(passive activities) of $400,000, but it has total deductions from those
same real estate rental activities of $600,000, the corporation will sustain
PALs of $200,000. Typically, under § 469(a) of the Code, PALs are not
deductible.'2 7 However, § 469(b) provides that "PALs can be suspended
and 'carried forward' to the following year" and after application of §
469(b)'s carry-over provision, under § 469(g)(1)(A), any remaining PAL
"shall be treated as a non-passive loss."2'
With respect to the Tenth Circuit, the deductibility of suspended
PALs carried forward to an S corporation was a topic of first impression
for the court when it agreed to hear St. Charles Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner.'29 The issue for resolution was whether it was proper for
the Commissioner to disallow the carry-over of suspended PALs by an S
corporation, which had incurred the PALs while it was a C corporation.'"

120.
(1995).
121.
122.
123.
124.

See NEIL A. RINGQUIST, WORKING WITH THE REVISED PASSIVE ACTIVITY Loss RULES 5

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
PEEL, supra note 2, at 231 (emphasis added).
Id. at 230 (emphasis added).

§ 603 (1995).
Id. at § 1202 (emphasis added).
See id at § 1207.1.
St. Charles Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 232 F.3d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 2000).
St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 775.
See id. See generally I. RICHARD GERSHON, A STUDENT'S GUIDE To THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE 6-7 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing the Code's different corporate tax treatments and
explaining how "S" corporations and "C" corporations received their names as a result of the Code
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES
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Since this was an issue undecided by any other circuit, the Tenth Circuit
relied on its own discretion when interpreting the congressional intent
and statutory language of the provisions in question.
B. Tenth Circuit Case: St. CharlesInv. Co. v. Commissioner13'
1. Facts
From 1988 to 1990, St. Charles operated as a closely held C corporation engaged in real estate rental activities (i.e., "passive activities").'
In 1991, St. Charles changed its tax status to an S corporation133 and sold
some of its rental properties, which had suspended PALs associated with
them for the years when St. Charles operated as a C corporation.' ,4 St.
Charles then identified those suspended PALs, totaling $6,038,001, on its
1991 tax return and claimed them as deductions as authorized by §
469(g)(1)(A).' 35 In 1996, the Commissioner issued a notice of adjustment
disallowing St. Charles' use of its suspended PALs based on §
1371(b)(1), which "prohibits an S corporation from carrying any 'carryforward' from a year in which the corporation was a C corporation to a
year in which the corporation is an S corporation."'' 36 In dispute was the
the two carry-over provisions of § 469(b) and §
conflict between
37
137 1(b)(1).1
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of St. Charles and held that when a
taxpayer corporation changes its status from a C corporation to an S corporation, it is permissible to carry forward the suspended PALs, incurred
during the years it was a C corporation, to the year it became an S corporation, and fully deduct those suspended PALs.' 3s The court explained by
implementing the rules of statutory construction, the "except as otherwise provided" language of § 469(b) 39 prevented any exceptions not

setting forth the requirements for each type of corporation in Subchapter S and Subchapter C,
respectively).
131.
232 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 2000).
132. See St. Charles,232 F.3d at 774.
133. The Code treats such corporations in a special fashion in that "[t]he income or loss to an S
corporation flows through to the shareholders" providing "the advantages of the corporate form
without double taxation." PETER C. KOSTANT, BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS: PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW 86 (1996). In contrast, a C corporation is taxed on its profits and the
shareholders are taxed on any corporate dividends they receive, which results in double taxation. See
id. at 85.
134. See St. Charles,232 F.3d at 774.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 775.
137. See id. at 776.
138. See id. at 779.
Specifically, § 469(b) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, any loss or
139.
credit from an activity which is disallowed under subsection (a) shall be treated as a deduction or
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expressly stated in § 469(b) from applying, which included §
1371(b)(1)'s restrictions' on carry forwards from a C year to an S
year.' 4' In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that Congress intended § 469(b) to be interpreted in this way because the plain language
of § 469(f)(2)4 2 allowed "the application of § 469 to a corporation's
PALs even after it ceases to be a closely held C corporation.' ' 43 The
court further determined that while its decision created a "windfall in
favor of the shareholders of St. Charles, effectively allowing one taxpayer (the shareholder) to offset his income with the losses of a different
taxpayer (the corporation)," the result was warranted because the statutory text of § 469 unequivocally supported it.'"
C. Other Circuits
As of the survey period (September45 1, 2000 - August 31, 2001), no
other circuits had considered this issue.
D. Analysis
Unlike McMorris, where the Tenth Circuit denied that its extension
of date-of-death valuation would create unfairness by always favoring
the taxpayer/estate,'" in St. Charles, the Tenth Circuit openly admitted
that its holding would create a windfall for the taxpayer. 47 Yet, the Tenth
Circuit justified the windfall in St. Charles as valid because there existed
"unequivocal support for such a result in the statutory text.' 48 While one
can understand how the "unequivocal support" standard provides the
minimum floor for which the court must comply, it is less clear why the
court is unwilling to exercise its powers of equity to recalibrate the windfall that exists. One can speculate that more was driving the court than
just strict compliance with the rules of statutory construction, such as
common sense. A common sense evaluation of the case points out that
St. Charles was still the same company, engaged in the same activities in

credit allocable to such activity in the next taxable year." 26 U.S.C. § 469(b) (2001) (emphasis
added).
140.
In particular, § 1371(b)(1) provides that "[n]o carryforward, and no carryback, arising for
a taxable year for which a corporation is a C corporation may be carried to a taxable year for which
such corporation is an S corporation." 26 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(1) (2001).
141.
See St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 775, 777 (emphasis added).
142.
Specifically, § 469(f)(2) states: "If a taxpayer ceases for any taxable year to be a closely
held C corporation ...this section shall continue to apply to losses... to which this section applied
for any preceding taxable year in the same manner as if such taxpayer continued to be a closely held
C corporation." St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 778 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 469(f)(2) (2001)).
143. St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 778 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 779.
145. See id. at 775.
146. See supra text accompanying note 51.
147. See St. Charles, 232 F.3d at 779.
148. Id.
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1991 as it was in 1988, 49 and it had merely elected for different tax
treatment under a different chapter of the Code: subchapter S, rather than
subchapter C of chapter 1.'5" Viewed in this light, the result achieved by
the court in St. Charles is both reasonable and distinguishable from
McMorris, where the court was dealing with a situation that was not the
same, because the settlement agreement was executed after the decedent's death, by parties other than the decedent himself.
III. TEST FOR DETERMINING THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF SALARIES BY A
CORPORATION AS REASONABLE BUSINESS EXPENSES

A. Background
Pursuant to § 162(a)(1), a taxpayer corporation is authorized to deduct a "reasonable allowance for salaries and other compensation" 5 ' of
its employees as an "ordinary and necessary business expense.' ' 52 However, several "suspect situations" exist in which the Commissioner is
more likely to challenge an employee's salary as excessive, 1 3 such as
when "the payor and payee are related parties"' or the related taxpayers'
"economic interests are essentially identical" ,-5
and income-shifting is
occurring, as in closely held corporations.' 56 It is within this context of
closely held corporations that the rationale for the reasonableness limitation is particularly evident.'57 Absent the reasonableness limitation, income-shifting would occur in the form of the employer-corporation
paying an excessive salary to its controlling shareholder (who also serves
as the corporation's executive so that "the corporation is practically a
one-person company"), 8 which is deductible to the employercorporation, in lieu of paying a dividend to the shareholder-executive,
which is not deductible to the employer-corporation.'59 As a result, the
corporation shifts the income that was due and owing to the shareholderexecutive away from itself by not paying a dividend and reduces its own
tax liability by the dollar-amount of the shareholder-executive's compen-

149.
150.
151.

See id at 774.
See PEEL, supra note 2, at 186.
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO

THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 117

(3d ed. 1982).

DANIEL Q. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH DIAGRAMS FOR
EASY UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS I 6.03(2)(a) (4th ed. 1998).
153.
DANtEL Q. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND BASIC CONCEPTS
IN THE TAXATION OF ALL ENTITIES 321 (Student ed. 1983).

152.

154.
For example, "corporation and shareholder or as members of the same family--so that the
,overpayment' actually entails no economic loss to the employer." CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 151, at
117.
155. Id. at 118.
156. See id
157. See id.
158.
TIMOTHY P. BJUR & DENNIS JENSEN, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2129.10 (1995).

159.

See CHIRELSTEIN,

supra note 151, at 118.
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sation. '6° Of course, since the shareholder-executive's "economic interests are essentially identical" to the closely held corporation' S6I (i.e., pay
as little tax to the Commissioner as possible by reducing "their total tax
burden"), '62 without the reasonableness limitation, the choice to pay an
excessive salary rather than a dividend16 would result in great revenue
losses to the Commissioner.
Thus, in the event the Commissioner is successful in proving an
executive's salary is excessive, the executive can still get paid, however
the salary will be "disallowed" and "recharacterized as a dividend,"
which is taxable to the executive as income arising from his role as
shareholder, but is not deductible by the corporation as a reasonable
business expense 6 Throughout the dispute, the burden of proof remains
with the taxpayer asserting the compensation is "reasonable.' 65
With regard to federal circuit court law on this topic of reasonable
compensation, there is a vast body of established law.' 66 However, as the
topic relates to the Tenth Circuit, one specific approach, the "multi-factor
test," was adopted in 1976 in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Commissioner,67 and it provides nine factors to consider when determining whether a salary is "reasonable. ' ' 68 In Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v.
Commissioner,69 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the decision of
whether to continue its use of the "multi-factor test" or adopt70 the "independent investor test," as recently embraced by other circuits.
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Eberl's Claim Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner
1. Facts
Taxpayer corporation, a closely held Colorado claims adjusting
company, provided independent claims adjuster's services to insurance
companies following major disasters.' Eberl was the corporation's
founder, president, sole shareholder and claims adjuster. 72 While a 1988
employment agreement existed between Eberl and taxpayer corporation,
Eberl's salary or a formula for its computation was not specified.'73 A
160.
161.
162.

See id.
Id.

163.

POSIN, supra note 153, at 365.
See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 151, at 119.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
See Kurzet v. Comm'r, 222 F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 2000).
See discussion infra Part In.C.
528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1976).
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 999.
249 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2001).
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003.
See id. at 996.
See id.
See id. (emphasis added).
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1992 amendment to the agreement also did not fix the amount of Eberl's
compensation, but did loosely tie his salary to gross revenues.'7 The only
other employees receiving regular salaries were part-time clerical staff.'75
At no time during taxpayer corporation's existence were dividends
.paid.'76 Taxpayer corporation's gross receipts typically ranged from $2
million to $4 million, but sharp inclines were recorded in 1992
($20,438,803) and 1993 ($9,168,585) based on the large number of major catastrophes in those years. 77 Consequently, Eberl's salary was significantly higher in those years: $4,340,000 for 1992 and $2,080,000 for
1993 (versus $190,000 to $608,000 in prior years). 78 When taxpayer
corporation attempted to claim Eberl's salary as a deductible business
objected to Eberl's 1992 and 1993 salaries as
expense, the' Commissioner
"excessive."' 79 The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether Eberl's
salaries in 1992 and 1993 were "reasonable," or whether they in fact
constituted disguised dividend payments that should have been taxed.'s
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the Commissioner and rejected
taxpayer corporation's invitation to adopt an "independent investor test,"
as recently embraced by other circuits, 8 ' in favor of stare decisis by reaffirming the use of the "multi-factor test of reasonable compensation" set
forth in its prior decision, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner.'
The court explained that a compensation plan is considered "reasonable"
if it is a result of a "longstanding, consistently applied plan negotiated at
arm's length.'5' 18 Here, it was not. No written documentation that a formula for calculating Eberl's salary existed" and even if such formula
had existed, it was not negotiated at arm's length since Eberl was both
controlling shareholder and employee.'85 Moreover, Eberl's salary was
not determined until the end of each year, once taxpayer corporation's
expenses were known, which enabled Eberl to receive virtually all of the
corporation's net profits as compensation (not taxable) in lieu of paying a
dividend (taxable) 6 Under the totality of these circumstances, the court
concluded Eberl's salary was unreasonable and "a disguise for nondeductible profit distributions,"'' 87 on which taxpayer corporation had a
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

at 996-97 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 997.
See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 997.
See ia
See id
Id. at 996.
See id.
See id at 1003-04.
528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1976).
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1000.
See id at 1000 n.2.
See id.at 1000.
See id.
Id.
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duty to pay taxes.8 In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged
that while the "independent investor test"'8 9 had the potential to provide a
simpler and more purposive solution than the multi-factor approach, it
was bound, absent en banc rehearing, to adhere to the totality of the circumstances/multi-factor approach adopted in Pepsi-ColaBottling.'9°
C. Other Circuits
Among the other circuits which have agreed with the Tenth Circuit
that a multi-factor test is best to use in determining the reasonableness of
salaries, there is variation in the actual number of factors that must be92
satisfied.' 9' For example, the Tenth Circuit's Pepsi-Cola Bottling case'
lists nine factors,'93 as does the Sixth Circuit, as set forth in Mayson Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner,'" but the Fifth Circuit applies only eight factors, as
95 Despite
listed in Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner.'
these
quantitative discrepancies in the factors employed by the above circuits
to determine reasonableness of salary, in the end, they all employ a form
of balancing the totality of the circumstances, rather than focusing on just
one dispositive issue.
In contrast, of those circuits that have adopted the "independent
investor test,"' 96 only the Seventh Circuit in Exacto Spring Corp. v.

188. See id. at 1002.
189.
Specifically, the independent investor test asks, "whether an inactive, independent
investor would be willing to compensate the employee as he was compensated." Eberl's Claim 249
F.3d at 1003 (quoting Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983)).
190.
Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003-04.
191.
See id. at 999.
192.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1976). Those nine
factors are:
(1) [tjhe employee's qualifications; (2) [tjhe nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; (3)
[t]he size and complexities of the business; (4) [a] comparison of salaries paid with the gross income
and the net income; (5) [t]he prevailing general economic conditions; (6) [a] comparison of salaries
with distributions to stockholders; (7) [t]he prevailing rates of compensation for comparable
positions in comparable concerns; (8) [t]he salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; [and]
(9) [in the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers the amount of compensation
paid to the particular employee in previous years.
Id. at 179.
193. See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 999.
194.
178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) (employing identical factors as the 10th Circuit in
Pepsi-ColaBottling Co.).
195.
819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying the same factors as the 6th Circuit in
Mayson Mfg. Co., except for factor (9), which was not relevant, "[b]ecause the taxpayers have not
argued that the payments in the years at issue were made in recompense for underpayments in
previous years").
196.
See, e.g., Dexsil Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 96, 100-201 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining how
the independent investor test "is not a separate autonomous factor; rather, it provides a lens through
which the entire analysis should be viewed"); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.
1983) (applying a multi-factor test "from the perspective of an independent investor") and Rapco,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 85 F.3d 950, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). See also Eberl's Claim. 249 F.3d at
1003.
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Commissioner'9'has completely rejected the multi-factor test.'9 The Seventh Circuit in adopting the "independent investor test" held that the
CEO's "'exorbitant' salary (as it might appear to a judge or other modestly paid official)" was "presumptively reasonable" because the investors in the company were "obtaining a far higher return than they had any
reason to expect."' 99 The court explained this result was justified, hence
the qualifying language "presumptively reasonable," as long as the
higher rate of return being generated was due to the CEO's own exertions, and not someone else' S.* In reaching this conclusion, the court
reasoned that by tying salary to performance, executive retention was
encouraged because "killing the goose that lays the golden egg ' 20' would
not be good business for the company or its investors. In addressing the
inadequacies associated with" the multi-factor test, the court explained
that "judges are not competent to decide what business executives are
worth," 20 2 and yet that is exactly what the multi-factor test requires judges
to do. In particular, the court criticized the lack of directive provided by
the multi-factor test in that "[n]o indication is given of how the factors
are to be weighed in the event they don't all line up on one side." 203 The
court explained that such an imbalance is resolved by a judge using his
own discretion and his "own ideas of what jobs are comparable, what
relation an employee's salary should bear to the corporation's net earnings, what types of business should pay abnormally high (or low) salaries, and so forth. '24 The court further explained that since judges are
neither trained nor experienced in such industry-specific matters, and the
multi-factor "test cannot itself determine the outcome of a dispute because of its nondirective character," the results are arbitrary. 2° As a result, corporations have no uniform guidance from the law when it comes
to determining executive compensation, and this lack of predictability
206
creates expensive and unavoidable legal risks for the corporation. As a
replacement for the "redundant, incomplete, and unclear" 20 7 multi-factor
test, the court proposed that the "independent investor test" provided a
more logical and fair approach to determining executive salaries by, in
essence, allowing the supply and demand needs of the market dictate,
like other prices, what was reasonable.00 This supply and demand approach is reflected in whether the corporation, through the efforts of its
executives surpasses the investors' expectations of return on their in197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1004 n.6.
Exacto Spring, 196 F.3d at 839.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Exacto Spring, 196 F.3d at 839.
See id.
Id. (quoting Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986)).
See id. at 836, 838.
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vestment in the corporation. 2°9 When an executive achieves a higher rate
of return than investors expect, he can command a greater salary, which
in turn, is an incentive for the executive to stay with the corporation and
continue to make it profitable for the investors, allowing everyone to
win. 210
D. Analysis
In McMorris, the Tenth Circuit expressly announced favoritism for
the date-of-death valuation method because it offered all of the advantages of a "bright line rule." 2 ' Yet, when the Tenth Circuit was presented
with the opportunity to adopt the "independent investor test" in Eberl's
Claim, which is clearly more of a "bright line rule" than the multi-factor
test, the court declined to do so.212 While this decision is attributable to
the court's desire to conform to the principle of stare decisis, there are
two hints that the court is leaving the door open for future consideration
of the "independent investor test." First, the Tenth Circuit's remark that
"absent en banc rehearing" it must conform with its prior precedent in
Pepsi-Cola Bottling, suggests the inclusion of such a statement means
the court may consider changing to the "independent investor test" if
given the opportunity for an en banc rehearing. t 3 Second, and perhaps
providing more convincing evidence is the court's acknowledgement that
the "independent investor test is an attractive solution. 214 For the numerous reasons articulated by Chief Judge Posner in Exacto Spring Corp. v.
Commissioner,2 5 the more simplified "independent investor test" is a
convincing approach for determining the reasonableness of salaries by
eliminating the arbitrary and unpredictable decisions arising from a
court's free exercise of judicial discretion in an area it has no experience:
the private, for-profit, corporate world. 1 6
CONCLUSION

In general, tax law is substantially driven by statutes and IRS regulations, which limit courts in their interpretations. Typically, the rules for
statutory construction are strictly complied with leaving little room for
courts to exercise flexibility or make changes in the law without receiving criticism. Thus, it is no surprise that while the Tenth Circuit was
willing over the past survey period of September 1, 2000 through August
31, 2001, to adopt some new tax law in cases of first impression: that is,
the date-of-death valuation in McMorris for determining individual estate
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 838-39.
See id. at 838.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
See Eberl's Claim, 249 F.3d at 1003.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999). See supratext accompanying notes 198-211.
See supra text accompanying notes 198-211.
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tax liability; and the deductibility of suspended passive activity losses
("PALs") carried forward to an S corporation in St. Charles; the Tenth
Circuit was less willing to depart from the principle of stare decisis and
make changes to past holdings. For example, the Tenth Circuit's refusal
in Eberl's Claim to join the bandwagon established by other circuits in
adopting the "independent investor test," as a "new" test for determining
the reasonableness of executive salaries.
Therefore, attorneys practicing within the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction would be well advised to embrace the court's past decisions and not
expect a change in tax law, unless the case presents a topic of first impression and the Tenth Circuit is required to rely on its own discretion,
rather than just rules of statutory construction, to arrive at its decision.
Darby Hildreth

REFINING THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S STANCE ON EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS: THE ADA, FREE SPEECH IN THE WORKPLACE,
AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
INTRODUCTION

Employment law is an area in which many lawyers and non-lawyers
alike have experience. After all, most adults have either been employed
or employ others. The issue underlying many employment cases seems
to be the struggle to balance the employee's right to be treated fairly and
with dignity in the workplace, and the employer's need to maintain an
efficient, profitable business. This tension has formed a large and diverse
body of caselaw ranging from topics such as wages to sexual harassment.
This article focuses on United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decisions in employment law from September, 2000 through
August, 2001. Employment law encompasses many different topics, and
it is not possible to discuss all the cases decided in the Tenth Circuit in
this writing. Therefore, this paper examines some of the more significant
cases decided in three common areas of employment law. Part I discusses the American Disabilities Act's requirement for reasonable accommodation. Part II discusses free speech rights in the workplace, and
Part III examines the Fair Labor Standards Act.
I. ADA- REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

A. Background
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' ("Act" or "ADA")
provides that private employers may not discriminate against qualified
individuals with disabilities and must accommodate workers who qualify
for accommodation.2 As part of this mandate, some courts, including the
Tenth Circuit, have held that the Act requires employers to consider reassignment into other available positions when a disabled employee cannot
perform the functions of his position.3 Until now, however, neither the
Act nor the Tenth Circuit have provided guidance as to the time frame
during which the employer must consider reassignment.4
The "EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] guidelines and previous case law show that a 'reasonable accommodation'
may include reassigning the disabled employee to a different, vacant

1.
2.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101,etseq. (2001).
See Christopher J. Murray & John E. Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and

the ADA, 83 MARQuETrE L. REV. 721,722 (2000).

3.
4.

See Murray & Murray, supra note 2,at 722 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2001)).
See Murray & Murray, supra note 2, at 731.
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position for which he is qualified."' The Tenth Circuit in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. ,6 set forth the criteria for determining an employer's
accommodation requirements if the employee has requested reassignment to a vacant position.7 In Smith, the court held that "[i]f no reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in his or her existing job,
then the reasonable accommodation may require assignment to a vacant
position so long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not
impose an undue burden on the employer., 8 In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment by the employer, the employee must be able
to show the following:
(1) The employee is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA and has made any resulting limitations from
his or her disability known to the employer;
(2) The preferred option of accommodation within the
employee's existing job cannot reasonably be accomplished;
(3) The employee requested the employer reasonably to
accommodate his or her disability by reassignment
to a vacant position, which the employee may identify at the outset or which the employee may request
the employer identify through an interactive process,
in which the employee in good faith was willing to,
or did, cooperate;
(4) The employee was qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform one or more appropriate vacant jobs within the company that the
employee must, at the time of summary judgment
proceeding, specifically identify and show were
available within the company at or about the time
the request for reassignment was made; and
(5) The employee suffered injury because the employer
did not offer to reassign the employee to any appropriate vacant position.9
Some critics have argued that this rule is unclear because it does not
tell an employer how long he or she must seek a position for which the

5.
Tenth Circuit Opines on ADA 'Reasonable Accommodations,' UTAH EMP. L. LETrER
(Wood Crapo, L.L.C.), June 2001, at 4.
6.
180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
7.
See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
8.
Smith, 180 F.3d at 1169.
9. Id. at 1179.
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employee is qualified as a reasonable accommodation.' ° Note that the
fourth factor only states the employee must show a position was available "at or about the time" of the request for reassignment." The Smith
court specified only that the term "vacant position... includes positions
that the employer reasonably anticipates will become vacant in the fairly
immediate future."' 2 In Boykin v. ATC/VanCom,' 3 the Tenth Circuit attempted to narrow the timeframe within which employers must reassign
an employee to a vacant position."
B. Boykin v. ATC/VanCom,
Fred L. Boykin ("Boykin") brought suit in Denver County District
Court against his former employer, ATCIVanCom of Colorado, L.P.
("VanCom"), claiming that VanCom violated certain sections of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").' 6 After VanCom removed the
case to federal court, Boykin appealed the ruling of the federal court
granting VanCom summary judgment.'7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
ruling of the district court.'8
1. Facts
VanCom hired Boykin as a part-time bus driver in 1997.' 9 Boykin
suffered from transient ischemic attacks ("TIA"), also known as ministrokes.2° While working for VanCom, Boykin suffered three TIAs, one
occurring while Boykin was driving a VanCom bus. 2' As a result of Boykin's attack while driving the bus, VanCom required Boykin to undergo
an examination by a doctor hired by VanCom.22 The physician revoked
the medical certification Boykin needed for commercial driving for one
year, which would be reinstated if Boykin did not suffer any TIAs during
that year and was then cleared by a neurologist at the end of the year.
23

Boykin asked VanCom to accommodate his disability by reassigning him to a dispatch operator or data-entry position.4 VanCom responded that neither position was available and offered Boykin a bus
10.

See, e.g., Reassignment Obligation Doesn't Last Forever, Wyo. EMP. L. LETrER

(Holland & Hart), May 2001, at 7.
11. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1179.
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13.
14.
15.

Id.at 1175.
247 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1063.
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See id.

17.
18.

See id.
Id. at 1066.
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See id. at 1062.
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cleaner position.25 Boykin could not accept the position VanCom offered
because it conflicted with his schedule as a full-time college student.26
Boykin was subsequently terminated."
Six months later, new positions became available at VanCom because of a contract into which VanCom had entered with the Regional
Transportation District (RTD). 28 The positions included an opening for a
dispatch operator.29 VanCom notified Boykin of the available positions
but added that Boykin would need to apply for the position. 0 Boykin did
apply and was interviewed, but was not hired.3
Boykin sued VanCom for failing to comply with the ADA, contending that VanCom should have assigned him to the dispatch operator
position when it became available instead of requiring him to apply for
the position along with other candidates. 32 Boykin also alleged that under
the ADA, VanCom was required to place him in the position as a reasonable accommodation of Boykin's disability even though he was terminated six months before the position became available.33 Further, Boykin
asserted that VanCom did not comply with the ADA when it offered the
bus cleaner position to Boykin because VanCom knew that the position
posed a schedule conflict with his school schedule. 34 Finally, Boykin
claimed that VanCom violated the ADA by failing to "enter into the
good-faith interactive process required by the ADA. 35
The district court granted VanCom's motion for summary judgment
on the basis that VanCom did comply with the ADA in offering Boykin
the bus cleaner position.36 In addition, the court ruled that VanCom was
not required to offer Boykin37 the dispatch operator "position six months
after Boykin' s termination.,
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed Boykin's claim that VanCom violated
the ADA by failing "to offer Mr. Boykin a reasonable accommodation
for the period during which he was disabled from driving a passenger

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See
Id.

id.
Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1062
id.
id. at 1063.
id.
id.
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id.
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bus."3 Boykin argued that VanCom should have placed him on indefinite
leave until a suitable position became available, because VanCom had
knowledge that positions would become available due to the pending
contract with RTD.39 The court did not accept this argument because: (1)
six months is not a reasonable amount of time within which an employer
must reassign an employee; and (2) VanCom was not required to accommodate Boykin's personal schedule conflict with the bus cleaner
position, as the failure to accommodate constituted "discrimination on
other bases" not covered by the ADA.'
The court first discussed Boykin's contention that VanCom should
have placed him in a position after six months." The court found that,
under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation by an employer "may include reassignment to a vacant position for which the employee is qualified. 4 2 This reassignment might also include positions that are not vacant
at the present time, but "also includes positions that the employer reasonably anticipates will become vacant in the fairly immediate future."4'3
The court held that "[e]mployers should reassign an employee to a
position if it becomes 'vacant within a reasonable amount of time."'" To
determine a reasonable amount of time, the court must decide on a "caseby-case basis and [it] is to be determined in light of the totality of the
circumstances."4'5 Here, the court held that VanCom did not violate the
ADA by failing to reassign Boykin six months after he was terminated,
nor was VanCom required to place Boykin on indefinite leave for an
"excessive amount of time" until a position became available. 6 However,
the court wrote that an employer is obligated to reassign an employee at
37 days. 7
Second, the court discussed Boykin's argument that when VanCom
offered him the bus cleaner position, it violated the ADA because VanCoin knew that the job conflicted with his school schedule.48 The court
wrote that "the ADA forbids discrimination against a qualified individual
because of the disability, not 'discrimination on other bases."' 9 Further,
the court held that "the ADA 'does not require an employer to make accommodation for an impairment that is not a disability within the mean38. Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1064.
39. Id.
40. Id at 1065 (quoting Buckley v. Consol Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1998)).
41.
Id. at 1064.
42. Id.
43. Id.(quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999)).
44. Boykin, 247 F.3d. at 1065 (quoting Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
45.
Id.at 1064 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o) (2000)).
46.
Id. at 1065.
47.
See id. (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996)).
48.
Id. at 1065.
49.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir.

1998).
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ing of the Act or that does not result from such a disability."'" In sum,
even though Boykin's TIA fell within the meaning of the ADA, VanCom
did not have to accommodate his schedule when considering possible
reassignment.
C. Other Circuits
1. Sixth Circuit
In Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp." the Sixth Circuit established
that an employer must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position
that will become available in a short amount of time. 2
Monette was a customer service representative for the defendant,
Electronic Data Systems Corporation. 3 He was injured at work when
some heavy equipment fell on him 4 After returning to work from medical leave related to his disability, Monette was placed on unpaid medical
leave for thirty-seven days until a position could be located.5 After that
time, the defendant terminated Monette, concluding that it could not reassign Monette to any other positions within the company. 6 Monette
sued the defendant pursuant to the ADA and provisions of the Michigan
Handicappers' Civil Rights Act. 7 Monette proposed that he be placed on
indefinite unpaid medical leave until a position became available. 8
The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant was not required to place a
disabled employee on indefinite unpaid medical leave until a vacant position arose. 9 However, the Court stated in dicta that "[i]f, perhaps, an
employer knows that a position for which the disabled applicant is qualified will become vacant in a short period of time, the employer may be
required to offer the position to the employee. '
The Sixth Circuit further found in Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriffs Dept ' that an employer was required to reassign an employee if a
position became available "within a reasonable amount of time," but the

50. Id. at 1066 (quoting Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d
Cir. 1998); cf.29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9 (2000)).
51. 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996).
52. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1173.
53. See id. at 1176.
54. See id
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61.
Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriffs Dept., 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000).
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particular employer in that case was not required to assign an employee
to a position one year after the employee's disability was disclosed.62
2. Eighth Circuit
In Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City,63 the
Eighth Circuit followed the rule articulated in Monette by stating that a
reasonable accommodation can include reassigning the disabled employee to a vacant position. 6 This vacant position may include not only
vacant positions at the time of the reassignment request, but also those
that will become available "in a short period of time. 65
D. Analysis
The importance of Boykin comes from its narrowing of the timeframe during which employers must consider reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position if a suitable position is not available at the
time of the request."6 Even though the Tenth Circuit did not provide a
bright-line rule and instead opted for a "case-by-case" approach, employees seeking accommodation and employers attempting to accommodate have a clearer picture of what vacant positions must be included in
67
the accommodation search. Now, in the Tenth Circuit, six months is
generally too long to require an employer to reassign an employee to a
position that has become available. 68 In addition, an employer is not required to place an employee on unpaid medical leave until a vacant position becomes available.69
However, Boykin illustrates the idea that an employer must also
widen the scope of the meaning of "vacant" to include positions that an
employer believes may become available in the next few months. If the
employer fails to consider a position that may become available in the
next six months, the employer may be liable under the ADA for failure to
accommodate.7'
Another important aspect of Boykin is that it parallels with the
holdings of the Second Circuit when it states that "[t]he ADA does not
require an employer to make accommodation for an impairment that is
62. Hoskins, 227 F.3d at 729.
63. 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000).
64. Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 (discussing the decision in Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. 90
F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996)).
65. Id.
66. See Boykin v. ATC/VanCom, 247 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).
67. See Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70.
See Indefinite Leave not Required as ADA Accommodation, N. M. EMP. L. LETER
(Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, LLP), Aug. 2001, at 1.
71. See Christopher M. Leh, Reassignment Six Months After Termination not Required Under
ADA, CoLO. EMP. L. LETER, June 2001, at 1.
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not a disability within the meaning of the Act or does not result from
such a disability."72 This principle will defeat an argument, such as that
made by Boykin, that an accommodation offered by a company might be
unreasonable if it conflicts with the plaintiff s schedule.73
II. FREE SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS
A. Background
Public employees have a limited right to free speech in the workplace.74 Freedom of speech for public employees has evolved through
cases that consider the issue of freedom of public employees to associate,
and more specifically, public employees who were required to take loyalty oaths. 75 The Supreme Court wrote that "the right to speak on matters
76
of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
While the loyalty oath cases protected a public employee's right to free
association and speech, little guidance was offered by the Supreme Court
to employers as to the extent of the employee's freedom of speech.77
1. The PickeringBalancing Test
It was not until Pickering v. Board of Education7 8 that the United
States Supreme Court set forth criteria to help determine the scope of a
public employee's right to free speech. 79 The Supreme Court devised a
test in order to strike a "balance between the first amendment rights of
public employees and the proper exercise of managerial authority by
state employers." 80 As citizens, public employees should be able to comment on matters of public concern, while still allowing the State to efficiently provide services to the people.' Thus, an employee can only win
his or her case against an employer if his or her speech is shown to regard a matter of public concern.82
In Pickering, the first factor in the balancing test was to consider the
working relationship between the parties. 83 "[A] close working relation-

72.
Boykin v. ATCNanCom, 247 F.3d 1061, 1066 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Buckley v.
Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2nd Cir. 1998)).
73.
See Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065-66.
74.
Stephen Allred, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of Public
Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1984).
75. See id. at 433.
76.
Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
77.
Allred, supra note 74, at 437.
78.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
79. See Allred, supra note 74, at 437.
80. Id. at 438.
81.
See id. at 430.
82.
See Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (And Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 941 (2001).
83. See Allred, supra note 74, at 438.
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ship between the employee and the managers who are the subjects of the
employee's criticism could tip the balance in favor of the employer's
right to limit free speech."' Second, the Court examined whether the
speech had a detrimental effect on the employer." Specifically, this factor looked at whether the "public agency could continue to accomplish
its mission in light of the employee's statements on a matter of public
concern." 6 The third factor was the employee's relationship to the issue
and the nature of the issue that was the subject of the employee's
speech." If the employee had expertise related to the issue, the speech
was more likely to be protected because the employee made a "valuable
contribution to public understanding" of the issue.88
2. Matters of Public Concern
It then became important to distinguish what exactly was "a matter
of public concern." 8 9 In Connick v. Myers,' the United States Supreme
Court held that if the employee's speech did not constitute a matter of
public concern, the speech was not protected, and no balancing test was
needed.9' Also in Connick, the Supreme Court held that the expressive
activities of an Assistant District Attorney who circulated a questionnaire
about office morale and management practices did not touch upon a
matter of public concern. 92 "Whether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of the speech, and that speech must relate to some matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. 93 After Connick,
"[w]hen the employee's speech is about narrow issues relating to the internal management of the agency, lower courts tend to characterize it as a
personal grievance or as part of performing the job itself, rather than as
involving a matter of public concern." 9
The Tenth Circuit uses a modified Pickering/Connicktest in order
to evaluate a party's First Amendment retaliation claim.95 First, the court
examines "whether the employee's speech involves a matter of public
concern." 96 If the speech does involve a matter of public concern, then

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
U.S. 138,
94.
95.
96.
Edmund,

Id. at 439.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 440.
Id.
See Allred, supra note 74, at 438.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
See Allred, supra note 74, at 432.
See id. at 431-32.
Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
14647 (1983).
Wells, supra note 82, at 953.
See Dill v. City of Edmund, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998).
Finn v. New Mexico, 249 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Dill v. City of
155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998).
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the court must balance "the employee's interest in commenting upon
matters of public concern 'against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."'97 Third, if the balancing test favors the employee, the employee must then demonstrate "that the speech was a 'substantial factor or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision." 98 Finally, if the speech is proven to be a factor, then the employer
may show that "it would have taken the same action against the employee" despite the occurrence of the protected speech. 99
The Tenth Circuit used the hybrid Pickering/Connickanalysis in the
following two cases discussed below: Finn v. New Mexico,'°° and Ballard
v. Muskogee Regional Medical Center.'1 '
B. Finn v. New Mexico"°2
1. Facts
John Finn had been an employee of the New Mexico State Highway
and Transportation Department ("Department") beginning in 1974.'03 In
1995, a new administration announced the reorganization of the department, which resulted in Finn's demotion and transfer to a different division.' 04 Finn argued this decision was illegal because the Department
acted without the approval of the New Mexico State Personnel Office.'05
Once Finn was officially notified that he would be demoted and
transferred to another division within the department, he began sending
Intra-Department Correspondence ("IDC") memorandums to the new
upper management.' ° The first IDC contained assertions by Finn that the
management was abusing its power and "attempting to 'crucify"' Finn.' °'
After this first correspondence, Finn left for medical reasons, and upon
his return to work he was notified that he was again demoted.'08
Finn then sent an IDC to the new upper management along with
over thirty-five other agencies and individuals, criticizing the reorganization of the Department.' 9 This IDC contained statements that the "De-

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1201).
Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202).
Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202).
Id.
238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
249 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1244.
See id.
See id
See id. at 1244-45.
Id. at 1245.
See id.
See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1245.
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partment's use of the phrase 'Equal Opportunity Employer' was a 'sick
joke.""' Finn also claimed that the department reorganization was the
result of favoritism, and that Roybal, the new Deputy Secretary, was
unqualified for
his position."' Finn added personal attacks against Roy2
bal as well."
During the next two weeks, Finn sent two more IDCs with similar
content." 3 Finn was then given notice that disciplinary action could ensue
if he did not cease his acts which were considered to be "detract[ing]
from . . . maintaining a positive work environment."'"4 Finn disregarded
the warning and sent another IDC to several individuals and agencies
that made, among other things, statements accusing Roybal of engaging
in an adulterous affair with a married employee, and promoting the em"
ployee after
6 the employee's marriage ended. ' Finn was terminated after
this IDC.11
Finn then filed suit in the district court, alleging that the defendants
infringed upon his right of free speech.' '7 The defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that Finn's speech was unprotected by
the First Amendment because it "was not a matter of public concern and
that defendants' interest in regulating such speech outweighed plaintiff's
interest in engaging in the speech.""' 8 Rahn, an individual defendant, also
filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he had qualified
immunity against Finn's claims." 9 The district court denied both motions
and Rahn appealed to the Tenth Circuit. 20
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. 2' The court
assessed Finn's First Amendment retaliation claim using the four-part
test applied in Dill v. City of Edmond, another Tenth Circuit case.122 The
court concluded that only the first two parts of the test needed to be addressed in that case.' 3 First, to determine whether a government employee's speech is protected, the court had to decide "whether the em-

110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
1998).
123.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id
Id. at 1246.
See Finn, 249 F.3d at1246.
See id.
Seeid
Id.
See id
See id
Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249.
See id. at 1247. See also Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (10th Cir.
See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247.
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ployee has spoken 'as a citizen upon matters of public concern'
or
24
merely 'as an employee upon matters only of personal interest."
While speech pertaining to internal personnel disputes and working
conditions ordinarily will not involve public concern, "speech that
seeks to expose improper operations of the government or questions
the integrity of governmental officials clearly concerns the vital public interests." In making this determination, we consider the "content,
form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. ,2 5
The main issue was that while portions of Finn's speech did constitute matters of public concern, much of the content of the IDCs was of
personal interest to Finn. 2 6 The defendants argued on appeal that the
district court erred when it failed to consider the speech in its entirety
and instead made its decision by "picking and choosing" certain parts of
the speech as protected.2 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that Finn satisfied the first part of the test, because limited portions of Finn's speech did "touch on matters of public concern."' 28 However, the court noted that a mere "tidbit" of speech that touched on matters of public concern would limit the employee's interest in the
speech. 29 In sum, enough of Finn's speech touched upon matters of public concern to protect it.'3 °

Next, the court applied the second part of the Pickering analysis. 3
This is a balancing inquiry, weighing the "employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern 'against the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.",132 To evaluate the employer's interest, the
court considered "whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors
or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes
with the regular operation of the enterprise.' 33 Because the court did not
find any evidence that the speech caused disruption, there was no state

124. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
125. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988));
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
126. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247-48.
127. Id. at 1248.
128. Id.
129.
Id. at 1249.
130.
Id. at 1248.
131.
Id. at 1249.
132.
Finn, 249 F.3d at 1248. (quoting Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.
1998)).
133.
Id. at 1249. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)).

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

20021

interest to prohibit Finn's speech, and thus the First Amendment protected the speech."
Overall, the court has reached many different outcomes using the
same standard. For example, here, the court found Finn's speech to be
protected by the First Amendment, whereas in the case of Ballard v.
Muskogee Reg'l Med. Ctr.,133 the court found that the First Amendment
afforded no such protection.
C. Ballardv. Muskogee Regional Medical Center

36

1. Facts
Ballard was employed as a psychological technician at the
Muskogee Regional Medical Center ("Medical Center") and sued after
she was terminated. 3 7 Ballard alleged that she was wrongfully terminated
after she notified the County Health Department that a patient was in
poor condition.' 38 The Medical Center argued that Ballard's work performance was the reason for her termination. 39 The Medical Center explained that Ballard had encouraged "a known suicidal patient to jump
out of a window," and misrepresented herself as a nurse.14
The jury had found that Ballard was wrongfully terminated on the
basis of free speech retaliation, but also that she would have been terminated for reasons other than her speech.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding, ruling that a
jury cannot award damages for the plaintiff if the jury also finds that the
42
defendant had legitimate grounds upon which to terminate the plaintiff.
Using the Pickering analysis, the court held that the employer's liability
was relieved if it could show that it terminated the employee for reasons
other than the exercise of speech.'4 ' Thus, the employer satisfied the
fourth part of the test, despite the lower court's ruling that the other reasons did not "negate the constitutional violation which occurred, and
according to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, ... merely affects the Plaintiffs damages."'" In conclusion, the court found that there were other

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id.
238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001)
See Ballard,238 F.3d at 1252.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1253.
See Ballard,238 F.3d at 1253.
Id.
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substantial reasons for the Plaintiffs termination, which
negated any
4
argument that she was terminated because of her speech.1
D. Other Circuits
1. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit reached a different outcome using the Pickering/Connick analysis. For example, in Khuans v. Sch. Dist.,'46 Khuans, a
schoolteacher, was terminated after speaking to the principal about her
problems with a fellow employee.1 47 Khuans told the school's principal
that the other employee often could not be found at school during the
school day, and that she had problems communicating with the employee. 48 After complaining, the Assistant Administrator informed
Khuans that she would be replaced. 4 9 The district court denied the superintendent's claim of immunity, and he appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 5°
The Seventh Circuit rejected Khuans' claim of retaliation because
even though she did speak upon matters of public concern, she also
spoke about matters that were not relevant to the public. 5' For instance,
while Khuans informed school officials that the employee failed to follow mandates pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, the court characterized Khuans' comments about the employee's
inability to communicate as not a matter of public concern. 5 2 The Court
further wrote that the district court erred when it held that there was a
constitutional violation because "one item of speech was protected."'53
Because Khuans' speech was more private than public, it was not protected by the First Amendment. 14
Further, the court held that even if Khuans' speech was a matter of
public concern, the speech must be weighed against the "actual and potential disruption caused by her remarks."'55 The court opined that
Khuans' speech was shown to be disruptive by interfering with staff relationships, challenging authority, and causing meetings to be held which

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
123 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).
See Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1012.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1013.
See id. at 1016-17.
See id.
Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1017.
See id.
Id.
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were not part of the daily operations of the school.'5 6 In light of these
factors, Khuans' speech was not protected.' 5'
2. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, in Buazard v. Meridith,'5 s used the Pickering
analysis, and held that a police officer's speech about personnel issues
was not protected.'59 The court in Buazard held that "when a public employee's speech is purely job-related, that speech will not be deemed a
matter of public concern."' 6 This is distinguishable from Finn in that
under the Buazard holding, Finn's speech about management practices
would not have been a matter of public concern, and thus not protected.
E. Analysis
Finn and other cases cited above illustrate the diverse outcomes
reached through use of the same test. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits
place the line between protected and unprotected speech in different
places. 6' The Tenth Circuit's holding in Finn seems to be more favorable
to employees because it protects speech that other circuits would not;
namely, speech that is job-related.' 62 In addition, the Tenth Circuit overlooked the fact that much of Finn's speech was directed toward individual supervisors, and not public issues. 63 Comparing Finn with the cases
cited from other circuits, Finn markedly departs from the usual outcome
of First Amendment speech retaliation cases brought by public employees.' 6 Finn's speech was inflammatory and personal as compared with
the speech denied protection in Khuans, yet Finn's speech was given First
Amendment protection by the Tenth Circuit. 65 Further, both employees
spoke about matters of private and public concern, but the speech that
was protected by the Tenth Circuit was delivered in a way that seemed
less disruptive to the workplace.' 66
The vast difference in outcomes is illustrative of the wide discretion
of the lower court judges in applying the Pickering/Connick test. 67 The
Pickering progeny use three values to decide legal outcomes of a variety
of fact patterns: (1) efficiency of government services; (2) allowing em-

156. See id.
157. Seeid. at 1018.
158.
172 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1999).
159. See Buazard, 172 F.3d at 548.
160. Id.
161.
See Khuans, 123 F.3d 1017-18; Buazard, 172 F.3d at 548.
162. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249.
163.
See id
164.
Compare Finn v. New Mexico, 249 F.3d 249 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2001), with Khuans v.
Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997), and Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 1999).
165.
See Finn, 249 F.3d.at 1245-46; See also Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1012-13.
166.
See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249.
167.
See Wells, supra note 82, at 960-61.
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ployees to speak on matters of public concern; and (3) government's6
8
diminished interest in the speech if its relation to the workplace is low.'
Even though the values are the same, courts focus on different parts of
the analysis to decide whether the speech should be protected; some focus on aspects such as the "internal-external" aspect of the person's
speech, while other courts place more emphasis on whether the speech
was disruptive to the workplace. 69
Such diversity in the area of public employee speech cases mirrors
the sentiments by writers on the topic. Those that encourage public employee speech protection feel that the courts have not gone far enough to
guard employees from retaliation, noting that courts should not focus on
disruption or the "virtue of obedience."' 7 Others assert that limiting the
First Amendment speech rights of public employees fosters efficiency
and a harmonious workplace. 7 '
The wide range of outcomes and opinions concerning public employee speech protection may signal that a narrower test or standard is
more desirable. On the other hand, the flexible Pickering/Connickanalysis may be well suited to meet the needs of both management and employees in different government workplaces.

III. FAIR LABOR

STANDARDS ACT

A. Background
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") requires employers to pay
any qualified employee under the FLSA minimum wage for the hours the
employee worked, and must generally pay overtime for hours worked
over forty hours per week. 7 2 Therefore, the definition of "work" becomes
key to the issue of on-call time because if the definition of work only
includes the time spent responding to the call, an employee will not be
compensated for any time spent on-call and restricted from engaging in
personal activities.1 3 Compensation for on-call time is becoming a more
to use
prominent issue in the courts due to the tendency of employers
74
employees more efficiently through the use of on-call time.'
The United States Supreme Court resolved a conflict in the lower
courts in 1944 when it decided two cases on the same day: Armour &
Co. v. Wantock, 75 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 17 6 In these cases, fire168. See id. at 991.
169. See id. at 965-67.
170. See id. at 942.
See id.
171.
172. See Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2000).
173. See Eric Phillips, On-Call Time Under the Fair Labor StandardsAct, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2633, 2634 (1997).
174. See Phillips, supra note 173, at 2647.
175. 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
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fighters sued for compensation for the time they were required to remain
at the station, waiting for a call, yet were idle while waiting.'77 The Supreme Court held in both cases that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation." Framing the issue as whether the employee's "time is spent
predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's," the
Supreme Court opined that the answer depended on "all the circumstances of the case.' ' 1 79 The Court wrote that such circumstances as the
"agreement between the parties, the nature and extent of the restrictions,
[and] the relationship between the services rendered and the on-call
time" should be examined.'O
In the Tenth Circuit, most decisions have held that on-call time was
not compensable. In Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc.,'8 the Tenth
Circuit held that van drivers were not eligible for compensation for oncall time because the employees had opportunities in between calls to
engage in personal activities, such as exercise, do laundry, visit friends,
and go to restaurants. 82 Therefore, the restriction on personal activities
was not enough to be considered predominantly for the employer's benefit. 83 Similarly, in Armitage v. City of Emporia,'8" the Tenth Circuit decided that an employee who is "merely required to leave word at his
home or with company officials where he may be reached is not working
while on call."'85
However, the Tenth Circuit held that on-call time was compensable
in Renfro v. City of Emporia.'86 Firefighters for the city were not required
to remain on the station premises while on call but were required to re87
port back to the station within twenty minutes of receiving a callback.'
In addition, the firefighters received a large number of calls while on
call." The firefighters argued that the restrictions were so severe that the
employees could not be with their children alone without a caretaker on
call, could not go to dinner or a movie, could not work on their cars, nor
participate in activities with groups of people for fear that they would be
called. 8 9 The court held that the callbacks were so frequent that the fire-

176.
177.
126, 127
178.
179.
180.
323 U.S.
181.
182,
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

323 U.S. 134 (1944).
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1944); Armour v. Wantock, 323 U.S.
(1944).
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Armour, 323 U.S. at 134.
Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
Andrews v. Town of Skiatook, 123 F.3d 1327, 1330 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Skidmore,
134).
839 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1988).
See Norton, 839 F.2d at 655-56.
See id. at 656.
982 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1992).
Armitage, 982 F.2d at 432.
948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir. 1991).
See Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1531.
See id. at 1532.
See id
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fighter was not able to use the on-call time "for his own benefit." '9° This
case is one of the rare cases holding for the employee in on-call compensation disputes.' 9'
B. Tenth CircuitDecisions
1. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co.' 92
a. Facts
Kathy Pabst, James Gilley, and Steve Barton were employed at
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company ("OG&E") as Electronic Technicians. 193 Their duties consisted of "monitor[ing] automated heat, fire, and
security systems" in OG&E buildings.'19
The plaintiffs were required to be on call from 4:30 p.m. until 7:30
a.m. and twenty-four hours a day on weekends.' 9 If one of the plaintiffs
received a call, they were to respond within ten minutes.'" This was until
1996, when the response time was changed to fifteen minutes.9 7 If the
plaintiffs failed to respond to the call within the allotted time, it was
grounds for discipline.' 98 The plaintiffs were required to carry a pager to
receive calls.' 99 These pagers were not effective all the time, so the plaintiffs had to stay at home to receive calls either on their home telephones
or via their laptop computers.3 The plaintiffs received around three to
five calls a night, not including calls for other issues.2 °' On average, a
response took forty-five minutes.' °
The plaintiffs claimed they were instructed by their supervisor only
to report on-call time during which they responded to an alarm. 23 The

plaintiffs
plaintiffs
plaintiffs
overtime

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

were paid one hour for each call answered, and two hours if the
had to go to an OG&E facility to correct the problem. 2 4 The
did not report all of the calls answered, nor did they report as
the remainder of the time on call.

Id. at 1538.
See id.
228 F.3d 1128
See Pabst,228
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Pabst, 228
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Pabst,228

(10th Cir. 2000).
F.3d at 1131.

F.3d at 1131.

F.3d at 1131.

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

20021

The plaintiffs argued that the on-call procedure significantly interfered with their personal lives.2' The plaintiffs claimed that the calls at
night substantially interrupted their sleep. 07 In addition, the plaintiffs
were seldom able to leave their homes while on call because of the fear
that they might miss an alarm.' °
The district court found that all the on-call time was compensable
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 209 Accordingly, the court
awarded the plaintiffs compensation for fifteen hours per weekday and
twenty-four hours each Saturday and Sunday, minus any hours already
paid by the company.2 1 0
b. Decision
OG&E appealed the judgment against them for prejudgment interest, damages and liability. 2 ' The plaintiffs appealed the ruling of the district court denying the plaintiffs' claim of liquidated damages based on
the district court's finding of no willful violation.2 2 The Tenth Circuit
reviewed the FLSA requirement that an employer pay "a minimum wage
for each hour it 'employs' an employee, as well as an overtime premium
for hours in excess of forty per week.,,2 3 The court then framed the issue
as whether "on-call time is 'work' for purposes of the statute.",241 To determine whether on-call time can be classified as work, the court used the
Armour/Skidmore inquiry of whether the "on-call time is spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer or the employee.",25 The court said
that this issue could also be put in terms of whether the "employee is
'engaged to wait' or 'waiting to be engaged.' -2 1 6 The court's analysis into
whether the plaintiff's on-call time was compensable included such criteria as: "number of calls, required response time, and ability to engage in
personal pursuits while on call. 217 This assessment is "highly individualized and fact-based." 2 8
Here, the court held that the plaintiffs' on-call time was compensable, comparing the plaintiffs situation with that of Renfro v. City of Emporia,2 9 which was the only case cited by the court that compensated the
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
to work").
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1131-32.
See Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1132.
See id.
2
Id. (citing the definition of "employ" in 29 U.S.C. § 03(g) (2001) as "to suffer or permit
Id.
ld (citing Armour, 323 U.S. at 133).
Id. at 1132 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137).
Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1132.
Id.
948 F.2d. 410 (1Oth Cir. 1991).
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employees for their on-call time. 220 Relevant to their determination was
the fact that even though the plaintiffs were not required to return to an
OG&E building for every call, the frequency of calls made the plaintiffs'
situation particularly burdensome.22'
The court rejected OG&E's argument that the plaintiffs' time spent
doing personal activities should be subtracted from the on-call time compensated.222 This decision was based upon the test of whether the time
spent on call was predominantly spent "for the employer's benefit or for
the employee' S.,,223
C. Other Circuits
The analysis is the same in all circuits surveyed. 224 There is not
much departure from the United States Supreme Court decisions Armour
and Skidmore.225 The primary analysis centers on whether the employee's
time was spent predominantly for the employer or employee.2 6 Even
though the courts use the same analysis, the outcome can be vastly different. Some courts rule that on-call time should not be compensated
despite long periods of time where the employee is on call, or short re227
sponse times.
1. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit uses the same test as the Tenth Circuit. In Bright v.
Houston Northwest Medical Center Survivor, Inc.,228 the Fifth Circuit
held that an employee's on-call time was not compensable when he was
required to respond within twenty minutes of a call. 229 The court found
that the employee's on-call time could be spent going shopping, going to
restaurants, and watching television." 3 This ruling was despite the fact

220. See Renfro, 228 F.3d at 1134.
221.
See id at 1135.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224.
See Bright v. Houston N.W. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that an employee's on-call time was not compensable when he was required to respond
within twenty minutes of a call); Dingtes v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056 (7th
Cir. 1999) (focusing on the argument that the time spent on call could be devoted to ordinary private
activities); Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n, 938 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Commission's on-call policy imposed significant restrictions upon the employees' ability to pursue
personal activities).
225. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1994); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134(1944).
226. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
227.
See Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991)
(employee on-call for one year with no break); Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. 164
F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1999) (employees were required to respond to call within seven minutes).
228. Bright, 934 F.2d at 672.
229. Id. at 672.
230. See id. at 673.
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that Bright was on-call for an entire year with no reprieve.2 1' "We do not
deny the obvious truth that the long continued aspect of Bright's on-call
status made his job highly undesirable and arguably somewhat oppressive.... But the FLSA's overtime provisions are more narrowly focused
than being simply directed at requiring extra compensation for oppressive or confining conditions for employment.,

232

The Fifth Circuit wrote

that the "critical issue" in on-call compensation cases is "whether the
employee can use the [on-call] time effectively for his or her own purposes. 233 Here, Bright was not restricted to the workplace or his home,
but was able to travel anywhere within twenty minutes of the hospital
because the hospital contacted him through use of a beeper.23
2. Seventh Circuit
Similarly, in Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., the Seventh Circuit recently held that on-call time for Emergency Medical
Technicians is not compensable. 235 The court's analysis focused on the

defendant hospital's argument that the time spent on call could be "devoted to ordinary private activities. 236 The court held that because the
employees' actual chance of being called to work while on call was less
than fifty percent, the required seven-minute response time was not conclusive that the employees were restricted in their personal activity. In
addition, the court held that in close cases, the court would look to the
agreement of the parties because the FLSA "encouraged parties to structure a mutually beneficial arrangement.,

23 8

By giving deference to the

the court assumes that both employees and manageparties' agreement,
239
benefit.
ment
3. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit analysis is also similar to the Tenth Circuit. The
Eighth Circuit determines whether the employee's time is primarily used
240
for personal activities to decide whether on-call time is compensable.
In Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n,24 the plaintiffs were employed
by the Arkansas Forestry Commission ("Commission"), and were on-call
twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week.24 2 The Commission did
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
(1999).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id. at 678.
Id.
Id. at 677.
See Bright, 934 F.2d at 678.
See Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1999).
Vivian Illana Orlando, Selected Recent Court Decisions, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 171, 172
See id.
Id.
See id. at 172-173.
See Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n, 938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991).
938 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991).
See Cross. 938 F.2d at 914.
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not compensate the employees for any time on-call, arguing that the
FLSA exempted employees engaged in "fire protection activities," and as
such the overtime hours were calculated over a twenty-eight day time
period rather than a standard week.2 43 The employees argued that the oncall policy restricted the employees from using their time for personal
activities.2 4 The Eight Circuit agreed, holding that the Commission's oncall policy imposed significant restrictions upon the employees' ability to
pursue personal activities. 24s The court cited that the employees' ability to
travel was limited, and they must monitor their radios for transmissions,
which restricted the employees to an area of thirty-five to fifty miles.24
Further, the employees' ability to attend musical or sporting events,
church, or other events that cost much money was hindered due to the
constant requirement to monitor their radios and the possibility of having
to leave the event to respond to a call.247 Thus the court held that the employees were engaged to wait because the on-call conditions were so
restrictive that the employees could not use their time for personal activities.2'48
D. Analysis
Some scholars argue that on-call cases are different from "waiting
time" cases like Armour and Skidmore because even though the employee may enjoy more time away from work, the burden on the employee may be greater due to the employer placing the employee on-call
for more time as a result of the increased time away from work.249 For
example, some employers, as in Cross and Bright, place employees oncall for all time spent away from the workplace.25
The analysis of the courts appears to focus on the hindrance of the
on-call situation on the employee's personal activities.' A key aspect in
determining the burden on the employee is how many calls the on-call
employee receives on average and the length of the call.52 Therefore, the
greater number of calls a person receives, the more likely it is that the
on-call time will be deemed compensable. Another factor in determining
the intrusion into the employee's personal life is the response time re-

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
See id. at 915-16.
See id. at 916.
See id. at 916-17.
See id. at 917.
See Cross, 938 F.2d at 917.
Phillips, supra note 173, at 2639.
See id
See Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2000).
See Phillips, supra note 173, at 2641-43.
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quired by the employer2 3 Some scholars argue that very short response
times should be enough to compel compensation for on-call time.'
The benefit to the employer is often overlooked in a court's analysis
of an on-call time issue, even though courts cite it as part of the
analysis.255 Courts do not consider the cost efficiency of placing employees on-call for much of the employee's time spent away from work in
order to gain employee time without compensation. One scholar argues
that courts should compare the employer's benefit of on-call work
against regular time at work.256 Here, the employer knows that placing an
employee on-call instead of requiring an employee to remain at work at
all times keeps the requirement of paying employees at a minimum.2' "If
the [on-call] employee did not have to respond, then the employer either
would have to go without the service or would have to pay somebody ''at8
2
least the minimum wage to be present at the place of employment.
The use of beepers and cell-phones are keeping employers increasingly
in touch with their employees and this time may sometimes require compensation.
What makes Pabst stand out is that it is one of the few Tenth Circuit
cases that awarded compensation to those employees who claimed their
on-call time should be compensable.259 It joins the Renfro line of decisions departing from the typical Tenth Circuit practice of denying such
claims.26
CONCLUSION

In 2001, the Tenth Circuit decided these important cases in three
areas of employment law. The Tenth Circuit refined the meaning of "reasonable accommodation" in two ADA cases, decided whether to protect
free speech in the workplace, and revisited the issue of on-call time under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The three areas of law discussed in this
article show the diversity of issues within the field of employment law.
Surely the courts have not refined these topics to their fullest extent, and
therefore, we can expect more from the Tenth Circuit in the future on
these and other employment law issues.
Gretchen Fuss

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 2643.
See id.
See Pabst,228 F.3d at 1132.
See Phillips, supra note 173, at 2646.
See id. at 2646.
Id.
See Pabst,228 F.3d at 1133-34.
See id.

THE DEATH OF A DOCTRINE: THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS AND RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS URINE DRUG
TESTS ERODING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE."
INTRODUCTION

Drug use has infiltrated almost all aspects of modern life.' Along
with its increase in use, the inherent dangers surrounding the drug culture
have also escalated. These inherent safety concerns include robberies,
assaults, discipline problems, and violence. The employment sector and
school sector are not immune to these problems, where absence, injuries,
and work tardiness are affected by drug use.2 The question that arises for
almost all employers or school superintendents is how to control or contain the drug use and its dangers. Governments, employers, and school
superintendents have tried many techniques, including zero tolerance
policies, lectures on the evils of drugs, other presentations, and increasing police presence.3 In recent years, another technique surfaced in an
effort to try to combat drug use: random urine drug screens.4 In the employment sector, the screens come in three forms: (1) pre-employment
drug screens; (2) post accident drug screens; and (3) random drug
screens. In the school setting, many tests happen during sports physicals,
as a disciplinary method, or randomly to a group of students.
Individuals and groups have challenged these drug tests as an unconstitutional search under the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
both in the Supreme Court and in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Although only one Supreme Court case concerning random suspicionless
drug testing has held the policy as unconstitutional, 6 almost the exact
opposite result has happened in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.7
Drastically different results have been reached among the circuit courts
using similar logic and the same tests.'
Part one of this article discusses the general background of Fourth
Amendment law limited to the decreased requirement of probable cause
in administrative searches and the judicially created "special needs"
doctrine that eliminates a warrant requirement under certain circumstances. Part two discusses cases from both the Supreme Court and the

1. See Alex J. Barker, Vernonia School District47J v. Action: Defining the Constitutional
Scope of Random Suspicionless Drug Testing in InterscholasticAthletics and Beyond, 5 WIDENER J.
PuB. L. 445, 446 (1996).
2.
Id.
3. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
4. See Alex Barker, supra note 1, at 446.
5. See discussion infra Part 11.
6. See discussion infra note 199 and accompanying text.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See discussion infra part M1.
457
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Tenth Circuit concerning random suspicionless drug testing. Part three
discusses the inconsistencies in the reasoning the Tenth Circuit has used
to hold the policies unconstitutional; determining that the special needs
doctrine has been effectively eliminated in the Tenth Circuit. Part four
concludes that only drug testing based on individualized suspicion, akin
to the decreased probable cause for administrative searches, will pass
constitutional muster in the Tenth Circuit.
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE BACKGROUND

A. General WarrantRequirement
This section presents a brief contextual overview surrounding the
debate about the constitutionality of random suspicionless drug testing
protocols. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....9 The
Fourth Amendment only protects individuals from governmental intrusion, not from private party actions. '° A court must address three questions when analyzing a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment: (1)
was there government action; (2) did the activity amount to a search; and
(3) was the search reasonable." If there was no governmental action, the
Constitution does not apply.' 2 If the activity was not a search, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.'3 And if the search was reasonable, the
search was not unconstitutional."
1. Defining a Search and Reasonableness
If a court determines that the activity is a search, a rebuttable presumption exists that a warrantless search is unreasonable, unless there is
an exception to the warrant requirement.'" Consequently, defining what
actions constitute a search is very important to the outcome of the case.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) ("[The Fourth Amendment] protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but the protections go further,
and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.").
11.
See Amanda E. Bishop, Students, Urinalysis & Extracurricular activities: How
Vernonia's Aftermath is Trampling Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 233-34
(2000).
12.
See Rachel L. Diehl, Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure - Random, Warrantless,
and Suspicionless Searches of Student Athletes Through UrinalysisDrug Testing by Public School
Officials Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment - Vernonia Sch. Dist. V. Action, 115 S. Ct 2386
(1995), 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 230, 230-31 n.6 (1996) (describing the "state action doctrine").
13.
Id.
14. See Bishop, supranote 11, at 233-34.
15.
See United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1986) (Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a carefully defined exception to the warrant
requirement.).
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In Katz v. United States,' 6 the Supreme Court described the balancing test that courts should use to determine whether or not a search took
place. ,7 The test weighs the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
from governmental intrusion against the government's interest in controlling the activity.'
To determine the level of the expectation of privacy, courts look to
actions by the individual displaying a subjective belief of an expectation
of privacy.' 9 If the individual lacks a subjective expectation of privacy,
the inquiry ends and the activity does not amount to a search. 20 If the
individual displays a subjective expectation of privacy, then the court
must determine whether a reasonable law-abiding person would expect
privacy in the same situation.2'
After confirming a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts determine the rationale of the specific governmental action. 22 Courts consider
many factors: the need or interest for governmental intrusion, the rationale behind the action, the actions of the individual governmental actor,
and other possible methods the government could have employed.23
After determining the expectation of privacy and the governmental
interest, the court employs a balancing test to determine the extent of the
invasion of the expected privacy to determine if the activity should be
defined as a search.24 The court balances the intrusiveness of the action
against whether or not the area deserves protection from government
intrusion.25
If the court considers the governmental activity a search, it is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant established on probable
cause. 26 This presumption can be overcome by any of the numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement. Essential to the discussion of urine
drug testing are two exceptions, the administrative search exception and
the special needs doctrine. Both of these exceptions are discussed later
in this article.

16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
18See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
19.
See Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313, 317
(1981) (concluding that a more objective definition of privacy is needed for an effective yet fair
application of the Fourth Amendment in the privacy context).
20. See id. at 327.
21.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See id. at 362.
Keith S. Berets, The Boiling Frog: Privacy Rights Hang in the Balance in Vernonia
23.
School District v. Action, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1996).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
See id. at 1102.
See Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d at 297.
Id.
See discussion infra Parts lI.A, 1.B.
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2. Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause in
order to issue a warrant. 29 For police to obtain a search, seizure, or arrest
warrant, they must appear before a neutral judge or magistrate and establish probable cause based on the facts of the case.30 Probable cause does
not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the level of proof required
at a criminal trial; rather, it only requires evidence of probability of
wrongdoing.' In addition, proof of probable cause allows use of evidence not normally admissible at trial, including hearsay and prior bad
acts.32 Because probable cause represents a probability rather than an
absolute, a good faith exception exists for warrants issued on faulty
probable cause. 33
Probable cause to search differs from probable cause to seize or
probable cause to arrest. 3 Probable cause to search requires evidence that
the items the police seek relate to the criminal activity. 35 Furthermore,
these items must be in the place the police intend to search.36 Probable
cause to seize only requires evidence that the items the police seek to
seize relate to the criminal activity.37 Probable cause to arrest requires
evidence of a criminal offense and that the individual the police intend to
arrest committed that offense.38
If no initial ruling on probable cause exists prior to the search, seizure, or arrest, and if a judge rules against probable cause after the fact,
and if none of the various exceptions apply, the search, seizure, or arrest
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual.3 9 The exclusionary rule bars the admittance of evidence gained through an illegal search
or seizure and serves as a deterrent to illegal police activity.4°

29.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

30.
See Peter J. Kocaras, ProperAppellate Standardof Review for ProbableCause to Issue a
Search Warrant,42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1993).

31.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. 232 (1983) ("[Plrobable cause is a fluid concept turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.").
32.
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412 (1969) ("the constitutional requirements
of probable cause can be satisfied by hearsay information.") (overruled on other grounds).
33.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a "good faith" exception to
faulty warrants).
34.
See Frederick Alexander & John L. Amsden, Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 75 GEO.
L.J. 713, 725 (1987).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 725.
40. See Edward R. Glady, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule, 71 GEO. L.J. 434, 435 (1982).
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B. Relevant Exceptions to the Warrant Requirementfor Suspicionless
Urine Drug Tests
1. Administrative Search's Relaxed Probable Cause
Administrative searches are conducted by administrative agencies,
4
whose actions rise to the level of the definition of a search in Katz. 1
These searches typically originate as non-criminal in nature, but the
fruits of the search can be used in a criminal trial. 2 In themselves, administrative searches are not outside of the warrant requirement.4 '3 However, the Supreme Court has relaxed the probable cause standard in administrative searches to a point well below the level required to establish
probable cause in the criminal context."
The leading case, Camara v. Municipal Ct. of the City and County
of San Francisco,"established this relaxed standard.4
a. Facts
Municipal building inspectors were going from house to house conducting inspections of apartments for building code violations that could
pose safety concerns, including residential occupancy in areas forbidden
by permit.47 An individual refused the inspector entry into his residence.f
After repeatedly refusing subsequent searches, he was fined and criminally punished for his refusal to abide by the building inspector's requests to search pursuant to the inspector's authority under the housing
code. 49 The individual filed a writ of prohibition based on a violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights.5
The City argued that the inspections were narrowly tailored for the
least possible demand on individuals. 5' The City also argued that at all
times the inspectors acted reasonably, satisfying the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.12 The City argued that a warrant
requirement was an impossible obstacle in these particular inspections

41.
See Sunil H. Mansukhani. School Searches after New Jersey v. T.LO.: Are There any
Limits?, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 345, 352 (1996).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
(1967).
47.

Id.
Id at 353.
See id.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Camara v. Municipal Ct. of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535
Camara,387 U.S. at 526.

48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 527.

50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 531.
Id.
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because they were inspecting large areas based on legislative assessment
of various factors. 3
b. Analysis
Initially, the Court ruled that it was overruling previous precedent,5
which held that regulatory searches that are essentially civil, limited in
scope, and not exercised under unreasonable conditions were constitutionally valid. 5' The Court ruled that routine inspections for health and
safety were not as intrusive as a search by a policeman, but that the
Fourth Amendment's protections still applied.5 6 Part of the ruling relied
on the fact that criminal charges could come from the civil inspection,
including code violations and criminal penalties for non-compliance with
the search 7 Secondly, the individual had no way of knowing if the inspector's demands to search were valid, and to what extent the search had
been administratively authorized. 8 This meant that there was a large
amount of government discretion, the type of discretion the Fourth
Amendment was meant to curtail. 59
The Court next considered the argument that public safety justified
the search under the reasonableness requirement even absent a warrant. 6°
The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the question is whether
the authority to search should be supported by a warrant, not whether the
public interest justifies the search.6' In addition, the warrant requirement
should be concerned with whether obtaining a warrant would frustrate
the purpose behind the search.62
After concluding that the Fourth Amendment bound the search in
question, the Court next looked to the level of suspicion required in order
for the government to obtain a warrant, probable cause or something
less.63 This was in turn an analysis of reasonableness, balancing the governmental interest and the privacy intrusion.6
The Court held that the agency would have to get a warrant, but not
a warrant based on the probable cause standard traditionally used in law
enforcement. Officials would not have to "show the same kind of proof

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
Id. at 528.
See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
Camara, 387 U.S. at530.
Id.at531.
Id.at532.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Camara, 387 U.S. at533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 532-33.
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to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the
fruits or instrumentalities of crime."' The Court concluded that the ultimate standard was reasonableness, 7 balancing the governmental interest
that allegedly justifies the intrusion with the scope of the intrusion on
individual's privacy.68 This relaxed standard of probable cause also applied to the determination of reasonableness of warrantless searches, thus
providing both a relaxed definition of probable cause to get a warrant,
and relaxing the standard of reasonableness applied to warrantless
searches. 69
c. Holding
Administrative searches are typically broad, suspicionless searches,
searching broader areas than a typical criminal, for example the building
code compliance in a block, and this type of search has a decreased standard of probable cause - the standard of reasonableness.7 °
2. Special Needs Doctrine as an Exception to Warrant Requirement
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 7' has been cited as the birth of the "special
needs" doctrine.72 The Supreme Court established an exception to the
warrant requirement when there is a special need beyond that of law enforcement that justified warrantless searches.73 The special needs analysis
balances the legitimate expectation of privacy with the interest of the
government to establish an exception to the warrant requirement.74
a. Facts
A high school teacher found a 14-year-old student smoking on
school property, which violated local school rules. 7 The teacher took the
76
student to the vice principal, and the student denied ever smoking. Then
the vice principal opened the student's purse and discovered a pack of
cigarettes and some cigarette rolling paper." This prompted him to
search her purse more thoroughly. 78 His search revealed substantial evidence that the student was involved in dealing marijuana to other stu66. Id. at 538.
67. Id.
68. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
69. Id. at 539.
70. Id. at 539.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
71.
72.
See Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, "Special Needs" in Criminal Justice:
An evolving Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 3
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 203, 209 (Spring 1993).
73. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
74. See Vaughn, supra note 72, at 209.
75.
T.LO., 469 U.S. at 328.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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dents.7 9 At no time did the school obtain a warrant for the search."0
Criminal delinquent charges were filed against the student and she
moved to suppress 8the evidence found in her purse as violating the
Fourth Amendment. 1
b. Analysis
Initially, the Court determined that school officials had to comport
with the Constitution,82 and in particular the Fourth Amendment, 3 and
that the actions of the school principal or administrators were government actionm In addition, it was beyond dispute that the opening and
removing the contents of the purse was a search because of the high expectation of privacy in a closed purse. The case then turned to the question of the reasonableness of the warrantless search8 6
The Court ruled that students had an expectation of privacy and had
not waived their right to privacy by being on school property. However,
the Court stated that school officials had a legitimate need to maintain an
atmosphere promoting learning and this required easing the restrictions
of search and seizure law applying to law enforcement.88
The Court concluded that school officials did not need to obtain
warrants to search for drugs because of the particular circumstances of
the school environment, 9 and that relaxed standards applied to probable
cause for administrative searches.9 The Court only required an establishment of individualized suspicion, suspicion that the individual has
violated a school rule or the law. 9' Since there was reasonable individualized suspicion, the school official did not have to obtain a warrant to
make the search reasonable. 92
The constitutionality of the search of a student, the Court ruled,
should depend simply on the reasonableness of the search, considering
the totality of the circumstances.93 This includes whether the search was

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 328-29.
T.LO., 469 U.S. at 329.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 337.
T.LO., 469 U.S at 334.
Id.at 341.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id.at 343.
T.LO., 469 U.S at 341.
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justified at its inception,9" and whether the search relates in scope to the

justification for the search. 95
The Court defined justification at the inception as reasonable
grounds to suspect that the search would reveal evidence that the student
had violated either the law or the school rules. 96 This individualized suspicion was a relaxed standard compared to probable cause.97
Justice Blackmun stated, "Only in those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. ' Accordingly, many credit this as the birth of the "special needs
doctrine.,99
c. Holding
A search of a student's purse was constitutional because there was a
special need, beyond law enforcement, that justified the warrantless
search as reasonable. °°
II. SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTS IN THE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court's Approach to Suspicionless Drug Testing
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' ° '
The first case in which the Supreme Court addressed random suspicionless urine drug testing of employees was Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association.102 Skinner established the precedent that urine
collection for drug testing was a search and demanded the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.' 3 It also began the development of the "special
needs" °doctrine as it applied to drug tests, beyond the search of purses in
T.L.O.1 4

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id. at 333.
See id. at 351-52.
See Bill 0. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999

B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 71,75 (1999).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

T.LO., 469 U.S. at 347-48.
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Skinner,489 U.S. at 617.
Id. at 619.
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a. Facts
Labor union representatives brought an action challenging random
suspicionless drug testing done by the Federal Railroad Administration
("FRA").' °5 The FRA promulgated a rule requiring that after certain types
of railroad accidents, employees had to consent to either blood or urine
drug and alcohol testing. '°6 In addition, another rule authorized, but did
not require, urine or breath
alcohol and drug tests after individuals vio0 7
lated certain safety rules.
Testing was completed by an outside agency using "state of the art
equipment and techniques."'' ° Both blood and urine were collected after
major accidents. °9 Employees were notified of the test results and given
an opportunity to respond."0 Urine and breath tests could also be conducted after accidents when there was reasonable individualized suspicion, or where certain rules were violated."'
The FRA pointed to numerous accidents caused by drug or alcohol
impairment of employees, and described the type of workers covered
under the rules as safety sensitive."2 In addition, they stated that the reason for the testing was deterrence from drug and alcohol use during work
and that test results would not be divulged to criminal authorities without
the employee's consent.'13
The labor union countered that the collection of blood, urine, or
breath constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment and employees'
right to be free from governmental intrusion." 4 In addition, they argued
that the policy was not an effective deterrent and therefore did not adequately fulfill its stated purpose.115
b. Analysis
The Court first had to decide whether there was state action implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment." 6 The FRA argued that
because an outside private company collected and tested the urine or
blood, there was no state action." 7 Consequently, because private actors

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at612.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 610.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609.
Id. at 610.
/d.at 611.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 607.
Id. at 620-21 n.5.
Id. at 612.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630 (inferred for Court's discussion of deterrent effect of policy).
Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
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are not bound by the Constitution, there could not be a violation of the
Constitution."8
The Court rejected this argument.' 9 They applied the state action
doctrine, ' 2 stating that private party action can amount to state action
under certain situations.' 2' Because the FRA was a governmental agency,
and required the tests, and the private medical company
acted on behalf
22
of the governmental agency, state action existed.'
The next question the Court had to answer was whether collecting
and testing urine amounted to a search that should be protected under the
Fourth Amendment.'23 In previous decisions, the Court had stated that the
collection of blood using a surgical technique (using a needle to withdraw blood from a person's body) was a search under the Fourth
Amendment,' 24 but the Court had not previously decided on the collection
of urine using non-surgical techniques.'2 The Court determined that there
was a very high expectation of privacy in bodily functions,'26 and the
collection of such violated that expectation. 27 In addition, the Court
stated that this expectation was reasonable.' 28 Balancing this with the
government's interest, the Court concluded that the collection of urine for
urine drug tests
was a search within the protections of the Fourth
29
Amendment.
The Court also considered whether the search was reasonable without a warrant based on probable cause or individualized suspicion. '' The
Court applied the special needs doctrine, developed in T.L.O., to conclude that the FRA did not need a warrant. 3 'The search was beyond
normal law enforcement and justified a departure from the usual warrant
and probable cause requirements because: (1) a warrant would do little to
further the protections of the Fourth Amendment; 3 2 (2) the burden of
obtaining a warrant was likely to frustrate the purpose behind the
search;'3 3 and (3) the FRA had little occasion to become familiar with the

118. Id. at 614.
119. Id. at 615.
120. See Diehl, supra note 12, at 230-31 n.6 (1996) (describing the "state action doctrine").
121.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 617.
124. Id. at 616. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (holding blood
collection as a search).
125. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 617.
128.
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th
Cir. 1987)).
129. Id.
130.
Id. at 621.
131.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
132. Id. at 622.
133.
Id. at 623.
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subtle nuances of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'" In addition, the
special need for safety while operating trains was demonstrated by the
dramatic figures that the FRA provided.'35
The Court then balanced governmental interest with the privacy
intrusion to determine reasonableness and justification for the suspicionless search. 3 6 Because of the number of accidents detailed by the FRA,
and the safety sensitive nature of the position of the railroad workers, the
government's interest was compelling. 37 In addition, because the railroad
workers worked in a highly regulated industry, they had a decreased expectation of privacy. 3 ' The Court held that the balance decidedly
39 tipped
in favor of the FRA conducting drug testing without a warrant.
c. Holding
Urine alcohol and drug tests are searches within the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 4 0 It is reasonable to conduct

such tests for drug use in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion of a particular employee because of the "special needs" balancing
in favor of the FRA. '' Consequently, the alcohol and drug tests contemare reasonable within the meaning of the
plated by the FRA's 4regulations
2
Fourth Amendment.'

2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab

43

In a companion case decided the same day as Skinner, the Court
upheld another suspicionless drug test without any showing of a drug
problem or the concrete showing of danger that had been emphasized in
Skinner.'44
a. Facts
The United States Custom Service implemented a random suspicionless drug testing policy.'4 5 The policy covered three categories of

employees: (1) those who had direct involvement in drug interdiction or

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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Id. at 623.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 626-30.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 617.
id. at 633.
ld. at 633.
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
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enforcement; (2) those who carried firearms; and (3) those who handled
classified information. 1 46
Testing was strictly completed with a same sex individual standing
outside a closed bathroom stall, dye in the toilet to assure water is not put
in the sample, listening for normal sounds of urination, measuring the
temperature of the sample, and sealing the sample.4 4 Analysis of the
urine was done confidentially, and results were not released to anyone
outside of the agency without the individual's consent, including law
enforcement personnel' 8
The Custom Service stated that there were no known significant
drug problems to date,' 9 but that the positions were very safety
sensitive,5 highly susceptible to illegal influence, 5 ' and employees could
be dangerous to the public if the employees used drugs because they carried firearms and were the first line of defense in drug trafficking for the
United States.'52 In addition, there was minimal, if any, day to day supervision that would enable the Service to establish individualized suspicion.'53
b. Analysis
The Court noted that this case had been decided on the same day as
Skinner, and as such, they quickly concluded that there was government
action and that it did amount to a search. 1 The Court also noted that it
was not disputed that this testing policy was not for law enforcement
purposes and thus possibly fell within the special needs doctrine.'15 The
Court then looked to exceptions for
5 6 the warrant requirement to determine
the reasonableness of the search.'
The Court concluded that the Customs agents were probably more
familiar with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,' 7 as opposed to the FRA
in Skinner, but that a warrant requirement in the instant case would divert
valuable resources away from the Service's primary mission." Secondly,
a warrant requirement would do little to increase the protections required
by the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 9
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Id. at 661.
ld. at 661-62.
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Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 670-71.
Id. at 674.
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The Court briefly referred to the point that the testing was not random, per se, because the employees knew when the testing would occur,
who was covered, and there was no discretion on the part of the agency
in who was tested.' 6° This increased the government's interest and decreased the individual's expectation of privacy.6 '
The Court extolled the virtues of the testing program's stated purposes, and how important it was to have drug free agents doing the valuable job of the Custom Service. 62 This indicated a very important governmental interest.' 6 In addition, there was great public interest in instituting effective measures to prevent individuals who carry firearms from
using drugs.' 64
In contrast to these interests was the employee's expectation of privacy.' 65 The Court noted that occasionally there were reasonable searches
in the workplace where in other contexts it would not be considered reasonable, and that this lowered the individual's expectation of privacy in
the workplace.'" The Court concluded that agents could not reasonably
expect to keep the Service from gaining personal information that bears
directly on job fitness, and urine drug tests provided this type of information. 167 Finally, the employees had notice about the tests decreasing
their expectation of privacy." Consequently, the individuals' privacy
interest did not outweigh the governmental interest.' 69
70
Next, the Court looked to the scope of the drug testing protocol.
They concluded that despite evidence that there was a minimal drug
problem at the Service, the deterrent effect was very important.' The
Court concluded that American workplaces were not immune from "one
of the most serious problems confronting our society today," drug
abuse. 172 Therefore, the Service did not have to establish a real special
need; the deterrent
effect and the possibility of harm to the public were
7
sufficient.'

Consequently, Von Raab did not require the same showing as required in Skinner, that there was a drug problem causing accidents and
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serious injuries,
but instead merely that there was a possible serious pub74
lic harm.
c. Holding
Suspicionless testing of Custom Service agents who carried firearms
or who were directly involved in drug enforcement was reasonable
within the Fourth Amendment and did not require a warrant, probable
cause, or individualized suspicion, because of the application of the special needs doctrine. 175 In light of this holding, the remainder of the case
was remanded to the lower court to determine if individuals who were in
contact with confidential communications were also7 6in a position that
required the application of the special needs doctrine.
77
3. Vernonia School District471 v. Acton'

Several years later, the Court again had an opportunity to evaluate
random suspicionless urine drug testing, this time in the context of
schools, and again upheld the policy as constitutional .
a. Facts
Vernonia School District 47J (the "District") required random urine
drug testing for all students involved in after school athletics. 7 Urine
samples were tested for a variety of drugs, including stimulants, cocaine,
and THC.' s° Other drugs, including alcohol and LSD, could be tested for
on request, but the identity of the student did not determine which tests
were conducted.' School officials rigidly conducted the tests, with the
administrator outside of the stall while the person being tested was inside
the stall. 2 The specimen was sent to an outside agency for anonymous
testing."3 Results were mailed only to the superintendent and not divulged to the police) 84
The District detailed how drugs had created disciplinary problems,
and that other efforts, including special classes, guest speakers, the presence of drug sniffing dogs, and various other presentations, had not
stemmed the drug problem.' The District's showing had the same pur174. See id.
175. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
176.
Id. at 678 (The district court held that the testing of employees who had access to top
secret information was reasonable. See 756 F.Supp. 947 (E.D.La. 1991)).
177. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
178. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
179.
Vernonia 515 U.S. at 648.
180. Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
181.
182. Id. at 650.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 651.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.
185.
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pose as the showing used by the FRA in Skinner, to establish a special
need.
The District had determined that the athletes were the core of the
drug culture, and that drugs negatively affected the athletes' abilities by
decreasing motivation, memory, judgment, reaction time, and coordination.1 6 Because of these effects, athletes were a threat to themselves and
others as injuries were more likely during athletic competitions and
practices when athletes were on drugs. 87 As a result, the drug testing
program was narrowly tailored to test only athletes, not the entire student
body, to affect the core of the drug culture, thus affecting all of the drug
culture. "g
If the superintendent received a positive drug test result, a second
test was conducted to confirm the results. 9 If the second test was positive, the parents of the student were notified for a meeting with the principal.' 90 During that meeting, the student had the option to enter counseling or to be removed from the athletic team for the current year and the
following year. 9' If the second test was negative, the first test was dismissed. '9
b. Analysis
There was minimal discussion, or real question, about whether the
school actions amounted to government action, or whether the action
constituted a search. 193 Skinner and T.L.O. had decidedly answered both
of these questions. The only question remaining was the reasonableness
of the warrantless search.'19
The Court held that the student athletes had a much lower expectation of privacy because they were students.'95 In addition, they showered
and changed clothes together in the locker room,' 96 they were subject to
physical exams prior to the start of the season,197 and they knew that, as
students, they had a decreased expectation of privacy because they had to
comport with strict regulations for after school athletics.' 98
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On the other hand, the school had a great interest in controlling the
drug problem because the problem was "epidemic,"' 99 drug use led to
drastic discipline problems, 2°° the athletes could hurt themselves or others
when playing sports on drugs, 20 ' and the athletes were role models for
other students.202 The District had established a real need that was beyond
normal law enforcement
• 201purposes, and accordingly, the Court applied the
special needs doctrine.
Next, the Court looked to the intrusiveness of the test and the scope
0 The Court held that the test was relatively
of the drug testing policy.2
2
5
unobtrusive. In addition, because the policy only covered athletes who
appeared to be role models and the core of the drug culture the Court
held that the policy was not overbroad. °9
Applying the special needs doctrine, the Court balanced the expectation and nature of the privacy interest, the type of intrusion, and the
governmental concern. 7 The Court concluded that the governmental
purpose severely outweighed the students' expectation of privacy.2 8
c. Holding
Random suspicionless drug testing of students participating in after
school athletics as a condition of participation is constitutional and does
not violate the Fourth
•
209 Amendment's protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
2
4. Chandler v. Miller

0

Chandler v. Miller is the most recent application of the special
needs doctrine to random suspicionless drug testing policies by the Supreme Court. This case differs from the previous three because it held the
drug testing policy unconstitutional. 2 ' The Court chose not to apply the
special needs balancing test because the City had not established the
elements of the doctrine.
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a. Facts
The Georgia State Legislature passed a law requiring any individual
who was running for a high office to submit to and pass a urine drug
screen. " High office positions consisted of the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General and District Attorneys,
School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Agriculture, and
Labor, Justices and Judges, and members of the General Assembly and
Public Service Commission.214
Results of urine drug screens were to be provided by the candidate
30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election.1 5 The tests were
arranged by the candidates and could be taken at a number of medical
facilities, including the candidate's private physician." 6 Release of results
was in the sole discretion of the candidate, and criminal authorities did
not receive positive results.2 7 Procedures of the tests were to be regulated
by federal statute. 28
The State argued that it had a significant interest in assuring that
candidates were drug free because of the position the candidates could
hold, public impression of a drug free government, and that the individuals needed to be clear headed in the performance of their job duties.2 9
Three candidates from the Libertarian party challenged the statute as
violating the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.2
b. Analysis
It was beyond doubt by this point in precedent that there was state
action, and that the collection of urine for drug testing constituted a
search. 2 So the remaining issue was whether the search was reasonable
without a warrant and without individualized suspicion. 2
Initially, the State argued that the Tenth Amendment allowed them,
under their sovereign power, to establish qualifications for holding a
state office.223 However, the Court dismissed this argument, stating that
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sovereign power did not release the requirements of the Fourth Amend4
ment ' and thus the case turned on the reasonableness of the search.2
The Court next looked to the special needs doctrine.226 After evaluating the precedents of Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, the Court analyzed whether there was a special need demonstrated in the instant case
to relax the warrant requirement.227
The Court noted that there was no known or demonstrated drug
problem for the group being tested.) In addition, there was no demonstration that there was a concrete danger demanding the application of
relaxed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 229 Also, the scope of the statute was not well designed to identify individual drug users. 20 Because
the candidates could arrange the test themselves, could only release
negative results without disclosing any positive results, and could circumvent the protections by abstaining from drugs, the policy would not
work to fulfill its stated purpose.3
The Court distinguished the present case from Von Raab, where
there was a showing of a real need, because the individuals in that case
carried weapons and were the front line defense for the United States.232
In the instant case, there was no similar danger.233 In addition, the Customs Officers in Von Raab were not subject to day-to-day scrutiny,
whereas public officials, or candidates, were subject to heavy scrutiny
from both their coworkers and the public, which could establish reasonable individualized suspicion.234
Consequently, the State had not shown a real need that required
loosening the protections of the Fourth Amendment to necessitate that
the state could conduct suspicionless, warrantless searches.233
c. Holding
As a threshold matter, the special needs doctrine would only apply
if a real need or a severe public threat was demonstrated.2 36 Because the
state had not established a real need, the special needs doctrine did not
apply.137 Random suspicionless urine drug testing of state office candi224.
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228.
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dates was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment because the state had not shown a special need to allow warrantless
searches without suspicion.238
B. Tenth CircuitCourt ofAppeals Approach to Suspicionless Drug
Testing
3

1. Rutherford v. Albuquerque11
Rutherford was one of the first Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions concerning random suspicionless drug testing. This case was prior
to Chandler, and relied heavily on Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia to
establish the requirements of the special needs doctrine as it applied to
random suspicionless drug testing. 24°
a. Facts
Rutherford, the plaintiff, had been on physical layoff status as a bus
driver' from a work related back injury and a heart attack.242 During his
absence, the City had initiated a drug testing policy that provided for
drug testing as a prerequisite to obtaining a city operator's
permit, and/or
23
as a condition of beginning employment with the City.
Rutherford was unaware of this policy when he was cleared to go
back to work. 2" He went back to work with the City as a truck driver for
the public works department, a position that requires a city operator's
permit. 24 5 Rutherford's city operator's permit had not expired from his
previous job.2 6
When he arrived for work, the City sent him to the employee health
center for a drug test. 47 The drug test was positive for marijuana, and
Rutherford admitted to smoking marijuana. 24 As a result of the positive
test, the admission, and other no tolerance policies, the city terminated
his employment. 249 He brought this action claiming a violation of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
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b. Analysis
First, the Tenth Circuit quickly concluded that there was state action, as the government acting as an employer is bound by the constitution, ' ' and that the collection of urine was a search that implicated the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 2 Then, without considerable discussion, the court assumed the position of the City that Rutherford's position was safety sensitive.253 Consequently, the court looked to the special needs doctrine to determine if it applied, possibly making the search
reasonable in the instant case.25
The Tenth Circuit determined that the nature of the intrusiveness of
the testing procedure was not in line with the testing procedures in Skinner and Von Raab.255 The court concluded that the testing procedure at
issue was much more intrusive because the plaintiff was unaware of the
procedure and had no warning or advance notice.256 Intrusiveness was
magnified because Rutherford was not in an industry heavily regulated
for safety purposes, such as the railroad workers in Skinner.5 7 The court
seemed to overlook the size of the vehicle and danger of it on the road.5 8
Finally, the court noted that the government's interest to ensure safety
was decidedly low in the instant case. 259
Furthermore, because Rutherford had not been at work in over a
year, the test was not a reflection of his activities at work, actions that
would increase the government's interest. 260 Because there was no notice,
and there were no public safety concerns akin to Von Raab, Rutherford
had a high expectation of privacy that was violated by the test. 261
Another distinguishing factor that the court noted was a wide exercise of discretion by city officials in testing Rutherford 22 He was not a
new employee and he maintained his operator's license for the City. 263
Consequently, he was tested based on significant official discretion, not
under the rules of the City. 26 The court emphasized
that this discretion
was lacking in both Skinner and Von Raab.6 5

251.
Id. at 1260.
252. Id.
253. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1261.
254. Id. at 1261.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1262.
257. Id.
258.
See International Broth. of Teamsters v. Dept. of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir.
1991) (discussing safety sensitive position of heavy truck drivers).
259. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1262.
260. Id. at 1263.
261.
Id.
262. Id. at1261.
263. Id. at 1259.
264. Id. at 1261.
265. Rutherford, 77 F.3d at 1261.
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After distinguishing Supreme Court precedent, the court applied the
special needs balancing test. 266 When the court balanced the interest of
the government and the level of intrusiveness, under the special needs
doctrine, the scales tipped decidedly for the individual.267
c. Holding
Rutherford's expectation of privacy outweighed the governmental
interest under the special needs doctrine. 26' Consequently the City had
violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
because the City had not established probable cause or individualized
suspicion .269

2. 19 Solid Waste Mechanics v. Albuquerque

270

19 Solid Waste Mechanics was decided after Chandler, and the decision relied heavily on the analysis of Chandler to hold that a random
suspicionless testing policy did not warrant the application of the
27 special
needs doctrine because the policy did nothing to deter behavior. '
a. Facts
City mechanics commenced this action to claiming random suspicionless drug testing of city employees was unconstitutional. Testing
policy required urine drug testing for all employees whose jobs required
a commercial driver's license to be conducted when they renewed their
licenses. 273 Another policy required mechanics who worked on city vehicles to have a commercial driver's
license, which brought the employees
274
under the drug testing policy.
The City asserted that the mechanics were safety sensitive personnel
because the performance of their jobs could put others at risk, as they
worked on the brakes, steering, and other safety issues with city
vehicles.2 7' Then the City asserted that the special needs doctrine applied,
and that under previous Supreme Court precedent, governmental interest
outweighed privacy intrusion.276

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Id.
156 F.3d 1068 (1998).
19 Solid Waste Mechanics v. Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1069, 1074 (1998).
19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1070.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1071.
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b. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that there was state action by a
government employer, and that collecting urine for drug testing was a
search within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The remaining
questions were the reasonableness of the search and the application of
the special needs doctrine.278
Prior to completing the balancing test of the special needs doctrine,
the court ruled that the government was required to establish a special
need based on precedent in Chandler.279 There were two issues to determine if the government had shown a special need.280 First, did the government provide evidence of a real need that warranted the application of
the special needs doctrine? 2 ' Types of evidence accepted by the court
were the government showing that the testing program was adopted in
response to a documented drug problem or showing that the group being
'2
tested would pose a danger or threat to the public:. Second, was the
testing policy reasonably related to the goals of detection and deterrence
outside of law
2 3 enforcement purposes allowing relaxation of the warrant
requirement?
If either of these factors is not established, the special needs doctrine would not apply, and there would have to be another exception to
the warrant and probable cause requirement to make the search reasonable.2u
The court concluded that the City had failed to satisfy the second
factor, the deterrent effect, for the application of the special needs doc285
trine. The policy lacked a capacity to address drug problems in the
workplace because the drivers would know when the test was coming
and could prepare for it, and tests were given very infrequently - only
once every four years . 286 For the Tenth Circuit, advance notice and frequency were fatal to the policy.28 7 This sharply contrasts with the holding
of Rutherford a few years earlier where the court ruled that no
28 advance
policy.
testing
drug
suspicionless
random
a
to
fatal
was
notice
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Id. at 1072.
19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1072.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1073.
19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
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Id.
Rutherford,77 F.3d at 1263.
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The court noted that the rationale for the program - safety - was

legitimate, despite not having documented evidence of the problem.289
Therefore, the government had great interest in performing the drug tests
to assure safety. 290 The court did not require that this be shown by documented evidence, but merely accepted it as fact.'9 The court stated that
the mechanics held a safety sensitive position and that safety was clearly
a concern, even without documentation.2 92 This satisfied the first factor
for the application of the special needs doctrine. 93
Consequently, because the City had not established a special need,
the special needs doctrine could not be applied.294
c. Holding
Random urine drug testing of city employees unconstitutionally
violated the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures because the government had not established a special need.2 95
29

3. Earls v. Board of Education

6

Earls is the most recent of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions concerning random suspicionless drug testing. This case differs
from the previous Tenth Circuit cases discussed because it is in the context of a school, not employment. The court applied the precedent of
Vernonia in conjunction with 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, to hold that the
special needs doctrine did not apply because there was no real need
shown and the policy was both over and under broad.297
a. Facts
The school district implemented a random urine drug-testing program for all students involved in extracurricular competitive activities to
help combat drug use at the schools.298 Activities covered under the policy included athletics (like Vernonia), but also included student choir,
band, color guard, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of
America, academic team, debate team, cheerleading, and pom pom. 299

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
2001).
298.
299.

19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1074-75.
19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074-75.
242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
Earls v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Tecumseh Public Sch. No. 92, 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir.
Earls, 242 F.3d at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
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Each student participating had to agree to the testing or she was not allowed to participate. 3°°
Procedures of the test were almost identical to the intrusiveness of
the test in Vernonia.30' Tests only detected amphetamines, marijuana,
cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines, without testing for
alcohol and nicotine.0 2 Urine was collected behind closed stall doors

(similar to Vernonia), but in groups of two or three students.33
There was no mention of what happened to students with a positive
result, as opposed to Vernonia where a second test was completed. Results were put in a confidential file separate from the students' academic
record, and would only be released to school officials who had a need to
know test results, and would not be given to the police.
The District spent little time establishing the drug problems within
their specific district, and did not demonstrate that the policy was geared
toward the core of the drug culture.3

5

Parents, on behalf of their children, brought suit claiming a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
b. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit determined that Vernonia compelled the decision
that there was state action and that those actions constituted a search.3 In
addition, Vernonia compelled the application of the special needs doctrine. ' Although the court held that it was applying Vernonia, not 19
Solid Waste Mechanics, and holding that the school had established a
special need;0 their decision rested heavily on a lack of deterrence because of the lack of a documented problem, very similar to the analysis
310

in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics.

The court examined the privacy interest of the students and the level
of intrusion on that interest."' The court concluded that the students
tested had a decreased expectation of privacy compared to other students
and adults, but departed from Vernonia by stating that the students in the
instant case did not have as low an expectation of privacy as the students

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1267.
Id.
Earls,242 F.3d at 1268.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
Id. at 1270 n.4.
Earls,242 F.3d at 1272.
Id. at 1275.
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in Vernonia."' The court rejected arguments that the students' voluntary
participation in the activities decreased their expectation of privacy and
that all the included programs required communal undress and occasional out of town trips decreasing the expectation of privacy.3" It did
state, however, that students who participated in after school
activities
4
did have a lower expectation of privacy than other students.'
Then the court looked at the governmental interest and what the
government had established concerning the factors for the application of
the special needs doctrine." 5 The court concluded that the school had not
shown a sufficient drug problem that the drug testing policy would combat.316 It reviewed the history of the testing results and concluded that a
large, epidemic drug problem did not exist in the District as shown in
Vernonia.31' In addition, the policy was not an effective deterrent because
it was both over and under broad; it tested students who did not have a
safety issue, and tested too few students within the District.3 8
Thus, the factors for the application of the special needs doctrine, a
real need and deterrence, were not satisfied." 9 Without these elements,

the expectation of privacy, no matter how slight, outweighed the interests
of the government.32 °
c. Holding
Random suspicionless urine drug testing policy, as a precursor to
participation in any competitive after school activity, was unconstitutional and constituted an unreasonable search because the special needs
doctrine did not apply.33 '
The United States Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari for
Earls but the decision had not been issued at the time this article was
written.

322

312. Id. at 1275-76.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1276.
315. Id. at 1276-77.
316. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
317. Id. at 1272-75.
318. Id. at 1277.
319. Id. at 1278.
320. Id. at 1277.
321.
Id. at 1279.
322.
Bd. of Edu. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509, 2001 WL 1046942
(2001). Oral arguments were heard on March 19, 2002. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs
Expanded Drug Testing for Students, DENVER POST, March 20, 2002, at A5.
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III. THE DEMISE OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT

A. Only Reasonable Suspicion Drug Tests Survive
The Tenth Circuit has upheld urine drug testing policies only twice
in the past, and in both of these cases, the court held that there was individualized suspicion, which allowed a warrantless search.323

1. Saaverda v. Albuquerque

324

a. Facts
Saaverda was a firefighter and emergency technician for the City of
Albuquerque.3 2 In 1991, Saaverda suffered physical and emotional
problems to an extent that he self-referred himself to the city's employee
health center.326 When he was at the center, he provided a urine sample.327

When tested, the sample was proved to be solely water. 328 A second urine
test was completed, and this one tested positive for drugs.3 29 After a pretermination hearing, he was released from employment due to the positive drug test.3 Saaverda then sought judicial review of his termination
arguing, among other challenges, that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the random suspicionless drug test.'

The City argued that it was not random, nor suspicionless, but that
they had reasonable suspicion because of earlier threats he had made,
explosive fighting in public, and the initial urine test being water. 332
b. Analysis
The court very briefly went over the special needs doctrine, and
then dismissed that justification.333 The court believed that the City did
have reasonable suspicion, and if they had reasonable suspicion, they
need not apply the special needs doctrine. 33 Independent of the special
needs doctrine, reasonable suspicion in a non-law enforcement
context
33
provided an exception from the warrant requirement.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

See discussion infra Part III.A.
73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir. 1996).
Saaverda v. Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525, 1527 (10th Cir. 1996).
Saaverda,73 F.3d at 1528.
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Id. at 1528.
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The court agreed with the City that reasonable suspicion had been
justified by Saaverda's previous actions prior to the drug
test, and the fact
336
that he gave a sample of water for his first urine test.
As a result, there was no need to apply the special needs doctrine,
and the court chose not to, merely answering the constitutionality of a
drug testing policy as it applied to Saaverda, not addressing the question
of whether random drug testing was constitutional.337
c. Holding
Suspicion based drug testing in the instant case was constitutional
because there was individualized suspicion.338
339

2. Benavidez v. Albuquerque
a. Facts

Benavidez was a field service operator for the City's Public Works
Department. 3 ° He and his supervisor drove to another employees house
in a company vehicle.TM ' He went into the house to buy drugs while his
supervisor waited in the car, drinking beer." 2 Unfortunately for
Benavidez, it was a drug bust. 3' Both he and his supervisor were detained, but not arrested. 3"
When they were released, the police notified their supervisor and
explained that they had been questioned during a drug raid and that
Benavidez stated that he was there to purchase cocaine. 3 The City then
questioned Benavidez and his supervisor at length, but no drug test was
conducted because they did not appear to be impaired by alcohol consumption.' However, 36 hours later, they were tested. 37 Benavidez
tested negative, but his supervisor tested positive. 3M
Both were terminated. 349 Both filed suit claiming, among other
things, a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.3 °
336.
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339.
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341.
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b. Analysis
The court addressed the special needs doctrine, but dismissed it as
not applicable.35 ' The court looked to whether the City had a reasonable
suspicion and an individualized suspicion. Based on the amount of
information and its reliability, having come from the police, the information the City received about their drug involvements constituted reasonable suspicion.353 There did not have to be direct observation that an employee's ability to perform their job was impaired.35
The City established reasonable suspicion, so the special needs
doctrine did not apply. 3 5 The court refused to inquire further into the
drug testing policy of the City, especially the level of suspicion needed
by administrative order, because administrative order violations would
not give rise to a § 1983 claim, which was the jurisdiction claimed by the
plaintiffs.356

c. Holding
There was reasonable suspicion to make a warrantless search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.357 There was no need to analyze
the special needs doctrine.358
B. No Suspicionless Drug Tests Have Survived Special Needs Analysis
No case concerning suspicionless drug testing policies presented to
the Tenth Circuit has survived their "special needs" analysis. Each of the
three cases outlined above that have addressed the issue has invalidated
the policy on three different grounds: lack of notice, lack of deterrence
because of notice, and lack of proof of a real problem of drug use at a
particular school district.359 In each of these cases, the court strayed its
precedent and the United States Supreme Court.
1. Lack of Notice
The Rutherford court emphasized that Rutherford had no notice of
the drug testing policy, and that increased his expectation of privacy
making the test over intrusive.36 Since that decision, both the Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit have essentially overruled Rutherford, with350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
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out expressly doing so, by holding that advance notice is fatal to the deterrence of the testing policy.3 6 ' Relying on the fact that individuals could
give a false sample, or a clean sample, if they knew when the test was
going to occur, the Tenth Circuit in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics struck
down the policy because it could not effectively deter or ferret out a drug
problem.362 The Court in Chandler invalidated a policy on similar
grounds. 3
However, Rutherford still stands as law, having not been
overruled.36 Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, notice can be fatal to a testing
policy, either because it reduces the deterrent factor or because it elevates
the intrusiveness of the test.
2. Societal Drug Problems Are Not Real
In striking down the urine drug testing policy, the Earls court found
another way to invalidate the special needs doctrine, and in doing so ignored precedent by both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. In
Earls, there was minimum notice, the students knew about the testing
policy, but not when they were going to be tested.3 65 This appears to be
just enough notice, the midline between Rutherford's lack of notice and
19 Solid Waste Mechanics too much advance notice. Consequently, it
was a good deterrent.
The Tenth Circuit revisited the first factor for application of special
needs doctrine, the establishment a real need through documented evidence.- Unfortunately for the school, the government attorneys had not
proven any significant drug problem. Inherent in the court's rationale
was that if the school could not prove it, there must not be a drug problem. If there was no drug problem, then there was no real need, and the
special needs doctrine did not apply.
Fatal to the court's reasoning, and presumably what the school was
relying on, was that in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, Rutherford, and all of
the previous Supreme Court cases, drug problems were stated to be major social problems, one that court often assumed needed to be dealt
withY7 19 Solid Waste Mechanics went almost as far as to say no proof
of drug problems was needed to satisfy the real need of the special needs
doctrine." Consequently, despite prior statements by the court that drug
problems were a major societal safety problem that needed to be con361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
489 U.S.
368.

See id
19 Solid Waste Mechanics, 156 F.3d at 1074.
Chandler,520 U.S. at 320.
See Rutherford v. Albuquerque, 77 F.3d 1258 (1996).
Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267.
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trolled, and despite Supreme Court decisions to the same, the court
wanted a way to invalidate the policy.
The Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court had already decided the
issue of notice and deterrence; the court needed another "out." The only
way the court could dissolve the policy was to eliminate the special
needs doctrine by holding that the school did not show a real need. To do
this, the court relied on the Supreme Court in Vernonia expounding on
the major problems drugs had brought to that school as evidence of a
major drug problem proved by that District.369
3. Net Effects of the Courts Analysis
It appears that the Tenth Circuit strongly opposes any relaxing of
the protections of the Fourth Amendment.370 In fact, the court has only
accepted the relaxing of the Fourth Amendment under the special needs
doctrine in two circumstances - searches of individuals in prisons with
the governmental need of running and operating a prison safely,37' and
searches of homes and persons of parolees by parole officers.372 It appears that the Tenth Circuit rarely allows suspicionless searches, relying
mainly on a minimum benchmark of individualized suspicion for the
search to be constitutionally reasonable. This is bolstered by the fact that
the only cases concerning urine drug testing to survive the Tenth Circuit
have been based on individualized suspicion and no random suspicionless drug testing has been upheld as constitutional.373
The Tenth Circuit has chosen a rights-based approach, protecting
the rights and liberties of individuals, instead of a more utilitarian approach, providing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit narrowly limits other exceptions to the warrant requirement for administrative searches.374 This shows increased
protections for individuals' liberties and rights.
In the context of urine drug searches,375 and other Fourth Amendment contexts,376 the United States Supreme Court has a more utilitarian

369. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1270-71.
370. See discussion supra Part I.A.
See Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cit. 1995) (applying "special needs doctrine"
371.
to warrantless search of visitors to prisons).
372.
See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying "special needs
doctrine" to waive warrant requirement for probation officer to search probationer's home).
373. See discussion supra Part V.
See Jennifer D. Sheehan, Limiting the Closely Regulated Business Exception to the
374.
Warrant Requirement: V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d
1482 (10th Cir. 1990), 39 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 277, 286-88 (1991) (discussing Tenth
Circuit limits on administrative searches to closely regulated industries with stringent authorizing
statutes).
See Kenneth C. Betts, Fourth Amendment - Suspicionless Urinalysis Testing: A
375.
Constitutionally "Reasonable" Weapon in the Nations War on Drugs? National Treasury Union v.
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jurisprudence, relaxing the protections offered to the individual for the
benefit of society. This is exemplified by the Supreme Court repeatedly
carving out exception after exception to the warrant requirement for the
protection and safety of the public at large.377
Since the decision of Vernonia, the circuits have split on the constitutionality of similar urine drug testing policies of students. The Seventh Circuit has held virtually all policy as constitutional, relying almost
solely on the holding in Vernonia.37 s The split in the circuits makes this a
prime time for the United States Supreme Court to try to clear up the
issue, especially the requirements for the application of the special needs
doctrine. Presumably, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari
for Earls to address this split.
Until the Supreme Court affirmatively sets the guidelines for the
applicability requirements of the special needs doctrine, and gives more
guidance for the balancing weight to be given to each factor in the special needs balancing test, the Tenth Circuit should be more consistent
with the philosophy of utilitarianism expressed by the Supreme Court. In
order to do this, the Tenth Circuit could adjust the balancing test by giving more weight during the balancing to society's needs and more weight
to protecting the people from the dangers of drug use and addiction. This
should bring the courts decisions more consistent with the expressed
philosophy of the United States Supreme Court.
Although there are factual differences in any case, and courts have
ruled that Fourth Amendment challenges should be done on a case-bycase basis,379 the Tenth Circuit should not skirt the importance of precedent. The court should lower students' expectation of privacy and lower
the expectation of privacy of individuals employed in highly regulated
industries. In recognizing the importance of the government's purpose, as
the court did in 19 Solid Waste Mechanics, and recognizing the decreased expectations of privacy, as the court did in Earls, the court
should have the same balancing results as the Supreme Court. The court
should not look to any factor possible to strike down the policies, espeVon Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1018, 1051 (1990) (discussing
United States Supreme Court's relaxing of individual protections for drug testing).
376.
See Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth
Amendment Remediesfor Black Men: ContrastingPresumptionsof Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U.
L. REv. 151, 163-65 (1994) (describing the Court's adoption of a utilitarian rationale for the
exclusionary rule instead of a rights-based or judicial integrity rationale).
377.
See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: Issues for the 1990s
and Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 118-19 (1993) (discussing various cases carving out exceptions to
the wan-ant and probable cause requirements).
378.
See Jennifer Smiley, Rethinking the "Special Needs" Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug
Testing of High School Students andNarrowing of the FourthAmendment Protections,95 Nw. U.L.
REv. 811,827 (2001).
379See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
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cially if prior decisions, either in the Tenth Circuit or the United States
Supreme Court, have eliminated or lessened the importance of that factor.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has made its stance on random
urine drug testing very clear.'s The court will capitalize on any opportunity to protect individuals from what the court considers an unreasonable
search and seizure. The court has found these policies to be unconstitutional for a wide variety of sometimes conflicting reasons - because
there was no notice, too much notice, no special need shown, no significant deterrent effect, or an over or under broad policy.38' In sum the special needs doctrine will probably not apply, and if it is applied, the balancing test will favor the individual's expectation of privacy.
The court manifests this position by expanding individuals' expectations of privacy which often ignore prior dicta and precedent from both
the Tenth Circuit's and the United States Supreme Court's opinions.1 2 In
doing so, the Tenth Circuit has all but eliminated the constitutional suspicionless search aspect of the special needs doctrine, relying only on the
individualized suspicion doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement. 38 3 The court does this in a rights-basis effort to hold individualized
suspicion as the minimum suspicion level required for a warrantless
search.
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ADJUDICATION OF UNIVERSAL FUNDING IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
INTRODUCTION

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act")' updated and
changed the prior articulated goals of the Communications Act of 1934
("1934 Act") A key provision in the 1996 Act emphasizes the necessity
for universal telecommunications service in rural, high-price, and lowpopulation areas, creating a significant impact on telecommunications in
the western states.3 In the 1996 Act, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") took responsibility for discounting and even subsidizing telecommunication companies in furtherance of this goal.'
The stated purpose of the 1996 Telecommunications Act is, "[t]o
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies."' In the 1996 Act, universal service is a key component of
the stated purpose.6

This paper will explain some of the controversies surrounding universal service, focusing on the funding provisions associated with the
1996 Act. Specifically, this paper examines how recent decisions in the
Tenth Circuit and Fifth Circuit regarding universal service funding provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act will impact future adjudication of universal service funding issues. Thus far, no other circuit has
undertaken decisions regarding universal service funding provisions for
telecommunications.
Part I provides a background by reviewing current scholarly literature on the topic of universality. Part II examines the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Qwest Corporationv. Federal Communications Commission.7
This case raises a question of sufficiency of federal funding for universal
access.8 Part III examines the Fifth Circuit's decision regarding the
model used by the FCC to determine federal funding for universal service in Alenco Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Com-
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mission.9 Part IV provides a critical analysis of the materials presented.
Finally, Part V provides conclusions and recommendations based on the
foregoing materials, and a look towards the effects that the adjudication
of these issues will have on future issues of funding for universal telecommunications service.
I.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996'0 into
law on February 8, 1996." The 1996 Act came into being as a conglomeration of amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.12 The 19963
Act both enhances and supplements the provisions of the 1934 Act.
After decades of amending the Communications Act to deal with
emerging technologies e.g., cable, the Internet, cellular communication,
digital television, etc., the FCC presented its recommendations to Congress. 4 Congress then passed the 1996 Act adopting new provisions and
solidifying amendments to the 1934 Act.'5 Thomas Krattenmaker ascribes the FCC's interest in revising the regulations concerning telecommunication to the increasingly adaptable technology that allows people to communicate with each other more easily, across longer distances,
and eliminating barriers to incorporating that technology into the telecommunications marketplace.' 6

9. Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
It. Michael I. Myerson, Ideas of the Marketplace:A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 252 (1997).
12. Myerson, supra note 11, at 252.
13.
Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. "The goal of Congress was to create a legislative change as dramatic as the evolution
of the old-fashioned telephone, carrying voices over distant wires, into telecommunications, the
transmission of 'information,' including data and video, as well as aural communications." Id.at
253. See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J.
1, 3 (1996) ("The 1996 Act is a very lengthy and very detailed bill. Formally written as a series of
amendments and additions to the Federal Communications Commission's basic charter, the
Communications Act of 1934, the committee print of the law is Ill pages long."); Glen 0.
Robinson, "The 'New'CommunicationsAct: A Second Opinion," 29 CONN. L. REV. 289, 304 (1996)
("The driving force behind the 1996 Act was to legislate the conditions that would permit more
competition into telecommunications markets. This was Congress' central ambition, and rightly
central; next to it all other parts of the Act pale in importance.").
16. See id.
Telecommunications technology is largely regarded as an advancement over smoke signal
technology because it can carry more information per second, carry it a greater distance, and provide
more security against surreptitious monitoring . . . we are witnessing a convergence of devices
accompanied by a plethora of transmission paths. The telecommunications receiver is a radio,
computer, television, telephone, VCR, and fax machine all rolled into one.
Id. Krattenmaker suggests that prior to the 1996 Act:
Confronting, and obstructing, these technological developments were (and, to some extent, still are)
a series of governmentally imposed entry barriers that sought to force the new and the old

2002]

UNIVERSAL FUNDING IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

493

The 1996 Act, in contrast to prior legislation, emphasizes the importance of competition in the telecommunications marketplace.' 7 According to Michael Myerson, Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore:
This law represents a vision of a telecommunications marketplace
where the flexibility and innovation of competition replaces the heavy
hand of regulation. It is based on the premise that technological
changes will permit a flourishing of telecommunications carriers, engaged in head-to-head competition, resulting in a multitude of communications carriers and programmers being made available to the
American consumer.18

Prior to the 1996 Act, local telephone companies held monopolies
over telephone service, but were not allowed to compete in long-distance
or in cable markets.' 9 The 1996 Act specifically aims to deregulate telecommunications, so as to increase the amount of competition in the telecommunications market, in direct contrast to prior legislation. 20 Prior to
the 1996 Act, the FCC effectively separated the various telecommunications components:
Balkanizing the industry, keeping one industry firmly secured to its
own, specified piece of the telecommunications revenue pie, was a
natural outcome of regulatory capture. Indeed, the Federal Communications Commission became a cartel-enforcement agency, one that
could reliably be called on by incumbents to formulate rules that
21
would make competitive entry economically impossible.

technologies into a Procrustean bed. These barriers attempted both to confine certain devices to
certain limited uses and to limit the transmission paths telecommunications providers might employ.
Id. See also Angela J. Campbell, "Universal Service Provisions: The "Ugly Duckling" of the 1996
Act," 29 CONN. L. REV. 187, 190 (1996).
Traditionally, universal service had been concerned with POTs because that was all that was
available. In recent years, with the wide variety of new telecommunications services becoming
available, it became clear that it was time to re-examine the definition of universal service .... The
1996 Act is significant in that it ends the debate over whether universal service needs to be redefined
by requiring the FCC to do so.
Id.
17.
See Myerson, supranote 11, at 252.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 253. For example:
[All] of these assertions were true at the end of 1995 (and some still are): Television stations cannot
operate local cable systems; but cable systems must carry television stations. On the other hand,
firms sending multiple televisions signals to the home via satellite are effectively prevented from
carrying network television stations. Telephone companies cannot offer cable television and cable
television companies cannot offer telephony although both run wires for electronic communications
in the same houses.
Krattemaker. supra note 15, at 7.
20. See Myerson, supra note 11, at 254.
21.
Thomas W. Hazlett, "Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on
Thomas G. Krattenmaker," 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 221 (1996).
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According to the FCC, the 1996 Act will, "remove the outdated barriers
that protect monopolies from competition and affirmatively promote
efficient competition ... ,22 By removing the barriers, "[p]olicy makers
believe (or profess to believe) that if the telephony, radio, and television
are to merge--or not to merge-that result should be driven by consumers making choices in open markets that express their preferences."3
The FCC hopes to implement its goal of market competition, in part,
by encouraging universal service for telecommunications patrons.24 The
1934 Act also encouraged universal service, mandating regulation of
electronic communications to make them available to all citizens of the
United States.25
Historically, the FCC has had special policies addressing these constituencies' unique telecommunications problems. At a minimum,
this language ratifies these efforts. It makes it clear for the future, that
"all the people of the United States" referenced in section 1 of the
1934 Communications Act really means all the people and that the
FCC should make special efforts to ensure that some Americans are
not underserved because of where they live or how much money they
make.26
The 1996 Act, however, expands on the universal service mandate and
includes provisions that will allow the Act to adapt to the ever-changing
technological innovations that impact modem telecommunication serv27
ices.
The FCC included seven principles in the 1996 Telecommunications Act to justify and support universal service.' The specific provi-

22. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Part II, Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,479 (Aug. 29, 1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts.
1,20,51,90).
23.
Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 7. But see The Honorable Hullihen Williams Moore,
Richard L. Cimerman, John L. Langhauser, Philip McClelland & Mark J. Mathis, "Local Exchange
Service In The Next Century-What Still Must Be Done To Bring Us Where We Want To Be?", 4
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 8 (1996) ("Effective competition is not around the corner, because there
remains a tremendous amount of work to be done, both at the municipal, state, and the federal
levels.").
24. The FCC defines universal service as, "an evolving level of telecommunications services
that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section, taking into account advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and services." 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1 ).
25.
See Myerson, supranote 11, at 266.
26.
Campbell, supra note 16, at 196,
27.
See id.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(l)-(7).
(b) Universal Service Principles.-The Joint Board and the Commission shall base policies for the
preservation and advancement of universal service on the following principles:
Quality and rates.-Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.
Access to advanced services.-Access to advanced telecommunications and information services
should be provided in all regions of the Nation.
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sions that are cogent to this discussion deal with "[a]ccess in rural and3
high cost areas, 2 9 "[e]quitable and nondiscriminatory contributions,"
and "[s]pecific and predictable support mechanisms., 3' These are the
provisions that cause great difficulty in determining the adequacy of
funding for implementing universal service.3 Professor Myerson raises
two important questions that must be considered in order to understand
the universal service requirement of the 1996 Act: (1) "what services

Access in rural and high cost areas-Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications
and information services, including interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and
information services, that are reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas and
that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in
urban areas.
Equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions.-All providers of telecommunications services
should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement
of universal service.
Specific and predictable support mechanisms.-There should be specific, predictable and sufficient
Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
Access to advanced telecommunications services for schools, health care, and libraries.Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should have
access to advanced telecommunications services as described in subsection (h).
Additional principles.-Such other principles as the Joint Board and the Commission determine are
necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity and
are consistent with this Act.
Id. See also Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 21 (discussing the definition of universal service).
Campbell provides a useful explanation of the seven key provisions:
In developing universal service policies, the Joint Board and the FCC are to implement the seven
principles articulated in section 254(b). The first three principles address the type and quality of
services that should be available to consumers. The next two concern the mechanisms that will be
used to support universal service. The sixth principle addresses the special needs of schools,
libraries, and health care providers. The final principle permits consideration of any other principles
necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Campbell, supra note 16, at 194.
29. Myerson, supra note 11, at 266.
30. Id.
Id.
31.
32. Additionally, Krattenmaker argues that the focus on universal service allows the FCC to
maintain control over entities that it claims should now be subject to the competitive conditions of
the marketplace:
The conclusion is the continuing conviction that markets for telecommunications services ought to
be governmentally managed so that they provide-and to some extent conceal-pro-social crosssubsidies. Baldly stated, nonpredatory competition is not good if it leads to higher residential
subscription rates for basic telephone services.
Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 9. Campbell notes that there are difficulties with the funding
provisions, but notes:
The Act does not offer any details as to how the support mechanism will work. The NPRM does not
either; it merely lists a number of options and asks a series of questions. Until the support
mechanisms are developed and tested, it is too early to tell whether they will work as intended.
Although the Commission may fail to develop the perfect solution, even a flawed new system will
likely be an improvement over the present system.
Campbell, supra note 16, at 197. Similarly, Robinson notes that the universal service funding
provisions in the 1996 Act sidestep economics in favor of public good policy, "The measure is no
longer the measure of network value -to telecommunications users, it is a general social welfare
measure." Robinson, supra note 15, at 325.
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must be provided?"33 ; and (2) "how universal must their provision be?"4
Myerson does not answer the questions he raises; rather, he offers them
as touchstones for policymakers to look to when beginning to implement
the provisions of the 1996 Act. 35 Krattenmaker too asks, "Whence the
money?" 36 The 1996 Act itself leaves the answer to these questions to the
broad discretion of the FCC, providing that all telecommunications companies must contribute to the implementation of universal service.
The FCC relies on both state and federal funding to support its universal service initiatives. 3 s The FCC formulated a system of contributions
by telecommunications companies and subsidies for instituting universal
service programs.39 Geography, income of consumers, and facilities (e.g.,
schools, healthcare facilities, etc.) are important factors in determining
the amount and type of subsidies provided under the 1996 Act.40 According to Dawson, "The 1996 Act expresses a fundamental commitment
to encourage competition in rural and high-cost areas so that customers
in these regions will receive the same benefits as their urban counterparts."'

33. Myerson, supra note 11, at 267.
34. Id.
35.
See id.
36. Krattenmaker, supra note 15, at 21. See also Robinson, supra note 15, at 323-24.
The value of the network to each subscriber is a function of the number of persons reached by the
network; each additional subscriber to the network thus confers benefits to the other network
subscribers; to the extent the benefit to the network as a whole--that is to the inframarginal user--is
greater than the price that the marginal user is willing to pay to subscribe there is an externality. In
such a case it is efficient to charge the inframarginal subscriber for some part of the costs of
adding the marginal subscriber to the network.
Id.
37. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(4).
38.
See Emily Dawson, Universal Service High-Cost Subsidy Reform: Hindering CableTelephony and Other Technological Advancements in Rural and Insular Regions, 53 FED. COMM.
L.J. 117, 120 (2000).
The universal service program functions as a cooperative effort between the individual states and the
federal government. The individual states may independently develop separate universal service
programs as long as the provisions do not conflict with the FCC's general rules governing subsidy
allocation and find support in "specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms ... that do not rely
on or burden federal universal service support mechanisms."
Id.
39. See id.
40. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 202-03.
The fact that low income and rural consumers are specifically mentioned in the Act gives further
impetus to the FCC and states to make sure that people who might otherwise be left behind are
included. In effect, the Act gives the federal and state regulatory commissions a mandate to ensure
that the disparities between the haves and have-nots are not increased. The special attention paid to
schools, libraries and health care providers also promises real benefits for society. Schools are
training the next generation of American citizens and workers. Libraries are the traditional source of
information in communities. Since schools and libraries are open to everyone, they are good places
to begin to tackle the problem of the haves and have-nots.
Id.
41.
Dawson, supra note 38, at 120.
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Subsidies for telecommunications companies come in a variety of
forms. One example is the cost-shifting mechanism that shifts a portion
of the cost of service for high-cost areas to consumers in low-cost areas. 2
Additionally, the FCC uses forward-looking formulas to calculate the
amount of federal support to grant to each company for its universal
service activity:
The new model will enable the FCC to design more efficient networks based upon the geographic location of customers and necessary
upgrades in infrastructure. Using this model, the FCC can input cost
variables, such as network components, into the system to estimate
the forward-looking costs of providing telecommunications services
to these high-cost areas. From these data, the FCC will determine in
which geographic regions carriers will be eligible to receive subsidies.43

Unfortunately, the FCC's subsidy calculations have met with criticism from scholars." One of the arguments raised is that uncertainty in
the calculations may not provide an accurate determination of the amount
of support necessary to provide universal service.4 ' The uncertainty
comes from the manner in which the FCC determines whether a carrier is
eligible for the subsidies based solely on statewide calculations:

42. •See id. "[Slubsidies support the programs, shifting some of the costs associated with
providing service in high-cost areas to customers in lower-cost regions." See also Markenzy
Lapointe, Universal Service and the Digital Revolution: Beyond the Telecommunications Act of
1996,25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 74 (1999) ("[U]niversal service has been supported
through a system of subsidization, which shifted costs from one group of high-cost customers to a
low-cost group.").
43.
Dawson, supra note 38, at 122. Earlier the author explains why rural and insular areas
have higher telecommunications costs, "[rlegions that have fewer customers over which to spread
fixed costs, and other factors such as less technologically advanced networks and rugged terrain,
have inherently higher service costs. The universal service program provides subsidies to high-cost
regions to ensure affordable telecommunications services to citizens in these areas." Id. at 118.
44. See id. See also Krattenmaker, supranote 15, at 21-22.
Universal service is now an explicitly articulated goal of telecommunications regulation. It is to be
achieved by levying a proportionate tax on all telecommunications service providers, which should
make more visible both the nature and amounts of the cross-subsidies encompassed within the
universal service program .... Exactly what services will be encompassed within the concept of
universal service remains quite unclear, however, because no specific or fixed meaning may be
ascribed to the list of items that make up "universal service"; it is an "evolving level" of services to
be established "periodically" by the FCC, not just a basic dial tone.
Id.
45.
See Dawson, supra note 38 at 122. See also Robinson, supra note 15, at 324.
A more basic problem is determining where the benefit-cost ratio that justifies the subsidy ends.
Though conventional economic theory says that the inframarginal subscriber gains from extending
the network, no one with any economic sense at all would say that the net gain extends all the way to
100% participation. Although no one has found a means of calculating the cross-over point between
benefits to the inframarginal user and the cost of adding marginal users, that point occurs well short
of 100%.
Id.
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Therefore, a carrier can only receive high-cost subsidies for services
rendered in a particular state if the "carrier's average cost of providing service in [that] state exceeds 135% of [the] national average per
line." The problem is that calculating the cost of phone service in rural and high-cost areas is notoriously difficult, and the FCC has even
acknowledged this potential uncertainty in the system. 46

The following cases and analysis will examine these problems in further
detail, and illuminate some of the issues that still remain to be resolved.
47

II. QWEST CORPORATION V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Qwest, along with other telecommunications companies,4' brought
suit to challenge the FCC's funding for universal service provisions, including "local telephone service and access to emergency, directoryassistance, and long distance services. 49 As discussed above, costs of
providing universal service in a rural area are much higher than those for
providing the same service in an urban center. 5° To offset these costs
"states and the federal government have established policies that support
access to basic services in high cost areas." 5' The 1996 Act requires:
(d) Telecommunications Carrier Contribution-Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services
shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the
specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the
Commission to preserve and advance universal service ... (f) State
Authority-A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the
Commission's rules to preserve and advance universal service. Every
telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equal and nondiscriminatory ba-

46. Dawson, supra note 38, at 122.
47. 258 F.3d 1191 (2001).
48.
Other parties to the litigation are: AT&T Corp., Rural Telephone Coalition, Vermont
Department of Public Service, State of California and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California, The Maine Public Utilities Commission, Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc.,
WorldCom, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., Bell Atlantic-New
Jersey, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc., Bell Atlantic-Washington,
D.C., Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., New York Telephone Company, New England Telephone
and Telegraph Company, The Wyoming Public Service Commission, and GTE Service Corporation.
Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1191.
49. See id. at 1195.
50. See id. See also Alenco, 201 F.3d at 617.
Rural LEC's face special obstacles. The cost of providing telephone service varies with population
density, because dispersed populations require longer wires and permit lesser economies in
installation, service, and maintenance. Also relevant are geographic characteristics, for climate and
certain types of terrain make service calls and repairs more costly. Rural areas where telephone
customers are dispersed and terrain is unaccommodating are therefore the most expensive to serve.
Id.
51. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1195.
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sis, in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and advancement of universal service in that State. 2
Qwest did not challenge the theory behind universal service." Rather, it
questioned two of the universality principles in the 1996 Telecommunications Act that state:
(3) Access in rural and high cost areas--Consumers in all regions of
the Nation, including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas should have access to telecommunications
and information services, that are reasonably comparable to those
provided in urban areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas . . . (5) Specific and predictable support mechanisms-There

should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State
14
mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
The FCC attempted to implement these provisions in a series of FCC
Orders. 5 The Orders promulgated the methods the FCC will use to implement its policy directives. This case is a direct challenge to the
FCC's Ninth and Tenth Orders.57
Before implementing the principles contained in the 1996 Act, the
FCC generated several orders and finally decided to follow the guidelines for funding contained in its Ninth Order." The Tenth Circuit explained the funding mechanisms as follows:
To determine the amount of money that a state may receive, the FCC
employs a two-part method. First, using its cost model, it set a
benchmark at 135% of the national average cost per line. Second, it
computes the average cost per line within a given state. If the statewide average cost exceeds the benchmark, then the FCC provides
funding for costs in excess of the benchmark.59
In its Tenth Order, the FCC figured out which "input values" it
would use in the model and "anticipate[d] updating the model as technology and other conditions change." 6 The Tenth Circuit consolidated
the claims of Qwest and the other telecommunications companies. 6' The
consolidated claims can be summarized in three basic arguments: (1) the

52. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(3)(d)-(f); See also Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1199.
53. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191 (2001).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 254(2)(b)(3)-(5).
55. See Ninth Report & Order and Eighteenth Order on Reconsideration P 1, FCC 99-306,
CC Docket No. 96-45 (Nov. 2, 1999). See also Tenth Report and Order, FCC 99-304, CC Docket
Nos. 96-45, 97-160 (Nov. 2, 1999).
56. See id.
57. See Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1196.
58. See id. at 1197.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1198.
61.
See id.
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FCC should not rely on the states to fund its universal service
provisions; 62 (2) the FCC failed to appropriately and explicitly define the
reasoning behind the adoption of the 135% benchmark, thereby making
their calculations arbitrary and capricious; 63 (3) the funding mechanisms
proposed by the FCC are inadequate to support the FCC's universal
service vision. 6 These arguments in the consolidated claim deal specifically with the FCC's Ninth Order. Additionally, Qwest's final argument
was that the funding model proposed in the FCC's Tenth order violates
the Administrative Procedure Act.65 Each of the arguments put forth by
the telecommunications companies in the consolidated claim, and the
Tenth Circuit's response to these arguments, will be examined in detail
in the following sections.
A. States' Responsibilityfor the Funding of Universal Service Provisions
According to the record, "The FCC acknowledges that the Ninth
Order will result in reasonably comparable rates only if the states implement their own universal-service policies." 6 The Tenth Circuit partially
based its decision, to reverse and remand this portion of the case for further proceedings, on the FCC's recognition of the necessity of state
funding for universal service, and its failure to provide any inducements
for the states to implement their own universal service policies, in compliance with the requirements of the 1996 Act.67
The Tenth Circuit did not fail to recognize that Congress intended to
encourage a partnership between the states and the federal government in
order to promote universal service across the United States. 6' Nor did it
fail to recognize the FCC's necessary dependence on state support.69 In
reaching its decision, therefore, the Tenth Circuit rejected Qwest's argument that "the FCC must alone support the full costs of universal service., 70 However, the Court did not let the FCC off the hook, stating that,
"the FCC may not simply assume that the states will act on their own to
preserve and advance universal service. It remains obligated to create
62. See id.
63. See Qwest, 259 F.3d at 1198.
64. See id.
65.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2001). See also Qwest, 258 F.3d at
1205.
66.
Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202-03.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1203.
A State may adopt regulations to provide for additional definitions and standards to preserve and
advance universal service within that State only to the extent that such regulations adopt additional
specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not
rely on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.
47 U.S.C. §254 (c)(3)(d). See also Ninth Order, supra note 55, at P 56.
69. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202-03.
70. Id. at 1203-04.
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. for the states to assist in

implementing the goals of universal service.
B. FCC'sFailure to Define Key Terms andJustify 135% Benchmark
1. Defining "Reasonably Comparable" and "Sufficient"
Several of the terms used by the FCC in its discussion of its universal service provisions were at issue in this part of the court's opinion.
First, the FCC provides a definition of "reasonably comparable" as, "a
fair range of urban/rural rates both within a state's borders, and among
states nationwide.,1 2 The Tenth Circuit found that this definition is too
ambiguous to be useful to states attempting to implement universal service, even after further explanation by the FCC.73 The court rejected the
additional definitions as imprecise standards that are no more useful than
the original definition.4
The second term that the FCC inadequately defined is "sufficient."
The Tenth Circuit declared that the FCC asserted that the federal support
would be sufficient.75 The FCC's statement was a conclusion, not explanatory, and it was "inadequate to enable appellate review of the sufficiency of the federal mechanism and, if accepted, would
provide only a
76
circular argument in support of the FCC's position.
Once again, in their review of the ambiguous terms, the Tenth Circuit gave the FCC the benefit of the doubt by attempting to figure out if
the definitions were "reasonable constructions of the statute. 77 If the
71.
Id. at 1204.
72.
Ninth Order, supra note 55, at P 54.
73. Qwest, 259 F.3d at 1201. The court examines the FCC's definition in the best light
possible, examining several other definitions for reasonably comparable, before coming to its
decision:
At least twice, the FCC has provided what purport[s] to be further definitions of "reasonably
comparable":
(1) "Support levels must be sufficient to prevent pressure from high costs and the development of
competition from causing unreasonable increases in rates above current, affordable levels."
(2) "Some reasonable level above the national average forward-looking cost per line." [internal cites
omitted.]
Id.
74. See id.
75. Ninth Order, supra note 55, P 56.
76. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202.
77.
Id. See also Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If, the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.... If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute ....
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

definitions had fallen within a reasonable construction the ambiguity
would be admissible; however, the Tenth Circuit found that "deference
[to the FCC] is inappropriate" because the definitions are "[w]ithout a
'limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act."'"8 The court
remanded the case, requiring the FCC to more precisely define "reasonably comparable" and "sufficient" in a way that is "reasonably related to
the statutory principles. 79
2. Justifying the 135% Benchmark
In examining whether the FCC sufficiently justified its 135%
benchmark as a method of attaining reasonable comparability and sufficient funding for universal service, the court examined the FCC's justifications for choosing that benchmark, and other documents submitted by
related parties.8 0 Similar to the court's discussion of the definitions, the
Tenth Circuit, in its discussion of the 135% benchmark, tried to give
deference to the FCC's expertise as an administrative agency stating,
"[i]f, however, the FCC's 135% benchmark actually produced urban and
rural rates that were reasonably comparable, however those terms are
defined, we would likely uphold the mechanism.",8' The FCC attempted
to justify its benchmark by discussing the range of percentages from
which it had chosen, and that it had chosen the midpoint between appropriate guidelines. 2
The Tenth Circuit recognized that any determination by the FCC of
a benchmark is likely to be at least partially arbitrary, but strongly denounced the FCC for failing to uphold its duty as an expert agency:
We find these justifications insufficient to support the benchmark.
The FCC is not a mediator whose job is to pick the "midpoint" of a
range or to come to a "reasonable compromise" among competing
positions. As an expert agency, its job is to make rational and informed decisions on the record before it in order to achieve the prin-

78. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202 (internal cites omitted). "[T]he [1996] Act requires the FCC to
apply some limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
79. Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202.
80. See id. at 1202.
81.
Id. The court reached this argument after determining that instead of actually coming up
with a comparison of rural and urban rates, the FCC substituted a comparison of nationwide and
statewide averages, even though such empirical data had been presented to it by concerned parties.
Id.
82. See id.
The FCC gave four justifications for setting the benchmark at 135%: (1) It "falls within the range
recommended by the Joint Board," 115%-150%; (2) such a level is "consistent with the precedent of
the existing support mechanism," which uses a range of 115-160%; (3) that level is "near the
midpoint" of the current range; and (4) it is 'reasonable compromise of commenters' proposals.
See also Ninth Order, supra note 55, at P 55.
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ciples set by Congress. Merely identifying some range and then
picking a compromise figure is not rational decision-making.83
The court's decision to remand the case for more precise definition,
and a better explanation of the benchmark, had ramifications on the rest
of the case.4

C. Sufficiency of Fundingfor UniversalService
Because the Tenth Circuit determined that the FCC failed to adequately define "reasonably comparable" and "sufficient," and that the
FCC did not adequately explain its benchmark, the court concluded that
it was unable to "review the rationality of the Ninth Order., 85 The court
also stated that, "[b]ecause we remand for further consideration, we need
of
not address at this stage Petitioners' contention that the actual 8 level
6
funding is too low to be 'sufficient' to support universal service.
D. Challengesto the Tenth Order
Qwest's main challenge to the Tenth Order focused on the FCC's
choice of computer language used in the computation of cost models.87

Qwest also challenged several of the subroutines chosen for use by the
FCC.88 Subroutines are a sequence of programming instructions used
internally by the computer to perform specific tasks - in this case generating cost models. The Tenth Circuit deferred to the FCC's expertise on
the technical aspects of computer programming stating, "[aibsent the
most unusual circumstances, the FCC is far better situated than is this
court to decide basic technical specifications. .

.

. While Qwest takes

issue with the choice of Turbo Pascal, it has not convinced us that this
choice was so manifestly unreasonable as to be unlawful. 89 Ultimately,
in order to find in Qwest's favor on this point, Qwest would have to produce evidence that "the model overall produces such inaccurate results
that it cannot form the basis of rational decision-making." 9 The telecommunications corporations use the computer programs at issue to determine rates and calculate costs of providing universal service in rural
and high cost areas. 9'

The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case revolved around balancing
the FCC's expertise with the arbitrary nature of administrative decisionmaking. In a well-drawn opinion, the court gave appropriate deference to

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1202.
See id at 1204.
Id. at 1205.
Id.
Id.
Tenth Order, supra note 55, at P 17.
Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1206.
Id.
See id.
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the agency's expertise, while still requiring the FCC's decisions to fall
within the rational reasoning test.92 In the final result, the court reversed
and remanded the Ninth Order for further proceedings, and affirmed the
Tenth Order. 93 Thus, issues of sufficiency of funding remain open at this
point. In Alenco v. FCC,94 the Fifth Circuit also examined the issue of
sufficiency. 95

III. ALENCO COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Similar to the challenges raised in Qwest, the Petitioners in Alenco
challenged the definition and explanation of "sufficient." 97 However,
these Petitioners, local telephone service providers, challenged the sufficiency requirement on different grounds. 98 Petitioners claim that the FCC
orders 99 are, "inconsistent with the statutory requirements of the [1996]
Act; arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act; violative of the Takings Clause; and in noncompliance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act."'' °
The FCC's universal service provisions require funding,' °' therefore:
[t]o meet its historic mandate of universal service, the FCC has established a universal service fund to subsidize high-cost rural LEC's
to reduce the rates they must charge to their customers. A LEC is eligible for a subsidy if its operating expenses-its 'loop costs'-are
fifteen percent or more above the national average.02
The administration of this universal service fund was at issue in this
case, especially changes in the administrative procedures that limit subsidies and make funding portable, as well as the use of inflation indices
instead of industry averages to adjust the benchmark.' 3 Generally the
92. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 259 F.3d 1191 (2001).
93. See id. at 1207.
94. 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
95. See Alenco Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
96. 201 F.3d 608 (2000).
97. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 614.
98. See id.
99. Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-45, 12 F.C.C. Rcd 8776 (1997). Report and Order
in CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 95-72, 13 FCC Rcd 5318 (1997).
Id. (internal cites omitted).
100.
47 U.S.C. §254 (c)(3)(d)-(e).
101.
102. Alenco, 201 F.3d at 617.
See id. Petitioners' argue that:
103.
First, they oppose the continued imposition of a cap on growth in fund expenditures, which cap
limits total available support to the previous year's level, adjusted for growth in the number of
working loops. Second, they object to a new cap on the amount of corporate operations expenses that
Third, the Order makes the subsidy portable,
can be included in the loop cost calculation ....
following the customer who switches service from one LEC to another. Petitioners claim that
portability violates the principle of predictable funding. Fourth, beginning January 1, 2000, the
Order imposes an annual inflation index on the loop cost eligibility benchmark . . . replacing the
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Petitioners' arguments against implementation of these standards and the
benchmark fall into two categories: (1) a challenge to the FCC's expertise on the subject; and (2) the failure of the FCC Order to provide sufficient funding under the provisions of the 1996 Act.'°4 Each of these
challenges is examined separately below.
A. Expertise of the FCC
In order to determine whether an expert agency's methodology falls
within its areas of expertise and discretion, the courts must decide
whether Congress made intentional precise statements on the question at
issue.'0 5 If Congress did not, then the court may only reverse the agency's
decision if the construction falls outside of a "permissible construction"
of the statute, or if it is "arbitrary and capricious. ' 0 Under a final standard of review, the court must decide if the agency's decision was reasonable and if there is a "rational relationship between the facts found
and the choice made."' '° If the decision is within these specific confines,
then the court must defer to the agency's expert opinion on the matter
presented. "
According to the Fifth Circuit, "[w]e note that Congress obviously
intended to rely primarily on FCC discretion, and not vigorous judicial
review, to ensure satisfaction of the Act's dual mandates. ' 9 In an earlier
decision, the court explained its position on universal service regulation
further:
To be sure, the FCC's reason for adopting this methodology is not
just to preserve universal service. Rather, it is also trying to encourage local competition by setting the cost models at the "most efficient" level so that carriers will have the incentive to improve operations. As long as it can reasonably argue that the methodology will
former approach of recalculating a fresh benchmark periodically, based on updated estimates of
industry averages. Finally,the Order disallows additional service support when a rural LEC acquires
and upgrades another exchange, despite petitioners' claim that such mergers are efficient and should
be encouraged.
Id. (italics in original; internal cites omitted).
104. See id. at 620.
105. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
106. Alenco, 201 F.3d at 620.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
Universal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall
establish periodically under this section, taking into account advances in telecommunications and
information technologies and services. The Joint Board in recommending, and the Commission in
establishing, the definition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service support
mechanisms shall consider the extent to which such telecommunications servicesare essential to education, public health, or public safety; have, through the operation of market
choices by customers, been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers;
are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers; and
are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1).
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provide sufficient support for universal service, however, it is free,
under the deference we afford it under Chevron step-two, to adopt a
methodology that serves its other goal of encouraging local competition.1"0
The Chevron test requires that when a court reviews the construction of
an agency action it must first determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken" on the issue,
[i]f, however the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute ....Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.""
The court found that the petitioners failed to meet the "high evidentiary standard" necessary to show that the FCC's methodology was "arbitrary and capricious.""' 2
B. Petitioners Challenge to Sufficiency
The Fifth Circuit also examined the Petitioners' challenge to sufficiency and concluded that the Petitioners were mistaken in their interpretation of the sufficiency requirements because they failed to recognize
that universal service and local competition are dual goals, not mutually
exclusive of one another."3 Petitioners' arguments focused on the sufficiency of funding for companies providing universal service. However,
the court first examined the provisions of the Act itself, stating:
The Act only promises universal service, and that is a goal that requires sufficient funding of customers, not providers. So long as there
is sufficient and competitively neutral funding to enable all customers
to receive basic telecommunications services, the FCC has satisfied
the Act and is not further required to 4ensure sufficient funding of
every local telephone provider as well."
The court then began its analysis of the Petitioners' argument regarding the specific funding provisions."' The Fifth Circuit concluded

110.
111.

Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 410 (5th Cir. 1999).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

112.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

113. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 620. "The Act does not guarantee all local telephone service
providers a sufficient return on investment; quite the contrary, it is intended to introduce competition
into the market. Competition necessarily brings the risk that some telephone service providers will
be unable to compete." Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
[E]xcessive funding may itself violate the sufficiency requirements of the Act. Because universal
service is funded by a general pool subsidized by all telecommunications providers-and thus
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that funding caps have been established by the FCC to promote efficiency and to "combat wasteful spending," and as such are not violative
of the agency's discretion." 6 The Court stated, "The proposed 115% rule
is thus a wholly reasonable exercise of the Commission's legitimate
power to combat abusive spending; absent the proposed rule, the regulations provide no incentive to keep costs down.""'
Petitioners argued that portability of funding, allowing the subsidies
to move with the customer when they changed telecommunications providers, violated the "statutory principle of predictability.""' ' 8 The Court
rejected this argument because predictability is only a principle in the
Act, not a specific statutory command. Thus it is. within the FCC's expert
discretion to "ignore" predictability in implementing the 1996 Act's universal service and sufficiency provisions. "9 Additionally, the Court recognized that sufficiency of funding can be attained regardless of which
carrier is serving the customer's needs, thus the Petitioners were not
asking for predictability of funding, but trying to exempt themselves
from market competition-the second prong of the Act's goals.'20
The court rejected the Petitioners' final two arguments-regarding
changing the calculation of the benchmark by using the inflation and
failure to continue funding for telecommunications companies that
merge-because both of these areas are within the FCC's discretion as
measures instituted to assist in the transition from one funding model to
another.' 2' The Fifth Circuit rejected the petition for review, as a whole,
because:
...

[the petitioners] fundamentally misunderstand a primary purpose

of the Communications Act-to herald and realize a new era of competition in the market for local telephone service while continuing to
pursue the goal of universal service. They therefore confuse the requirement of sufficient support for universal service within a market
in which telephone service providers compete for customers ... with

a guarantee of economic success
for all providers, a guarantee that
2
conflicts with competition.

indirectly by the customers--excess subsidization in some cases may detract from universal service
by causing rates unnecessarily to rise, thereby pricing some consumers out of the market.
Id.
116. Alenco, 201 F.3d at 620.
117.
Order, supra note 100, PP 283-85, 307.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(5).
119.
Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 411-12.
120.
See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 622. "The methodology governing subsidy disbursements is
plainly stated and made available to LEC's. What petitioners seek is not merely predictable funding
mechanisms, but predictable market outcomes. Indeed, what they wish is protection from
competition, the very antithesis of the Act." Id.
121.
See id. at 622.
122. Id. at 625.
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In sum, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Petitioners' claims because all
of the FCC Orders they challenged fell squarely within the discretion of
the FCC as an administrative agency.
IV. CRITICAL EVALUATION

Since 1996, the universal service funding mechanisms contained in
the Telecommunications Act,13 and a variety of FCC orders subsequent
to the 1996 Act, have been subject to a variety of criticisms.' Most of
the criticisms can be categorized as either dealing with the adequacy of
funding, or mechanisms for establishing who gets funding, how much
funding they receive, and how funding will be distributed.'2
Thus far it seems as if the courts have been consistent in their rulings, and rightly so. It is true that the 1996 Act advocates the opening of
local telephony markets to competition. 26 However, the 1996 Act does
not leave telecommunications completely deregulated.2 2 To do so would
leave a vacuum and cause confusion for both the consumers and the telecommunications corporations because no one would have control over
the implementation of the universal service provision of the 1996 Act.
The FCC, in the 1996 Act, recognized and responded to 60 years of
technological innovation, and provided a mechanism for continuing to
monitor and respond to emerging technologies in the telecommunications
field. 28 Congress granted universal service an elevated position in the
1996 Act, and by doing so, made great strides to act in the public interest, convenience, and necessity, especially for those in rural, high-cost
areas. 129
The funding provisions contained in the 1996 Act are not legislative
perfection. However, both the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit examined sufficiency requirements, and recognized that the court is not the
appropriate body to determine funding provisions for an administrative
agency's regulation.' 3 The FCC holds an interesting position in the universal service funding debate, in that, the FCC proposed the regulation,
wrote the funding provisions, and yet advocates at least partial deregulation of the telecommunications industry. 3' If that seems conflicting, it is.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
124. See Myerson, supra note 11. See also Krattenmaker, supra note 15; and Campbell, supra
note 16.
125. See Dawson, supra note 38. See also Lapointe, supra note 42; Robinson, supra note 15;
and Myerson, supra note 11.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 254.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See 47 U.S.C. § 254.
130. See Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191 (2001); Alenco Communications, Inc, v. FCC,
201 F.3d 620 (2000).
131. 47 U.S.C. §254. The 1996 Telecommunications Act was the product of FCC proposals,
"An Act ...to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher
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Thus, not only was it prudent of the courts to defer to the FCC's expertise in this area, it was absolutely necessary.
This is not to say that the FCC deserves, or that the courts provided
absolute discretion in the application of its provisions. The Tenth Circuit
left open the issue of whether the funding mechanisms provided sufficient funding for the promulgation of universal service across the United
States for two reasons: (1) the FCC failed to adequately define its terms;
and (2) it failed to justify its choice of benchmark values.'32 The court
gave the FCC the opportunity to use its expertise to redefine its terms
before the court stepped in and usurped the FCC's authority. 3 3 This decision was appropriate because it gave all parties involved the opportunity
to continue discussing these issues. Since universal service is an evolving
concept, it would be impractical for the courts to close the revolving door
to the courthouse, foreclosing the opportunity for parties to obtain judicial review of these issues.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Alenco, "34 completely sidestepped the
issue of whether funding for universal service provisions was adequate"3
by placing the burden on the FCC as an expert agency and deferring to
its expertise. 36 The choice of benchmarks and calculation of who gets
what funding, was justified based on the FCC's discretion, and the court
chose not to interfere with the discretionary function of an administrative
agency.37 Sidestepping of the issue, however, does not constitute a flaw
in judicial reasoning. The court essentially acknowledged its own limitations in making decisions regarding funding. " 8 The court's function is
only to oversee the agency to ensure that it does not exceed the authority
granted to it by Congress. 39 It is not the court's job to interfere with the
inner workings of the FCC or to make factual determinations that will
influence the agency's ability to perform its duties.' °
The sidestepping by the court of key issues in determining sufficiency appropriately leaves the determination of discretionary issues in
the hands of the FCC, while retaining the court's ability to resolve these

quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment
of new telecommunications technologies." Subsequent clarifications and explanations came in the
form of FCC orders dealing with administrative details, in this case universal service funding
provisions. See also Order, supra note 99, PP 283-85, 307; and Report and Order in CC Docket No.
9645, 12 FCC Rcd 8776 (1997). Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 9645, 96-262, 94-1,91-213,
95-72, 13 FCC Rcd 5318 (1997).
132. See Qwest, 258 F.3d at 1201-02.
133. See id. at 1202.
134. 201 F.3d 620 (2000).
135. See Alenco, 201 F.3d at 619-20.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 620-24.
138. See id
139. See i&L
140. See id.
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issues judicially issues if the FCC fails to do so, or oversteps its discretionary boundaries.
V. WHAT COMES NEXT? UNRAISED AND UNRESOLVED FUNDING
ISSUES

One issue that was not raised in either Qwest or Alenco is how technological innovations will effect the universal service provisions. One
commentator believes that the new subsidy system, based on geographic
location, will create a gap in universal service in direct opposition to
what the 1996 Act intended:
Technological advancements in the telecommunications industry
continually challenge universal service and efforts to ensure that all
Americans have access to comparable services at competitive prices.
Implementing new technology generally reduces costs and provides
higher-quality service for customers because updates make systems
more efficient; consequently, carriers may pass these savings on to
consumers. Technological advances executed in low-cost areas further polarize consumers' telecommunications access, as urban areas
receive improved service at lower rates. Meanwhile, service in rural
and insular areas deteriorates, creating a situation where the rich get
richer, and the poor get poorer.141
The next challenge to the funding provisions for universal service
will likely examine the equitable distribution of funds. Rather than simply looking at the sufficiency of funds, the courts will next have to look
at the manner of distribution. Questions remain as to whether the FCC's
funding criteria adequately assign the monies collected from LECs, and
whether federal funding will reach the areas most in need of universal
service subsidies. This is not a static examination. As new technology
emerges, the FCC, or the courts if the FCC fails in its duty to do so, must
re-evaluate universal service funding and distribution mechanisms to
confirm that the goals of "reasonably comparable service" at "reasonably
comparable rates" in "rural,4 2insular, and high cost areas" are being attained, or at least attempted.
In sum, the 1996 Telecommunications Act showcases the FCC's
commitment to and Congressional support of universal service. 43 It is the
first legislation in the history of telecommunications to definitively express this commitment and as such is a step in the right direction. The
FCC has embarked on a journey into uncharted territory with this portion
of the 1996 Act, therefore it is under enormous pressure to make sure
that all of the provisions work as expected. Invariably, there will be litigation regarding the implementation of these regulations. Therefore it is

141.
142.
143.

Dawson, supra note 38, at 123.
47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3).
See id.

2002]

UNIVERSAL FUNDING IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

511

important for all parties involved i.e., litigators, telecommunications
companies, the FCC, and consumers, to remember the spirit of the regulation, and to be vigilant in its administration and adjudication.
It is also important to recognize that conflict between competitors is
a necessary component of integrating this legislation into the telecommunications environment. However, this conflict should be channeled
into appropriate arenas, so as to further the goals of the 1996 Act. First,
limitations on universal service must be recognized. It would be confusing and unrealistic to believe that in a market economy 100% of citizens
will ever have universal service. Thus, the FCC, taking into account the
research and recommendations of consumer groups, public interest
groups, and telecommunications companies, should promulgate realistic
goals. These goals should specifically target groups and facilities that
have been neglected in the past, while recognizing that doing so will
encumber established telecommunications companies. Secondly, the
FCC should take heed of the courts' recommendations, in these cases,
and provide inducements to the states and incumbent telecommunications companies for promoting universal service in their respective areas.
Finally, the courts should continue examining each case and promote
universal service by deferring as much as possible to the FCC's discretion.
CONCLUSION

The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the door for scholars,
attorneys, telecommunications companies, and consumers to grapple
with the conflicts arising from the emergence of new technology.'44 The
cases and articles discussed throughout this paper are the keys to understanding and implementing the universal service funding provisions
contained in the 1996 Act.' 45 Whether the goal of universal service will
ever be achieved remains to be seen. However, the 1996 Act elevated the
status of universal service to a level where it can no longer be ignored.
Jennifer Hargroves

144.
145.

47 U.S.C. § 254.
See id.
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